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WASTE / A PHILOSOPHY OF THINGS

William Viney

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A Philosophy of Things

William Viney

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To Ilaria

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1

Introduction

Objects called 'waste' can have a peculiarly telescopic effect on our imaginations. They are things that seem to disclose ways of living, permit certain ways of seeing and give access to wider actions, collectives and environments. Although this might suggest an intrinsic ethical value to waste, this book takes a rather different approach to the resonant possibilities of discarded things. It looks to philosophical ideas and our entangled experiences of things, time and stories, which need to be traversed in order for a discarded object to be called 'waste'. I also want to suggest a way of considering things that recognizes how philosophical ideas can be formed in relation to how matter acts, a philosophy that focuses on material in a more reciprocal manner, rather than in a way that assumes an order given through the exclusive dominion of the thinking subject. In doing so, *Waste* aims at doing philosophy in strange ways in order to better understand how material things have us looking sideways, at our material relations, at our ecologies and at ourselves.

Giving room to a philosophy *of* things, and therefore to studying thought as it emerges from life in a material world, is important because waste things tend to be seen as inert until they come to human consciousness. The conventional way of thinking about the creation of waste, rubbish, trash, garbage, or whichever words we like to employ to denote things without use, is that the concept like the thing is *created*, produced through the order or disorder we construe, manufacture or identify in the world. It is symptomatic of this constructivist approach that many scholars interested in the subject of waste are guided by the work of Mary Douglas and her book *Purity and Danger*. In her book, Douglas argues that concepts of dirt and the dirty are intimately linked to how we think with and act in space. Dirt, she argues, is 'matter out of place' and our attempts to be neat and clean do not relate so much to the things themselves but how we arrange, separate and order our psychophysical environments.[1] The status of waste is relative. Just as faeces is considered dirty when it is on our kitchen tables

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but less so when it is in our bodies, so Douglas argues that our classification of dirt lies not with *what* objects are but *where* those objects are. 'Dirt', writes Douglas, 'is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements'.[2] This intuition has led to a large body of work that has defined discarded things in similar terms, according to notions of disorder, abjection and disgust, according to our capacity to distribute things in space.[3] In these writings the construction of ethics coincides with the plasticity of space; 'refuse' and acts of 'refusal' entwine. Aided by Douglas's definition, many scholars interested in waste and the study of waste in the humanities and social sciences are now preoccupied with mobile, mostly urban, often bodily wastes, and the problem of their disposal. However, this insistence on spaces of waste can confuse and obscure the crucial influence that time has in our experience of and dealings with waste things. Waste is also (and in both senses of the phrase) matter out of time.

If I discard something it is not simply because I feel compelled to organize my environment into hygienic allotments of clean space – I can think of many for whom this is neither practical nor desirable – but because I encounter the time of things; objects that arise from the time felt in and with matter. Waste is also matter for whom time has run out or has become precluded. But what is at stake when we bring time into an analysis of waste? First, we are forced to pay closer attention to the ways in which experiences of waste are described and reproduced, meaning that we must also be sceptical about the veracity of those descriptions and the plurality of opinions they express. Second, a focus on the temporalities of use and waste might serve to contravene the constructivist position that assumes that humans always make or create waste. Instead, this book will also give air to some of the complex temporal relations between human and non-human things, reflecting on their contingency and flux, their intractability and effervescence, with the aim to provide an adequate vocabulary for describing all the ways in which waste can be experienced.

In the work that follows, I will sometimes speak in quite abstract terms about 'things' and 'objects' and 'stuff'. When I do, I aim to refer to all the things, large and small, grounded or airborne, which surround us in the world. These things do not hang about; we imbue and are imbued by the time we make through our temporary associations with these things, this paraphernalia. Whenever we think about, encounter or create waste we must consider the time that has come and gone, and the ways in which things make, take and use time in the tasks we pursue with their help and hindrance. Our perception of and interaction with objects not only imply this material sense of temporality but objects we

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call 'waste' have peculiar powers to make that temporality an explicit part of what they are and how we judge them. Our decisions and the decisions of others are frequently rooted in the temporalizing effects of waste, into the ends and beginnings that things of waste make exigent. Discarded objects are sometimes said to have 'had their time' or might be disposed of because they have 'seen better days'. Similarly, one might be asked if certain objects 'are finished' or 'dead' as a prelude to their disposal; waste frequently requires a sense of how time has somehow passed, paused or is no longer available to us through the things that surround us. Whilst waste things might often be associated with the inoperative, the unused or misused, this always makes this inaction distinct in time.

Neither entirely negative nor simply positive, the arresting sight of a thing no longer used displays the fundamental temporal relationships we take up when we take up with the world of things. Time conditions waste: it provides a measure of our uses, our projects and our ambitions. This book does not locate things within a cosmological theory of time, nor does it impose a relationship to any other externally consistent referent, including that of the human mind to make time for things; instead, it asks that we should reconsider what we mean by waste, both as a category and as a singular action, as both a thing that measures and a thing that is measured by time. In the process of choosing to use an object we must, in some sense, become coincidental with the time that thing makes possible, to the intentions and actions it facilitates, to projects we lend it and the time it lends to those projects. Whilst time provides the conditions for various acts of making waste, time also materializes in the things that preoccupy, enable and frustrate those activities. With our recognition of waste comes an acknowledgement of time's passing, its power to organize notions of wearing, decay, transience and dissolution and its power to expose that organizing function, to disclose how things are imbued with a sense of duration, punctuation and intermission that makes time an explicit, tangible thing of thought.

It is common in Anglophone societies to hear how people are constantly 'wasting time' by not doing something or not doing that thing correctly. Against an implicit and existential finitude, to 'waste time' is one of the ways in which concepts of waste and time might meet, disregarding potential or foregoing an opportunity with reference to a more desirable outcome. I might think that being stuck in traffic is a waste of my time because it prevents me from doing something else I perceive to be more worthwhile; equally, I might judge the time you spent on your literature degree a waste of time since you are now a physicist, and so on. Both examples treat time as a finite resource, as a thing to be misused and discontinued. 'Wasting time' is simply one of the more linguistically

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repeated conjugations of waste and time, one that can leave the process of using and wasting physical objects untouched. A broader history, philosophy and theology of waste can be posited that can also account for all the other ways in which waste, time and material come together and interact. This book argues that the temporal effects of waste have a much more general, fundamental and beguiling impact than the one limited to neglectful or indifferent activity; I want to consider in greater detail how waste negotiates a specific idea of time, a time rendered explicit by particular interactions and encounters with physical objects.

Whilst exploring the idea of waste is one of my aims, this exploration begins by appreciating how use and disuse organizes, divides and distributes time. By beginning to describe the timeliness of value, we will explore how the process of using and discarding objects generates and maintains certain temporal relations, relations that help us organize our experience of the world. The obsolescence of use demonstrates something of the two-fold temporal quality of material things, that is, that the passing of utility both makes and marks time, that objects are produced *by* and productive *of* specific temporal relations. An emphasis on the exchange between things and time will help us avoid an idea of value that is overly quantitative. Objects do not have a certain 'amount' of value until this value is used up; instead I argue that the value of things is determined by the times of use and waste that we ascribe to them. The temporal conditions of use and waste provide the theoretical foundations for all that follows.

There is a tendency, when considering waste, to exaggerate its temporal finitude and to miss one of its fundamental paradoxes – waste might indeed suggest a sense of temporal disruption, but it is also matter that lingers and remains, it is that category of thing conspicuous for coming to be by having been. Waste, then, is felt to be a discontinuous, provisional and yet materially continuous condition, one not to be defined by some intrinsic or universal quality but to a specific articulation of time. One benefit of understanding how waste and time constitute one another in this way is that we then confront how an object's specific physical properties, physical properties that mean that ice creams might melt and petrol is flammable, inform our experience of things. And we can be careful to account for the numerous ways in which things fall into and out of our use – to account, in other words, for the contingent ways in which we relate to things in and through time. To conclude, for quantitative or solipsistic reasons, that some objects are valuable and others are not avoids the central problem of waste's relationship to time – the value of things rises and diminishes according to the work they do or the future imagined for them, in other words, *to their potential realized in time*.

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Our momentary relations with things are managed and acknowledged in subtle ways. 'Waste' and 'time' do not stand in naked isolation; they require translation, description and mediation. In order to understand the 'biography of things', the stories that are told about and with things, we should also consider the ways in which time, objects and narrative coalesce; the 'chronography of things'.[4] And, rather than separate the ways that objects are described from the time that we perceive in them, we might demonstrate how narrative plays a crucial role in organizing time, ascribing potential action and delineating the transition between use and waste. From cherished objects, places or people to the most ruinous and decrepit of structures, narratives affect, broker and maintain the divergent times we distribute to things. The contingent and momentary relationships we enter into with physical objects can be *de*scribed, made legible, circulated verbally, entered into texts or images; things can be associated through the times they have entered into, charted through the various projects into which they have entered and participated. We identify objects in this timely and instrumental manner, this thing, we say to ourselves, *can do x activity*. What it is, can do and will do form an important part of what we understand a thing to be. Paul Ricœur once wrote that, 'narrative [is] the guardian of time',[5] insofar as thinking about time requires acts of narration; the diverging temporalities we associate with things energize and are energized by the shape of our narrative descriptions. Things already require narrative in this way; narrative is a response to and translation of the varying times we encounter with things.

So I want to stress that judging waste requires these legislating acts of narrative, that acts of narration solidify temporal relations and divide waste from more desirable things. In addition to how narratives aid us in tracing the knowable transitions between use and non-use, the intimate relationship between narrative and time also accounts for more uncertain encounters we might have with stuff. When confronting objects that do not appear to belong to a time orientated by use, purpose or activity, narrative forms an important response. More broadly, those constructive or reparative acts of narrative might disclose a compulsion to locate, reconstitute and explain what a particular object is, was or yet might be – what does this thing do, for how long will it do it, how does this expectation transform my valuations? At the end of this Introduction, I hope to have suggested a working vocabulary that will guide us through the remaining work and show how objects of waste co-ordinate and provide occasion for temporal navigation that move us beyond the important environmental concerns attached to the subject of waste towards a complementary, though perhaps controversial, acknowledgement of waste's significance in our thinking.

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Use-time and the end of ends

We tell countless stories about things, stories about how things come to be and pass on, what and how they mean.[6] I will tell another story to illustrate the descriptive content of waste and the temporal structure that this descriptive content reinforces. So, suppose I have bought some shoes, some rather plain shoes for walking and running. I buy these shoes in the hope that they will allow me to get on with life unabated by wind and rain, muck and grime, enabling me to pursue all the goals that shoelessness might preclude. In terms of my use for these things I don't think there's much need to distinguish between my desire to cover and insulate my feet and the shock and derision I might meet if I were to go barefooted; my reasons for wearing shoes are complex and result in a use that is similarly complex. I wear these shoes and wear them in a purposive, intentional manner, applying these things in order to facilitate and participate in specific activities. Narrative is already having its way. I construct a story for these things long before I put my feet into them. The stories I tell about my shoes anticipate and inform their use; I come into contact and give them use through an anticipation of their effects. Narrative accounts for a certain kind of time that these shoes promise but do not guarantee. I must continually open an unrealized future in order to interact with the use achieved through these things; even though I may have used these shoes countless times, I must continue to leave open their potential to be worn, I must continue to project the project of my use of them.

I use these shoes. I use them to put out the rubbish or to go jogging. They are useful things and I am glad I have them to use, they make possible my relentless hiking and break-dancing. These activities give my shoes a time of use, a period where their usefulness is realized, where a use-value becomes valorized. For a long time, the word 'material' has had this relationship with future use, to 'having material' for some prospective event. Michel Serres has noted that the Latin root of material, *materia*, was reserved in antiquity for 'timber roughly squared off for future construction',[7] and we still think of material, whether it be for building, growing, creating or collating, as including a bounded relationship to a certain form of functioning time, a time organized by forthcoming functionality. This might be said to be an active time but most of all it is a time made active under the specific tensions imposed by my aims and expectations, under the temporal tension of use and all the activities that I might do with them. The use of an object is bound to me, to my projects and my purposes, to what Martin Heidegger called 'the "towards-which" of serviceability, and the

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"for-which" of usability'.[8] Simply put, the temporality of use throws these things, these shoes, towards a functioning future, towards a future that is distinguished by an exchange between what the object is and the activity I give it. I realize my purposes and projections through the useful employment of these objects, these shoes, these timely and complicit things. 'They are good shoes', I say to myself, 'they do the job'.

Under the tension of my projects the use-value of my shoes is realized in the time of my wearing – my walking, my running and my kicking – until I can wear them no longer. For brevity's sake, I call this relation between use-value and the time it takes for this use-value to be valorized and cease an object's 'use-time'. I have given the example of shoes to make this concept a little clearer, but it is important to note that the duration of use-time depends upon countless variables, such as the type of object it is, its capabilities or range of functions, its relative scarcity, who or what uses it and so on. Nevertheless, plastic packaging, diamonds, jukeboxes, birthday candles and Ford Cortinas might all be used in vastly different ways and for vastly different projects, but, as objects placed in the time of use, they can all share a bounded sense of futurity, as objects made timely by the teleology of purpose and function. By understanding an object's use temporally, we see how the activity of using things gives shape and order to time, and, equally, materializes how the time we consign to things brings meaning to use. The concept of 'use-time' shows how the passing of utility also involves the passing of a particular kind of time, a use-time, which provides an occasion where time materializes in and through use. The value of objects, whether they be buildings, sacred relics or financial products, represents a style of time keeping: material made conspicuous in the time of use.

My shoes are used on the condition that they participate in useful activity, within the projective story I include them in that binds them to a time of my projects. Since their use and their time are so enmeshed, the ends of their utility give a structure, a temporal horizon. We are told that, ethically speaking, means do not necessarily justify ends. But temporally, utile ends (uses) and a sense of ending (temporal finitude) provide the fundamental means by which the temporalities of use are laid bare. Means are justified, in the sense of being given order and alignment, by these mutually dependent ends. I project the use of my shoes according to their potential for work; the uses projected and achieved through my shoes inform the limits of their time. In this way, use-time is explicitly future orientated, absorbed in the possibility that I might realize some latent or potential utility, but, in being so, my shoes become committed to a future in which a temporal limit remains an immanent part of their use.

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So, when I use my shoes I might expect my use to outlive them, I might expect to have others and I might impose an implicit limit on their longevity; I expect their end. Use-time, then, is that flexible yet orderly time where ends beget ends.

Use-time is projective; it throws an object into the future. We believe and will the thing to work, perform and function and we value things according to the simultaneous time that they afford us. Implicitly, use-time places objects under this temporal tension – *it is the finite time dictated by the use and cessation of use of a given object*. This analysis of things cuts between the two theories that have dominated in philosophies of time in the Anglo-American analytic tradition. An A-theory or presentist conception of time holds that the existence of the past and future is relational, *tensed* as past or future, and so experience occurs in a moving, perpetual present. B-theory, on the other hand, argues that the corruption of the present with the past and future renders the idea of the present inoperative. There can be no such thing as tense; instead, time is composed of a sequence of events that are linguistically related as being prior to or after one another.[9] Following Mark Currie's work on temporality and narrative, however, I argue that the temporality of use I explicate with the help of my shoes demonstrates that any neat division between tensed and untensed time is untenable. I can take the work that my shoes do for granted because my use for them remains in a present that holds an end at bay, a terminus yet to be realized. But when my shoes let in the damp, when the upper begins to prise apart from the sole to expose my hideous feet, or I simply get bored of these shoes and their rather banal, sensible character, the time of their use comes to an end and I might cast them aside. Doing so radically changes their temporal trajectory, their present, the presence of their use, gives them both a tense and, as I will explain in the next chapter, an event that marks that transformation. With the occurrence of waste, presentist A-theory commingles with eventist B-theory. When these shoes stop relating to a functioning future they do not merely confront me with their 'thingness', or a certain 'subject–object' relation, as Bill Brown suggests.[10] More importantly, they reveal how objects give, receive and distribute different times – revealing how the idea of the 'thing' or 'subject–object relations' are predicated upon the temporal trajectories and instabilities of use. Currie observes that one of time's many complications is that 'time is not an object in the same way as a tree, or rather, that it is an object, but it is also a condition from within which we understand objects'.[11] Yet if my shoes fall apart or a meteor shower destroys the trees in my garden, I confront how matter and time are not separate 'objects' but punctuate one another, producing times that

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are driven by the expectations of use and the complicit relations in which I enter into with the things with which I surround myself.

Use-time is a time of wearing, emptying, digesting, breaking or exhausting – it is a somewhat entropic time, a time of diminishing potential, a time orientated to and by an end. Whilst use-time might be a time orientated towards a delimited future and the realization of potential, it is similarly a time that sees this potential ebb and diminish. My shoes are either in the projective, useful time of my activity or they are discarded, surplus to my requirements. These crude temporal borders and boundaries that 'usefulness' give us go a long way to explain why we so frequently speak of objects as having a useful 'life'. When my car no longer works, I might say it 'dies' and console myself by adding that it had 'a good life', meaning that I was reasonably satisfied with the use-time I imposed upon it. This kind of language has entered into academic discussions of the meaning and significance of waste. Without fully asking what has died or how this death has occurred, John Scanlan, for instance, frequently refers to waste as 'dead matter'.[12] At this stage, it is interesting to note how inanimate objects attain 'life' only in so far as they serve our purposes or coincide with the useful time of the living. So long as these objects participate and are made complicit in the projective and finite time of our use, then things are said to have life. Use gives the object a simple life in this respect, a simple narrative that speaks of a tensed time of beginnings (acquisition), middles (use) and ends (discard). The narrative trajectory of an object, then, coheres in the time of use, my shoes will go their way eventually, whether I like it or not. It's just a matter of time, or rather, of matter in a certain type of time.

Waste-time and the end of the end

To step outside the time of use is to sever oneself from this bounded and projective condition I have called 'use-time'. No two objects are the same nor can we expect them to be used in an entirely similar manner but we can find some equivalence in the time that their use and their waste create. The discarded object is released from a state of tension, the obligation to and expectation of a functional future. That is, the narrative that drives and organizes use-time has lost its motivation or forward propulsion. Acts of narration do not disappear; however, they must now respond to the way in which my shoes no longer relate so clearly to the future. Narrative is both a consequence of and a mandate for discarding these things. For whatever reason I might throw away my shoes, I tell

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myself I will no longer walk, run or kick in them again. I no longer have any time for these things, or rather, my time is no longer their time. The give and take of use-time has become more complicated, disrupted, unbalanced. So, 'waste-time' can be defined as a state of material being that is marked by a temporal *dis*orientation. Unlike the regulating finitude that utility imposes, waste-time is a time without a functional, and therefore a temporal, end. The cessation of use creates a temporal threshold, a fragile partition between the time of use and the time of waste. No longer thrown forward or valorized by the correspondence between purpose and end, the object of waste enters a time divorced from the entropic finitude of use.

Jean Baudrillard has argued that, in becoming waste, functional things 'exhaust their possibilities in use, never having occurred in a former time, and which, though they can in varying degrees support the spatial environment, cannot support the temporal one'.[13] But it is surely not the case that my shoes, no longer useful to me, fail to 'support' time. On the one hand, my discarded shoes can still be occupied; they do not necessarily lose their potential to be usefully employed as footwear, as a doorstop, ornament or plant pot. And, on the other hand, and assuming my shoes are not reused in this way, they enter a redundant and decommissioned time that is cast-off and left over, a time of waste. Since use has been defined as a category that is constituted by the time in part produces, then the category of waste marks the temporal suspension of utile time rather than time's absolute erasure. The utility of a waste object is, therefore, a utility held in suspended animation, transforming a latent or potential use into a waiting room, attic or storehouse of use-time.

The temporal distinction between useful objects and waste objects that I am proposing has an interesting effect on how we narrate material things. Human activity, so closely allied to the purposive time of human use, shows itself to be dominated by narrative enclosures that come and go, enclosures that maintain the temporal trajectories and interpretative horizons of things. In the time of use, my shoes were anchored to a narrative end, to some kind of terminus or conclusion. Waste objects, on the other hand, are temporal things that linger on; although they might mark and measure the passing of time, they also expose the contingent terms by which we make and narrate things.

Waste is something we make and something we have imposed upon us; both objects we see pass from a time of use into a time of waste, and a thing that is arresting precisely because we do not necessarily witness this sequential movement. Using my shoes gave them an air of complicit continuity, a narrative thread that advanced from my first encounter with them towards a future in which

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they continue to reflect a time of use. The waste they might become has followed the smooth contours of a narrative sequence. And yet this accounts for only a very specific encounter with waste, one in which we co-author its creation, the conditions of use and non-use. And yet we meet with waste every day that is not our own and whose provenance is unknown to us. It is at these moments when our narrative response must meet with the slack and indeterminate presence of waste-time, with matter that issues different hermeneutic or narrative demands, demands that point towards explanation, reconciliation and resolution. It is driven not by an inevitable end or interruption but by the incomplete end already felt to have occurred: the tardy but unresolved, 'already-and-not-yet' of waste-time. Suppose we stumble across an abandoned shoe, it announces a time: it both suggests functions it no longer enacts and provokes speculative narratives as to its future. Is this the remainder of some grotesque or heinous crime, or simply the cherished left boot of a one-legged man? We might also speculate to what it might become – after years of being kicked around this country road it might, for instance, be taken up by an eager collector of shoes and be added to others of its kind. We ask, then, with Jacques Derrida, about the return of these things only insofar as we must acknowledge their temporal departure: 'Are they going to remain there, put down, left lying about, abandoned [délaissées]? Like these apparently empty, unlaced [délacées] shoes, waiting with a certain detachment for someone to come, and to say, to come and say what has to be done to tie them together again?'[14] We form our questions about these waste things as queries to be met with a thread of narrative, tales woven around things to which time has unravelled, become unlaced.

Narrative is brought into operation to deal with these gaps between what an object is, what its status as waste suggests it might have been and what it yet might be. Whilst an object of waste should not be treated like a text, these things do make exigent particular acts of reading and interpretation that respond to things 'punctuated by blanks and gaps that have to be negotiated'.[15] Martin Heidegger used van Gogh's *A Pair of Shoes* (1885) to note how equipment is made reliable by such techniques of reading. Stressing the absent relationship with the human body and a narrative response to that absence, Heidegger observes, 'From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge'.[16] Narrative supplements these things, filling them where the time of use that can be detected by traces, residues and signs of inaction. Derrida argues that abandonment opens them to an anonymous narrative about an absent subject, 'these abandoned shoes no

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longer have any strict relationship with a subject borne or bearing/wearing, they become the anonymous, lightened, voided support (but so much the heavier for being abandoned to its opaque inertia) of an absent subject whose name returns to haunt the open form'.[17] Although we tend to view things of waste as lowly or disreputable objects, we do so only because they are things of consequence, matters of consequence, things that disclose an intimate and intrinsic historicity. As the by-product of a process, waste bears the tracery of this 'afterness', and to be made present it must be supplemented by an absent backstory. Non-used, disused, devalued, unused, unemployed: our synonyms for waste carry with them an unacknowledged and negated baggage that underwrites their meaning. The important point is that whilst the teleology of use brought my shoe into order, giving it an orientation through time, the discarded thing is somehow bereft of the cohering effects of functionality, tenuously anchored by the function it no longer performs. For this reason, waste objects are felt to have a multiple, mixed, polyvalent and dispersed sense of time, without a familiar trajectory and depending upon an absent time made present. My shoes or the abandoned shoes of others do not run *out* of time when they become waste but come to be felt as *un*timely, as objects 'disjointed from time'.[18] Since their relation to use-time is held in a rich state of abeyance, objects of waste necessarily carry the trace of past events, and a peculiar openness to those of the future. By enacting their twofold temporal gesture, as both markers and makers of time, waste objects seem to gesture simultaneously to pasts and futures, yet are anchored by neither. Without the determination of a specific end, objects of waste mingle multiple times.

Whilst the advent of waste-time generates a threshold that divides it from the time of use, this boundary is a porous and contingent one. Waste seems to be able to communicate across this threshold since waste is always waste *of* something, it is only meaningful if it has a past or a time distinct from its present condition – to discern waste is to both uphold the use that has passed and announce the suspension of utility. As waste, my shoe is not simply a shoe anymore, no longer the shoes they used to be when they coincided with my plans for them. My shoes, if you like, have become neither *ready-to-hand* nor entirely *present-at-hand* either.[19] As familiar objects rendered unfamiliar, my shoes have something of the uncanny about them, they announce a non-identical return, a modified repetition of what was; waste muddies our sense of a present presence. So Derrida's characterization of the spectre as a 'disjointure in the very presence of the present, [a] sort of non-contemporaneity of present time with itself'[20] equally describes this temporally mixed and muddy sense of waste-time

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described here. To borrow Derrida's terms again, waste, by enacting 'a *différance* in being-with-itself of the present',[21] allows both redundant and potential utility to coexist. Redundancy has a mixed time with respect to the utility it contravenes, a utility that repeats upon itself without ever cohering and ordering a thing's future. From the Latin *redundāre*, to 'to surge, to flow, abound', to quite literally overflow, redundancy is patterned by a supplementary complexity that renders waste things temporally distinct from those of use.[22] Taking the temporal effects of waste-time still further, we should note that *redundāre* shares a Latin root, *unda*, 'a wave', with *abundāre*, from which we take the word 'abundance'. We might conclude that waste recalls an undulating, abundantly redundant time that gives a wave of simultaneous salutation and departure, a time that disperses and coheres, a time that overflows the present and saturates the past.

Waste-time causes provocation, a narrative exigency. By conferring the category of waste upon an object, we must narrate its past and speculate as to its future, an act of narration that attempts to chart the comings and goings of utility, and, necessarily, the passing of differing orders and disorders. Whilst waste-time might provide a temporal distinction between use and waste, this is by no means a certain or precise distinction by which to conclude upon an object's beginning, middle or end; its past, present or future. A temporal understanding of waste shows how my shoes can never be 'absolute rubbish', the unstable traces of past and future make the object of waste no more secure than the narratives it inevitably invites.

In the dynamic story told between use-time and waste-time, I have privileged a particular understanding of waste that is used up, defective or depleted. We have seen how useful things become waste things and, in doing so, move from one temporal condition to another. This is the transition popular with school teachers and waste management experts: things get used up and then need to be dealt with, recycled, incinerated, dumped or dispersed. In reality of course, much waste occurs without any use having occurred, where the entropic and end-orientated time of use has never been activated. We can dismiss the idea that waste is the opposite of use or represents a category of the 'useless', since, after first acquiring those shoes of mine I might throw them in the bottom of a cupboard without using them. After ten years there, unused and in their box, I can find them again and put them in the bin. Their passage into the time of waste has occurred without the entropy of use-time. Several issues arise from this: use and waste do not demand a sequential relationship; things can come to lack orientation through time without first entering the teleological and serial structures of use-time. Second, a sense of waste arises not from use but from a

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particular temporal relationship with it, indeed, precisely because use has not or cannot occur. What, for instance, do we make of the shoes I never use, the bar of surplus soap that gets discarded or the remaindered books that publishers pulp each year? This non-sequential relationship between use and non-use is one of the more compelling reasons for privileging time as a necessary condition for defining waste.

We also need to unpack the temporal consequences of saying that something has 'been a waste' or has 'been wasted' – a waste of resources, an inappropriate or misuse of time, a waste that comes when use has not occurred. In fact, we can resolve this problem within the structures of use- and waste-time outlined above. Having left my shoes unused and then decided to discard them I might be accused of having 'wasted them', wasted the opportunity they afforded me. Alternatively, someone might suggest that the financial expense I suffered in acquiring them meant that this represented another, related form of waste. The unused shoes show me a waste by non-use and the financial expense incurred shows me the waste of a finite resource. Both forms of waste arise from the narrative shadow created by the order of use-time, from an ideal order of time that has not been allowed to unfold, from a time that has not been allowed to begin and end where it should. Again, narrative structures engage with and respond to the time of things, to the ways in which we perceive time according to the functioning future in which they are not included. 'What a waste', we might say, 'that these shoes have gone unused' – their time of use is felt to be curled and pent up, unextended and unexpended. Such a version of waste ultimately shows nostalgia for an inoperative use-time, for a time that has been suspended or precluded. Whilst we might not arrive at this form of waste through the passage of use, the sense of temporal separation is just as strong as if this waste had occurred through or because of being used. The potential time of these things must still be narrated and this potential upholds the temporal orientation towards finitude that helped us define use-time. The time of things again divides across a threshold and, in the passing of use-time that is implied by something 'being wasted', registers a time beyond recovery, a time measured by a potential that has passed.

Epic wastes: 'Nothing will come of nothing'[23]

This book explores the temporal and narratalogical permutations of waste through works of sculpture, literature and architecture, being careful to stress

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the materiality of time common to these mediums. The intersection between waste and works of sculpture, literature and architecture provides a chance to examine how the intelligibility, functionality and use of these things frequently require a time of waste for us to compose and decompose their meaning. Waste, therefore, will be found to be standing between something and nothing; the remains of waste, its time, its place and its enigma, will be found caught between the significance lent by narrative engagement and the moments when waste fails to register, where the temporality of waste quite literally dissolves into dust.

Waste is not a work of environmental politics and does not provide a political economy of waste. This is not an unintended omission but a calculated decision. The definition of waste given in these pages is not reducible to a particular historical moment, a particular means of exchange or a conception of 'modernity'. Nor is the definition of waste provided in these pages completely set apart from the historical specificity of waste things; the concepts developed, such as use-time and waste-time, can be absorbed into more local contexts. The relations between things, narrative and time described earlier seek a philosophical mandate for a mobile vocabulary with which to discuss a diverse range of wastes, real and imagined, ancient, modern and futural. Consequently, this work is open to valid charges of being both wilfully ethnocentric and ahistoricist, accusations I am willing to countenance on the assumption that there might be more that is common to our experiences of waste than can be reduced to ethnic and socioeconomic alterity. The property and propriety of use and waste are implicit aspects of this work, since to use and to discard a thing is to make a claim on the time that a thing can or cannot achieve. Investigating the 'politics of things' would be a meaningless project without knowing how things are described, how they are said to occupy time and have their capabilities communicated. So, although this is not a work about the political nature of waste it questions how waste affects ideas of time, agency, narrative and coherence. It therefore makes the necessary philosophical intervention by which a robust, political theory of waste can be achieved.

Whilst Shakespeare's *King Lear* might seem an unusual text with which to take the subject of waste further, it provides a canny map by which to expand, reassess and reinvigorate the way we discuss objects and environments considered redundant, obsolete or discarded. *King Lear* is introduced here, not as a paradigmatic text but as one providing an opportunity to broaden our theoretical horizons. As an historical drama set in an obsolete time, *Lear* has been considered to be a 'veritable refuse heap: the wreckage of the ages, shadow-rich ruins, whispering in the wind'.[24] And, as a play concerned with a materiality

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of an age passing away in spectacular wreckage, it also helps us avoid allowing those discarded shoes to completely dominate our theory of waste in the way that shit, trash and toxic assets have tended to dominate the theories of others. Though these are subjects that have a useful and convenient proximity to the idea of waste, and many have levelled their analysis towards these subjects in effective and interesting ways, there remains an historical, philosophical and theological aspect to the problem of waste that a study dedicated to a particular kind of object might otherwise overlook.

Waste is a medial condition, not just a thing of consequence but an original thing, a thing to end and a thing to begin with. And let us be mindful of how waste can be both vast and miniscule, animal and mineral, human and divine, frequently expressing the transition from or between otherwise fixed positions. Waste is often to be found between something and nothing, presence and disappearance. Lear, King of Britain and ruler by 'heaven's benediction' (2.2.146), becomes a 'discarded father' (3.4.66) and is left raving on a windswept moor: 'They told me I was everything' he laments, "tis a lie, I am not ague-proof' (4.5.102). Here lies a fundamental, transitional property of becoming waste – it affects and requires the temporal structure of a 'before' and an 'after', a temporal break between being a divinely appointed monarch and a discarded parent, positioned with respect to matter and yet having that position no longer.[25] Shakespeare reinforces this transition by allowing discarded characters to enter discarded or unproductive places. The play harbours waste that marks both beginnings and ends; whilst Lear becomes a kind of human waste, the land he enters is a wasteland that pre-exists.

The tragic structure of the play depends on an interplay between productive and unproductive landscapes, places dominated by the cohering powers of use-time and places that carry the disarming chaos of waste-time. In a movement that seems to corroborate Peter Sloterdijk's observation that 'modern history is characterized by the structural long-term unemployment of kings',[26] cast onto the moor or 'common' wasteland, the King of Britain enters a space as inactive as his sovereignty. Indeed, the history of private land ownership and a cultural history of waste might converge on the notion of 'common' land. Since the twelfth century land held in common was land from which tax revenue could not be raised, it would not concern a monarch or their finances and was therefore labelled 'waste' in official treasury documents.[27] Excluded from his daughter's houses Lear comes to occupy this wasteland, this 'wild field' (3.4.100). Lear banishes and then is banished himself, put in a place where a king should never be, on a landscape so bare that 'For many miles about/There's

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scarce a bush' (2.2.465–466); a land barren and empty, a land removed from the teleologies of utility. For Kenneth Gross, this is an untimely space in which pasts, presents and futures appear commingled, a landscape that is 'archaic, yet full of contemporary detritus, things reified, accumulated, and dispersed all at once'.[28] In contrast to the fertile land to which Lear gives Goneril at the beginning of the play, 'champaigns riched,/With plenteous rivers and wide-skirted meads' (1.1.63–64), the moor is a place of contentious use and ambivalent ownership, a place where Lear's sovereignty is suspended and the material base of his rule exposed. The divine right of kings as they were assumed by James I provides the play with a key theological and political point of reference, 'the king is over-lord of the whole land: so he is master over every person that inhabetith the same, having the power over life and death over every one of them'.[29] *King Lear* displays not just a shift that transfers land ownership from systems of feudal absolutism to those governed by contract law, but allows us to witness absolute dominion and absolute times of use transform into times of absolute abandon. It is this exchange between ideas of waste and want, control and disposal, alongside territorial notions of the sacred and the profane, that sustains one of the most longstanding conceptions of waste – a division in time between what can and cannot be wasted.

Sovereign wastes: Unproductive and uninhabited

In the first act of the play Lear divides his land into three portions, 'conferring on younger strengths while we/Unburdened crawl toward death' (1.1.38–39). But without his land or a place to shelter from the storm, Lear and his retinue are without the property that once maintained his sovereignty. Beyond the first act Lear's palace disappears and he becomes the thing he most fears, 'unaccommodated man […] no more than a poor, bare, forked animal' (3.4.95–97). Exposed and without accommodation, poor and thrown into a state of nature, Lear and his group can be understood to be removed from the forces of power, property and civilization that safeguarded his sovereign relationship with the land. This is an extraordinary transition for the King of Britain, one that follows a passage from the palace of Act 1 to the wastes of Act 3, from the designs and purposes of land distribution to a land so bare that it cannot give a mad king relief. The land that Lear gives away becomes the thing that marks him as a beggar and it is the land's productivity that qualifies the tragic conclusion of the play: 'she's dead as earth' (5.2.230). The unproductive nature of this landscape

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requires some closer examination, however. In it we find a widening narrative arc that thickens the temporal orientations of use and waste and places waste not just at the end but also at the beginning of things.

As a space in which to dramatize Lear's ruination, this wasteland is large, vacant and without productivity, an untimely something next to nothing. Waste, both spatially and temporally, is a concept with uncertain limits. This quality emerges from the etymology of the word 'waste', which carries with it complex associations with landscape, the divine, human sovereignty and proportion. We take the word 'waste' from *vastus*, giving it the same Latin root as the word 'vast' and meaning a time and space that is void, immense or enormous. The vast etymology of waste takes in its vacant neighbours, *vanus* and *vaccus*, and includes the verb *vasto*, 'to make empty or vacant, to leave unattended or uninhabited, to desert'.[30] The earliest uses of the word 'waste' invariably denote an enormous and empty sense of a depopulated landscape, 'uninhabited (or sparsely inhabited) and uncultivated country; a wild and desolate region, a desert, wilderness',[31] a description synonymous with the common moor that Lear roams. The *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the first recorded use of the word 'waste' can be found in the *Trinity College Homilies*, written in the first half of the twelfth century: 'Ac seðen hie henen wendend atlai pai lond unwend and bicam waste, and was roted oueral and swo bicam wildernesse'.[32] Crucial to the earliest uses of 'waste' is sequential flexibility, its ability to describe an uninhabited space that humans had either left uninhabited, literarily land that had '*bicam* waste', as well as land that humans found uninhabitable, such as deserts, seascapes or mountain ranges. Common to both prior and posterior forms of waste are two quite distinct ideas – immensity and emptiness – that are as much temporal descriptions as they are spatial. The two can, in fact, be found to be spatially contradictory; for something to be large one assumes it must contain something to express that immensity and, equally, for something to be empty it must be prey to some form of delineation to make that emptiness distinct. By translating the spatially empty and enormous into the temporally empty and enormous we might resolve this contradiction; these are not spaces in which time is necessarily absent, a timeless space, but a type of landscape in which a particular kind of time has yet to occur or occurs no longer. Without the contents of use or the punctuation and teleology of temporal ends, this waste-time does not coincide with the plans and ambitions of human activity, a temporality that describes the disorientating conditions of an undirected time.

The temporality of waste is a condition of both an *a priori* emptiness and a thing that has become empty; it is both a pre-existing desert and a space

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that was once but is no longer inhabited, a site of origin and end. Here lies a spatiotemporal aspect of waste that cannot be easily contained by Mary Douglas' definition of 'matter out of place', which tends to neglect how places themselves can become abandoned, discarded or found without use. The vast etymologies of waste suggest places felt to be so large, empty and lacking in utility that they bring to bear an immobile, territorial waste out of joint with the time of human activity and proportion. Again, this is a question of time and the way in which scale and emptiness take their measure from human use, attendance and habitation. As was demonstrated when we considered the temporality of waste, the etymology of the word contains a sense of temporal severance, abandonment or exclusion, a time lacking the orientating shape of use-time. This territorial notion of waste exceeds more modern associations that tend to stress human agency and creation – theories that become dominated by the commodity form, environmental depletion, financial excess or bodily excreta. These are spaces that gain definition from the productive time that they cannot perform, to the human ends, both temporal and utile, to which they are not projected. Temporality is inscribed within our earliest encounters with and representations of waste. Put another way, and to repeat a doctrine explored above, waste is a temporal condition that does not coincide with the time of human activity.

On seeing Lear raving on his wasteland, Gloucester exclaims, 'O ruined nature, this great world/Shall so wear out to naught' (F.4.6.130–131). In Lear's ruin Gloucester fears that the greatness of the world will wear out to nothing, but, more than this, the connection that is made with ruin, decay and the earth's demise is not only one that describes a potential, apocalyptic future but one that also encapsulates a popular view of the earth's beginnings. Waste is not only something created by humans, that can occur at the whim of their demands, but is something felt to be primeval, a condition that occurs prior and in distinction to the human, a condition that separates the sacred and the profane. Just as the condition of waste-time is a time separated from use but is not necessarily a consequence of it, so it is that these temporal conditions provide a basis for measuring origins, departures and conclusions. And, whereas use-time gives temporal horizons and termini, the disorientations of waste-time can give a sense of matter never having truly begun. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, waste forms a precondition for humanity to take ownership of its environment, it is the condition that precedes Lear's 'heaven[ly] benediction'. Albeit by allusion, this is something of which King Lear appears all too aware when, in response to Cordelia's refusal to accept the gift of his land, he expounds the classical maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, 'Nothing will come of nothing' (F.1.1.88). In one respect, Lear

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warns that Cordelia will not profit from saying 'nothing' – her reticent modesty will not be rewarded. On the other hand, her 'nothing' opens an encounter with the earth's waste, both past and future, in which time separates matter from the time of human rule. By alluding to Parmenides' philosophical system, Lear recalls the Judeo-Christian belief in how the creation and redistribution of the earth's resources were founded upon the formless void described in the Book of Genesis. From what kind of 'something' does God create? Many Biblical scholars continue to translate the formless, primeval vacuum that precedes God's division of earth from sea as a state of waste. Genesis 1:2 can and has been translated, 'And the earth was waste and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep: and the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters'.[33] Variants suggest that the earth was 'without form or void'[34] or was 'formless and empty'[35] but, semantically and etymologically, all conclude the original state of the earth prior to God's intervention was one dominated by the immense and uninhabitable conception of waste that medieval uses of the word upheld: 'a wild and desolate region, a desert, wilderness'. This variation is born out of the peculiar and rather idiomatic Hebrew expression, וָבֹהוּ תֹהוּ *tōhû wābōhû*, with which Judaic scripture describes the condition of the earth in this ambiguous and desolate condition. The expression *tōhû wābōhû* is of obscure provenance, appearing at just two other occasions in Judaic scripture (the others are Jeremiah 4:23 and Isaiah 34:11, both of which effectively return the earth to the state described in Gen 1:2). There remains considerable debate about how to interpret and translate *tōhû wābōhû* but, following David Tsumura, we may make the following distinction: *tōhû* means a 'desert' or 'waste land' and *bōhû* means 'empty' or 'uninhabited place'. Comparing the 20 other occasions that *tōhû* appears in the Old Testament, Tsumura concludes that *tōhû wābōhû* should be understood as 'unproductive and uninhabited'.[36] For James Murphy this amounts to 'an absence of all that can furnish or people the land' and Keil and Delitzsch provide the following summary: 'The coming earth was at first waste and desolate, a formless, lifeless mass'.[37] The state of the earth prior to God's intervention has been considered, therefore, to be one of mingled confusion, a noisy and desolate plane of water that eventually produces something. This Biblical waste-time is primordial, before human time and understood to be enormous and empty partly because of its failure to accommodate this human time. It is not simply timeless since it waits; it is the waste-time that gives a temporal preface to the purposive, projective and teleological time of human use. Lear's 'Nothing will come of nothing' acknowledges the waste matter that stands prior to the beginning of the beginning of the world and, with Gloucester

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fearing the world is wearing out to naught, we find the temporalities of waste standing at both the temporal limits of human habitation.

We might integrate this extreme Judeo-Christian conception of waste with the theory of waste that stressed how matter, and thus time, becomes organized in relation to our activities of human use and non-use, by a temporal separation structured by what is considered unproductive and uninhabited. Waste-time is the time that separates and divides. This separation coincides with how Giorgio Agamben has defined the religious, not as something that binds entities together but as that which maintains a separation between things sacred and profane: 'Religion can be defined as that which removes things, places, animals, or people from common use and transfers them to a separate sphere'.[38] The Hebrew expression *Tōhû wābōhû* reflects a vision of matter at a point of complete separation, matter that falls beyond every human project, plan or ambition, unencumbered by the teleological imperatives of human use, a time without the termini of finitude or utility. In addition, this primeval notion of waste compromises the belief that waste is always produced, constructed or occurring after another process. Economists, for instance, tend to think of waste as a 'negative externality', as something that occurs as an indirect consequence of a process or exchange.[39] But the etymological and theological evolution of the term 'waste' shows that it is not simply something which comes *after* another event or is easily thrown in the bin, but helps describe an ancient relationship between humans, material and time. We are left with a conception of waste that is not entirely dominated by an idea of the 'correct' or the 'proper' or with a notion of economic or aesthetic value but one that has, at its first step, the separation and temporal organization of things. These reflections on the ways in which time, objects and narrative coalesce provide strong grounds upon which to criticize the economically limited idea of waste that is popular in the social sciences.

For a temporal poetics of waste

Economically determinist understandings of waste, such as those developed by Heather Rogers and Susan Strasser, have focused on the idea of the commodity as the basic unit of analysis: waste is all that can be bought, used and discarded. As capitalism has developed, so waste has come into being. When waste is considered to be 'intrinsic to consumption' and, since 'consumption' is considered to be a comparatively recent phenomenon, Rogers argues, 'The world of trash did not always exist as it does today. In the nineteenth century refuse

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was sorted, municipal waste was composted, and all kinds of materials that left the home as discards were extensively reused [the nineteenth century was an era when] *almost nothing* went to waste'.[40] As capitalism has developed so this commodity-led conception of waste has come into being, making Rogers' idea of waste a symptom of privatization and private enterprise. Susan Strasser also charts a social history of waste that is only 200 years old, contained within the unit of the American household economy: 'Although people have always thrown things out, trash has not always been the same [the history of trash] offers fundamental insights about the history of industrial society and its consumer culture'.[41] Both agree that one impact of industrialization was to produce waste as a *contemporary* thing: 'Garbage as we know it is *a relatively new invention* predicated on the monumental technological and social changes wrought by industrialization […] Garbage as we know it is an outcome of a fully realized capitalist system'.[42] This raises a conceptual and historiographic problem with which Rogers herself wrestles: people have always made and discarded waste, they have always produced or encountered things of various kinds and in various quantities that were said to be in a state of waste. At one moment Rogers tells us that 'During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries most American settlers threw almost *nothing* away; they were so poor that manufactured goods were almost absent from their lives'. And yet, an over reliance on an idea of 'manufactured goods' means that Rogers must contradict herself and admit that settlers did indeed produce *something* we would recognize as waste, 'Most people [of the seventeenth and eighteenth century] dumped discards like broken crockery and organic scraps in backyards and windows and doors to the street, leaving the stinking clots of waste to rot or get eaten by roaming hogs, dogs and raccoons'.[43] If the commodity is made to provide the historical and temporal parameters of any definition of waste, then we must dismiss the theological, etymological and historical continuities that can be found between various acts of waste making.

Albeit with reference to a different philosophical canon, Greg Kennedy presents a theory of waste through readings of Heidegger and a broader phenomenological tradition that shares the temporal and historiographic problems found in Rogers and Strasser. His thesis is caught between the verb 'to waste' – to misuse, squander, neglect or destroy – and 'waste' as a noun. In Kennedy's view, objects of waste should always be assessed in terms of the ethical transgressions found at their source, leading to some general statements about objects of waste which focus on the existential reprimand that these things seem to offer: 'Waste offends us to the extent that it reflects back our own shortcomings, our failure to preserve value that we originally invested in an

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object […] waste results from carelessness—that is, from a neglect or failure to care for the things we have valued'.[44] Waste is a source of existential shame, guilt and burden; it represents 'the desolate emptiness of failure and neglect'.[45] With his intensely reflexive focus, Kennedy argues that our capacity to discard things is a unique reminder of our own finitude, 'understanding trash brings us closer to ourselves; it discloses our humanity'.[46] Perhaps this is so because Kennedy's idea of waste is *created* and specifically tied to 'technological consumer trash'.[47] Like Rogers he understands acts of waste creation to be dominated by the commodity form: 'Trash necessarily follows from the logic of carefree commodities, whose consumption necessarily excludes taking care of them. In other words, the commodified consumption that inexorably concludes with trash does not let beings be and this ontological refusal likewise prevents us from entering into our own being'.[48] Predicated on the belief that care and concern are intrinsic to human behaviour, the disposability that Kennedy reads into objects leads him to argue that wasting is somehow anti-human, betraying a more intrinsic and original relationship with material things.

These theories of waste, as various as they are, sidestep the fundamental and rather ancient acts of temporal separation and narrative organization that allow us to speak of waste as a category of thing felt to be untimely, untethered from the time of individual and collective projects. The difficulty that arises from these more economically determined theories of waste is that they implicitly exclude more ancient 'unproductive and uninhabited' things or spaces from informing what we consider waste to be or do. The ultimate failure of those definitions of waste that seek to make waste things reducible to the operation of a specific system of exchange is that they cannot absorb the recurrent attitude to things across diverse times, places and people. By bringing time back into our analysis, I aim to show the continuities that exist between ideas of waste that have past and the ideas of waste that now dominate our contemporary present – from the primeval something that appears in *King Lear* and the naught that both begins and ends the world, to the purposive and action-orientated temporal structures that a pair of shoes might move through. Relevant to both is the incoherent time associated with waste things and the interpretative exigency these things issue.

The beginning of the end

As this Introduction has been keen to prove, the subject and problem of waste encompass the mythological narratives of human creation and desolation, as

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well as the everyday interactions with footwear; between the vast durations of unproductive territories and landscapes to the comparatively brief periods associated with wearing and using certain items of clothing. Partitioning one from the other would lead us to overlook how each requires a narrative content to bridge the separation in time, between the past and the future, the subtle shifts between something and nothing, the momentary relations that humans take up with things, that is, between the structures of use-time and waste-time. This is not *the* story of waste, nor is it just *a* story. It imagines the temporal infrastructure of many possible stories.

The work that follows is divided into three sections, each looking at different sculptural, literary and architectural manifestations of waste and the boarder processes of collecting, writing and building. These are not simply the objects of study but provide occasions where things inform the parameters of our knowledge about, and critical reflection upon, the subject of waste. This means that we can understand the qualities and phenomena of waste not as they are passively received but as they are actively formed. Each chapter tests various hypotheses about what waste is, does and can do within these practices, but returns to the interrelations between things, time and narrative. Chapter 2 explores the mediatory capacity of waste, its capacity to stand for a great range of political, and philosophical, theological and economic ideas. Instead of allowing this range and diversity to support a relativist position – 'waste is anything we want it to be and it can mean anything we want it to mean' – I argue that waste's mediatory potential is a consequence of the revelatory and anticipatory events that waste seems to mark and the temporal events it seems to carry into the present. Here some theoretical ballast is given to the idea that waste is a time of separation; either by accident or by anticipation, waste appears to make itself distinct from useful objects. These events show how experiencing waste both makes and marks time, providing occasions to generate narrative and interpretative exigency about what objects are, were or yet might be. The work of British artist Cornelia Parker gives the chapter its conclusion. Describing the ways in which sculpture can utilize the narrative exigency of waste, I show how these art objects energize and are energized by the redundant uses they signify. Chapter 3 collects and recollects this mediatory potential by examining how recent archaeological theory has drawn on the idea of waste as a way of characterizing the material negotiation with the past. Asking what it means to collect waste, how the past and the present become ordered by these acts of collection, this chapter considers the complex and diverging times of waste-time and questions how waste has been made a reliable object of the past. Again,

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the narrative demand of these things means that objects of waste are placed under constant review, a point neatly summarized by assessing Mark Dion's *Tate Thames Dig* and the archaeological issues it critiques. The slow evolution of Dion's cabinet of curiosities, full of rubbish found on the banks of the Thames, shows how the work of archaeology does not end in the museum but continues through it, as objects take their turbulent course through periods of use and disuse, disposal and display, storage and disintegration.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the problem of textual waste, particularly the waste we find in works of literary poetry and prose. Rather than isolating the representations of waste in particular works – things described as redundant or discarded – these chapters read these things through the compositional wastes necessary in the process of writing. In that respect, this section analyses the compositional wastes as a reflexive component of those objects described in the 'final' or 'published' version. The poetry of T. S. Eliot and the prose of James Joyce provide convenient places to test this experiment in reading the writing of waste, not just because they are writers with an explicit interest in waste things but because they are writers for whom the significance of drafting and redrafting can be traced in their manuscripts. The mode of literary criticism developed in these chapters does not necessarily recuperate earlier drafts into the 'final' version but demands that we consider the wastes described and the wastes of description simultaneously. So, whilst Chapters 2 and 3 concern themselves with a certain kind of archaeological collection of waste, Chapters 4 and 5 pursue a form of literary archaeology that ultimately exposes the necessary poetics of waste, the semantic plurality at stake in both its composition and reception.

Chapter 6 returns to notions of use-time and waste-time by applying both terms to architecture. It does so to explore the bearings we take from buildings and the sense of spatial organization and temporal assembly that functioning architecture gives us. If use-time gives the building an illusion of being strung up and towards certain expressions of the Now, waste-time folds the ruin upon itself and dissolves the temporal punctuation of use. Indeed, by eroding the singularity of the present by signalling a quasi-absent past, ruins appeal to a conception of temporality that is replete with a time of retentions, protentions and disruptions, one that situates the individual in an environment of competing and commingled tenses. This chapter explores the backward-looking aspect of the ruin, whilst Chapter 7 focuses on the ways in which ruins have provided a model of the future. From Hubert Robert and Joseph Gandy to Albert Speer and *The Planet of the Apes*, the projection of ruins, be it in paint, type or on film, is a distinct sub-genre of representing ruins. This chapter aims to explain the

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proleptic ruin in terms of the temporal indecision associated with waste-time; it also describes the eerie effect of these works in terms of the Freudian uncanny. Not as something to have been repressed that has now come to light, but as the process by which the unfamiliar mingles with the familiar, the present rendered into a future that has past. The ruinous imaginings of the future are frequently employed to periodize societies. This chapter concludes the argumentative project of this work as a whole, with a discussion of ruin's relationship to empire, time and dust; it concludes with the tangible traces of generations past and the intangible indistinction by which narrative no longer seems to be an adequate or operative response to things. We therefore return to Gloucester's fear that the world might wear to naught, not just the world in general but a particular kind of world in which objects are used, narrated and wasted in particular ways.

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Part One

Collecting Waste

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2

Narrating the Event of Waste

The previous chapter outlined the temporal structure of use-time and waste-time, showing how narrative interpretations give shape, tense, anticipation and retrospection to the passage of things through time. This chapter thickens this argument by considering the events that mark the transition between use and waste. Waste has often been associated with change of some sort, a change through which things seem to take on different meanings, values or relations over time. This change has been understood physically, relationally or even in the contingent terms of 'value'. An important consequence of this association between waste and these various forms of change is the tendency to imagine waste as offering a special event through which to understand how objects achieve a change in meaning. In this regard, the change offers a plateau by which to assess not just the subject of waste itself but the ontological status of material things more generally. The transition between different times, between times of use and non-use, value and diminished value, functionality and non-functionality, makes waste a clear example of how things 'constitute a key device in helping us recognize historical changes'.[1] Moreover, the event of waste gives witness to how discarded things are temporally and spatially dispersed, that attempts to narrate these events are simultaneously attempts to order, gather and collect things that end and remain.

By lingering beyond an end, by being both a material continuity and a temporal discontinuity, waste invites a quality of retrospection felt to be a function of waste and its cause. Waste becomes a bit like those tyre marks one sees on the surface of a road that tell us of an event that has past, a trace or residue of time to be forensically assessed. And, whether it is 'commodities', 'texts', 'things', 'architectures' or 'environments' that are under discussion, theorists and philosophers of these entities have frequently understood the advent of waste to provide some kind of event by which to contemplate the stuff these entities are and were. The opportunity to consider what an object does (or can no longer do)

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and how people use it to make sense of the world transforms waste objects into polyvalent intermediaries of all manner of ideas, beliefs, stories and accounts. This study makes the case that all the indices of 'change' one might wish to deploy through waste, as well as the narratives that attempt to describe and translate these deployments, must, at some point, be expressed in and through time. To be meaningful these indices must relate to, and therefore inhabit, a temporality of waste replete with affective ends. So, whilst architectural ruins are frequently described in aesthetic, environmental, financial, political or even molecular terms (depending on who or what is doing the describing), the importance of waste-time in announcing these developments remains a common denominator. In order for waste to mean all the things it can mean, a time is produced and the event of this temporal production can be described.

Interrupting waste

There exists a tendency to situate an object of waste somewhere between two extremes: as 'just a modest thing' by which to measure some process or change, or more spectacularly, as a thing through which to experience a full-blown revelation. The former sees waste as a mere outcome or product of time (its time has 'run out', it has 'had its day', 'past it'). The latter elevates waste as the necessary condition for spiritual, artistic and political change – that is, it helps form and articulate time itself. The discarded shoes discussed in the last chapter had a denotative and connotative potential that comes to rely on the production of varying temporalities, characterized by an orientation or disorientation to a functioning future. Whenever we assess ideas about waste we should always try to understand how its relationship with time is being represented – is waste passive or active, the product or producer of time? These positions are rarely given such clear expressions since they are regularly mixed and muddled, compounding the feeling that waste objects are *un*timely or without a proper time of their own. But somewhere between the 'wastes of time' (time producing waste) and the 'times of waste' (waste producing time) lies the notion that the advent of waste is rich with revelation, a thing of pedagogical potential that allows the everyday, the hidden or the unexpected to be suddenly unveiled. Recognizing waste is to recognize the events and actions in which things are embroiled; the temporal separation felt between a discarded thing and the activity in which it no longer participates gives a position to assess, discern and narrate how the order of things always depends upon the order of time.

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In his introduction to 'Thing Theory', Bill Brown suggests that objects of waste might give us secular revelations as we interact with everyday things. The following quotation explains how an interruption to utility might provoke a reconsideration of an object's meaning:

> We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily. The story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation.[2]

Although Brown does not address the condition of waste as such, he does describe how things can suddenly cease to relate to the designs of 'the human subject'. In a way that correlates with a movement out of use-time and into a time that no longer concerns our projects and aspirations, Brown suggests that we come to know an object in a new way when we can no longer put it to use. When an object ceases to feel complicit in our tasks, plans or futures, when we are shaken from one collective arrangement with that object and thrust into another, our relation with the thing moves beyond mere use to confront the subject–object relation that has passed. For Brown, this permits a confrontation with what he calls 'the thingness' of the object, disclosing our compulsion to master and manipulate things, asserting a material presence that is somehow outside our control. We sense how objects exceed our relations with them. When they break they expose us to a world of matter that Graham Harman describes as one that surpasses 'constituent pieces, more than [the object's relations], more than its qualities, and more than the events in which it happens to have participated so far'.[3] Appropriately, Brown's language is replete with 'flows' and 'arrested moments'. For him, the advent of waste provokes an odd sort of event, a hesitancy or interruption before the temporal continuum of material things as they relate to and work for us. Through this interruption the agency of objects is contingently revealed; waste exposes a certain state of affairs by casting a 'subject–object' relation into the past, into the realm of the no longer. Time, of course, is inscribed within this movement; the object marks the passing of a projective time that has been structured by our use of an object. It shows time to have been within the employment of a project that evolved through an assembly of material actors, actors no longer caught up in that particular collective arrangement. Should we respect the temporality already at work in Brown's text,

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we might add a slight amendment to his observation, 'the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation', noting how this subject–object relation remains implicit without such interruptions; the event of waste creates retrospection, it adds the past tense and helps expose our momentary relations with things by precluding a determined future and enclosing a past.

With a slightly different emphasis on the idea of the commodity, Julian Stallabrass's discussion of trash leads us into similar territory. Having highlighted how, by manipulating desire, the commodity fetish motivates and intensifies our production of waste, Stallabrass describes how the obsolescence of the commodity endows waste with a peculiar power to disclose reality:

> In becoming rubbish the object, stripped of this mystification, gains a doleful truthfulness, as though confessing: it becomes a reminder that commodities, despite all their tricks, are just stuff; little combinations of plastics or metal or paper […] We see them[, the objects,] for the first time with clarity, which is the same as that clearsighted ridicule with which we greet old adverts and the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of design in old commodities: their arbitrariness and alien nature are suddenly revealed.[4]

Although Brown and Stallabrass argue different points within different critical traditions, they provide the opposing sides of a common coin. For Brown, the snapping tool snaps us out of our phenomenological inattention, where the use of an object blinds us to how things 'really are/were'. We are rocked out of our habitual relations with objects at the moment when they appear able to impose themselves as independent entities, when they no longer function according to our designs or expectations, when the command implied by the first-person perspective is no longer wholly adequate. For Stallabrass, on the other hand, when objects cease to function they shed their arbitrary, pantomime act as commodities. By becoming waste these objects are released from the straitjacket of the commodity fetish, driven by the predominance of exchange-value, in order to reveal how things 'really are/were'. In both instances, waste is said to put an end to a time that is ordered by use and replaces it with a convolved, communicative inertia; objects no longer seem to do what they did and yet enjoy an increased propensity to convey this inactivity. No longer active in one kind of future, waste seems to animate the time that has passed, punctuating continuity with a material, thingly shape. Yet, by doing so, the event of waste seems to reveal how our experience of time is underwritten by the things that we use, time materializes and is made material through our projects, plans and ambitions. Brown and Stallabrass show that when objects become waste they come to act in

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unusual ways. However, the meaning of things is not achieved within a temporal vacuum, if the event of waste reveals the peculiarity of objects, then time might be made peculiar too.

Although John Scanlan's *On Garbage* provides a somewhat different perspective on the temporality of waste, it ultimately rehearses the conclusions that were drawn by Brown and Stallabrass. Scanlan argues that when something is considered waste it loses *all value*, it even loses the power to signify: 'stripping it of any descriptive characteristics that allows us to individuate it'.[5] It is Scanlan's emphatic belief that, in becoming a thing of waste, an object loses all distinction other than the distinction that makes it a waste object, 'objects of refuse ha[ve] no meaning apart from the negative undifferentiated one that declare[s] their lack of worth – the total absence of distinction in the damaged or soiled object'.[6] The waste category behaves as if it were a monolithic eraser of signification or difference. A paradoxical category, Scanlan's notion of waste makes it at once absolutely undifferentiated and yet profoundly different to everything found extrinsic to it. Regardless of whether we believe that such a notion is even possible, Scanlan's emphasis on the process of *becoming* waste is as pronounced as it was in Brown and Stallabrass. Again, much of this is born out of how waste is considered a product of time. 'Time', writes Scanlan, 'fundamentally conditions the creation of garbage in that it provides the framework within which things become corruptible and useless'.[7] Time, as a provider of 'frameworks', secures distinction for indistinct objects. Regrettably, Scanlan does not supply more details regarding this temporal framework, what it might look like, how well it is constructed or how it might correspond to the objects he describes. Suffice to say, time offers Scanlan some kind of static and unchanging backdrop by which things become articulate.

Whilst waste can be taken to mark a change played out on a temporal stage, it cannot do so passively or without affecting the way this stage is experienced and reproduced. Although time creates waste by tracing and articulating a change in things, should we not ask how waste informs what is meant by time? Since the advent of waste occurs in and through time, it provides us with an event that marks, measures and transforms duration. So, just as it is difficult to imagine the decline of Communism without the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the fall of the Roman Empire without the sack of Rome or even the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl without the ecological and architectural ruination and abandonment that followed, so it is hard to imagine how our experience of time went unchanged by these events. Whilst triumph and catastrophe frequently carry a waste content, it would be wrong to think that the catastrophe begins

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with an 'idea' of an event as an abstract presence or logical mystery. Instead, the catastrophe begins and is maintained by the motion of things through time.

My conception of 'the event' is rather different from the radical indeterminacy attributed to events in the writings of Jean-François Lyotard and Alain Badiou. For them, an event is that which lies beyond our comprehension. Lyotard claims that 'to encounter an event is like bordering on nothingness' and Badiou similarly argues that the event has no objective existence but only by an 'interpretative intervention'.[8] In its unfounded nature as neither reducible to an element nor comprehensible as a sum of its parts, the Badiouian event 'departs from the laws of being'.[9] These versions of events have no material form; unrepresentable, ineffable, they cannot be made legible in a story. I maintain that the event requires description to be telling and intelligible, and, whilst Badiou is right to suggest that each event is a fragment of a story with respect to the infinite occurrences that can be associated with that event, processes of concurrent material fragmentation mean that the experience of waste, ruin and other expressions of material exhaust are not just the product of interpretative invention or intervention but are visible, physical traces. It is our intimate use, our knowledge, expectation and skill in dealing with things that make the temporal separation of waste an event supported by material which persists and lingers, an evident and tangible remainder of past action. This makes what I have loosely called 'the event of waste' the observed or assumed transition where a thing falls into the mixed and disorientated time of waste. The articulation and fashioning of time occur in occasions both routine and utterly unanticipated, things give us the mark and measure of time. If we could simply anaesthetize an object in order to study the time it is said to inhabit (or *vice versa*) it would certainly help us come up with a general theory of waste objects. But to do so would reinforce a Cartesian division between 'mind' and 'matter' that tends to neglect how the creation of waste does not merely happen *in* time but is time's co-creative element. It is clear at this stage that the relay between an object, its status as waste, and the event it is said to represent produces a complex web of associations. In this respect, each actor in this triumvirate (object, event, time) should not be made to be a passive intermediary or homogenous substitute for another; each associates and transforms the other. Waste, amongst other things, transforms time to make the event knowable and available for narration.

Brown in particular, and Stallabrass and Scanlan to a lesser extent, share in a particular philosophical tradition, a philosophy that revels in how time is exposed through things. Martin Heidegger's analysis of the broken tool – which according to Graham Harman provides us with 'the greatest moment

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of twentieth-century philosophy'[10] – serves as an exemplary and influential example of how waste might reinforce an ontology of objects in time. The Heideggerian thesis on the failure of equipment is of great relevance to the idea of waste as an event of conspicuousness, an instant when something previously hidden comes to our attention.

For Heidegger, equipment (*Zeug*, stuff or paraphernalia[11]) is composed by its 'equipmentality', the contextual references to other things. A single piece of equipment always relates and belongs to a totality of useful things. Equipment, whilst contextually given within the totality of the world, is orientated to and by the workings of outcomes. It should be stressed that Heidegger's understanding of 'equipment' can designate mountains, roller-skates and wild bears, not just the hammers, jugs or other technologically 'simple' entities that he addresses directly. This is important because it takes us beyond Stallabrass' interest in the 'commodity', which appears to limit the concept of waste to things that have entered a particular economic arrangement, and it also takes us beyond the somewhat domestic and familiar objects – which need to be produced, distributed, consumed and exhibited – that Brown uses as his points of reference. Moreover, Heidegger's conception of objects amounts to a networked totality of equipment or things, and each equipmental entity is related to the world of equipment and applied to particular assignments at certain times. Objects take their definition not from what they are, in some static or ideal condition, but from the 'various ways of the "in-order-to", such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability'.[12] The ontological status of a particular object depends upon how it is put into the service of our dealings, our concern and the broader totality that Heidegger calls equipment. This projective interaction with things, with its structure of the '*towards-which*' and the '*for-which*', enacts the peculiar condition Heidegger terms '*readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]*'.[13] For Heidegger, this readiness-to-hand is a symptom of a kinetic, assigned and future-orientated manipulation of physical objects. By being caught up in the structure of unfolding work, the presence of the object is cast into the background. We are absorbed in the world of the thing and not the thing itself. As Harman explains, 'the more efficiently the tool performs its function, the more it tends to recede from view'.[14] Importantly, objects as equipment are not permanent fixtures but frequently break or go missing. An object can become unusable and, by becoming so, makes conspicuous the contextual relations suspended:

> We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous.

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> This *conspicuousness* presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself—that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back into repair.[15]

Heidegger is keen to stress that the loss of readiness-to-hand does not become replaced by a pure presence. Instead, presence is announced but restrained by our concern for the thing, through its repair and reassignment. But what if we do not concern ourselves with the broken equipment, what if we do not repair the object or return it into active service? In this regard Heidegger has little to say on the matter of waste, other than that discarded objects cease to become equipment and become 'equipment', and, despite this change, remain ready-to-hand. 'Equipment' becomes a kind of waste for Heidegger, 'in the sense of something which one would like to shove out of the way. But in such a Tendency to shove things aside, the ready-to-hand shows itself as still ready-to-hand'.[16] Contrary to Scanlan, Heidegger believes that objects that no longer relate to our projects and plans maintain some association with their former role as useful things. They become 'equipment', conspicuous things thrown into inverted commas, momentarily wrenched from the referential structures that have hitherto secreted them within the service of a particular project. The advent of waste provides an opportunity to reassess these assignments, the event of waste enacts a specific kind of reversal where what was once retiring or implicit has suddenly become explicit. The presence of the object appears between the disappearance of one expression of readiness-to-hand and the appearance of another, and between each expression of readiness-to-hand a break occurs that lights up the thing in question. This is not to say that the structure of reference had never been comprehended until this moment, but the disruption of the ready-to-hand serves to locate the object in a particular time and space. It causes,

> a *break* in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time *what* it was ready-to-hand *for*. The environment announces itself afresh. What is thus lit up is not itself just one thing ready-to-hand among others; still less is it something *present-at-hand* upon which equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded: it is in the 'there' before anyone has observed or ascertained it.[17]

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The event of waste is a time-creating phenomenon, announcing a present that was otherwise overwhelmed by the future. The seizure and subsequent revelation of a disrupted contexture denote the 'there' of the object, its particular location in space and time. Bill Brown would have us believe that the failure of equipment merely discloses a particular subject–object relation. Heidegger's thesis is far more ambitious. The failure of equipment discloses our relation with space, time or our being-in-the-world. It does not simply reveal how we *perceive* things in the world: it reveals the projective nature of *Da-sein*. If equipmentality is embedded within the referential web of the world, then it follows that any interruption to this equipmentality, or attempt to thrust this equipment into inverted commas, must reveal both from what and how this referential web is composed. The advent of waste puts objects at a threshold by which pre-existing structures of meaning are called forth to expose their fragility. For Scanlan, on the other hand, the disruption of pre-existing codes means that waste objects somehow fall from referential structures altogether. But in Heidegger's philosophy of things, the temporality of the broken tool and the event it produces keep waste from negating meaning. As Heidegger is careful to point out, the interruption to the ready-to-hand is precisely that, an interruption; the object does not simply disappear but it becomes ready-to-hand in a new way.

An undeniable tension has persisted so far in our investigation. Whilst these theories might point to the sensational occurrence where an object of use, function or serviceability is 'suddenly' and 'momentarily' lit up, what happens when this failure is expected? It might be convenient to speak of ruptures, seizures and so on, especially since these temporal metaphors help us conceive the dramatic or arresting encounters we might have with waste things and the durations they are said to represent. Indeed, catastrophes and the waste they produce are frequently expressed through this kind of seismic temporal event. And on the occasions where our circumspection does in fact wheel around and focus on the thing that has, until that time, gone unnoticed, it might be useful to think with the terms that Heidegger et al. suggest to us. Yet, when I finish reading my newspaper, I probably do not enjoy an encounter with the referential contexture of 'the world', and, for the majority of our meetings with waste, we rarely have this momentous sense of event or revelation. We must now consider the occasions when we know full well that waste will be the outcome of our actions; the formative importance of waste, time and their narrative description will remain a pressing concern.

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Continuities of waste

Until now we have considered a specific kind of waste event, where things suddenly divulge the assignments by which they took their meaning. Time is made by a break, an interruption or conclusion of use; waste creates an event by disrupting the continuity of use-time. But many things take their meaning from being assigned to being broken; their readiness-to-hand is felt through the inevitable sense that this readiness-to-hand is achieved not through the unexpected discontinuity of use but by an anticipated consummation of use-time. Things *go to* waste, moving, drifting or driving towards an inevitable end. In Heidegger's writings we saw how using and employing things might cause a form of inattention to the time of things, which provides the conditions of our surprise when they fail. This may well be the case for a great many objects, particularly those things we consider most durable, or for those who like to do their DIY in a wild frenzy. Yet this sense of inattention certainly does not tally with some foreseeable or desirable expressions of waste, to which we will now turn.

Things give, make and take time. An object's material qualities play a fundamental role in lending duration to our activities, to the perception that some things are more durable than others or are intrinsically transient. Heidegger's hammering thought experiment supposes that all hammers hammer in the same way over time, until they suddenly break and light up their referential context. But a hammer made of steel can be expected to hammer nails for longer and with different effects than a hammer made of jelly. Hammers will break in different ways according to the nature of their design, the materials and techniques of their manufacture and the sort of hammering they are put to. The circumstances, durations and, of course, the actual nature of the thing being used will alter the ways that waste is felt to occur.

We expect waste to be an outcome, frequently the *necessary* outcome of a process; things of waste often signify closure, resolution or a termination. Consider the leftovers produced when eating or creating energy. The disposal of a banana skin might be seen as the necessary consequence of eating a banana; carbon dioxide might be said to be one consequence of burning fossil fuels for energy. In this regard, economists speak of 'externalities' (often prefixed with the words 'positive' or 'negative') to describe the expected by-products of a process. Whether for good or for ill, the externality of waste is frequently found at the scene of numerous activities, often playing an integral role in the successful consummation of those processes. The waste products of the human body

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merely serve as particularly proximate examples of this temporal relation; bodily excretions serve as daily reminders of how our bodies are getting on with things. There are countless other examples of how waste can be anticipated, intended or engineered that rarely bring about the ecstatic character of temporality expressed through Heidegger's broken tool. Nevertheless, the 'towards which' and 'for which' that Heidegger argued are the hallmarks of readiness-to-hand do not disappear when we anticipate waste; it simply becomes apprehended through its finitude, through the imminent generation of an occasion, an event felt to stand in the future. If an object is said to be 'towards' and 'for' a particular project, then this object must also participate in shaping how its failure or non-participation is experienced. The deployment of material things, and the expectation of waste this deployment anticipates, suggests the image or conception of time that is being deployed. When objects are used, and an event of waste is then said to mark the cessation of this use, then waste announces itself as an object of time.

We constantly harness the temporal measure that functioning things give us. Use-time is, as we saw in the previous chapter, a time distributed by calculated ends. Whether we drift towards these ends slowly and gently, like the protracted wearing of a door against its hinges, or experience the kind of rapid and visible end when burning wood for fuel, we can narrate the changing potential for a thing to do work and fulfil the projects designated to it. Although advertising slogans might try to convince us otherwise, manufacturers rarely produce or are capable of producing objects that 'last forever', we use many objects with their functional and temporal ends mutually supporting each other. Planned obsolescence is the notion that one designs and manufactures equipment that has a finite use-time; it provides a useful example of how we expect things to waste.[18] The clothing, consumer electronics and motor vehicle industries are often singled out as being those that thrive on so-called 'death-dating'.[19] But this attitude towards objects, which we *expect* to break over indeterminate but no less finite durations, enacts a more general relationship we have with the manipulation of things through time. When we acquire a hammer or a mobile phone (by gift or some other means), we expect that its functional life is limited and that it will eventually, despite our best attempts to ensure its long service, cease to operate within our aims and activities. Crucially, waste is not always a leftover of time, a preterite thing of subtle retrospection, but a thing with which to think through the future. We find the tardiness of waste transformed into an object of future memory, employed in what Derrida called the 'future anterior' mode.[20] Waste-time operates as a powerful but insubordinate supplement to the time of use; the useful thing will become the waste that is the condition of our using. In this temporal respect, waste

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does not stand 'outside' or 'external' to our use of things, as orthodox economics tends to stress. Our care, the attention that we direct towards the thing, is equally finite – we are concerned so long as the object operates within our projects and yet we retain understanding of use that makes immanent the time of waste. The rites and rituals of waste disposal, as varied and complex as our treatment of human remains, testify to how we measure the time expected in things according to their relation to the labour of the living.

Since the unexpected, surprising or arresting moment when objects fail to meet our expectations enjoys the drama of the unforeseen, and offers a chance to observe the suspended relations once implicated in an activity, it might be tempting to set this revelatory event against a more pragmatic, predetermined or anticipatory understanding of waste. But to anticipate waste has its own promise of revelation. Finding that one's hopes or expectations have come to pass, that what once was useful can be made wasteful, can seem to verify all sorts of procedures, beliefs and durations. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the advent of waste has the potential to provoke lofty thoughts of the universe, God or the state of human nature, and the anticipation of waste plays an equally significant role in this provocation. Waste can be produced, both entirely unexpectedly and by our most fervent machinations, but the consequences of these events or encounters with waste meet in how we understand waste objects to communicate what an object is, was and yet might be; their narrative potential. As was elaborated in Chapter 1, discarded objects, those things that no longer relate to our plans and projects, enter a polyvalent and suspended time – deferred, postponed and yet anticipating something else, something more, something yet to come. So although the condition of being waste can taint an object with a tardy sense of 'already and not yet', it does so by being available to participate in the fulfilment of time.

So far, I have suggested two rather generic modes by which waste emerges. The first saw the occurrence of waste as something that took us by surprise, revealing the discontinuous time we invest in an object as well as how objects give time to those that it acts with and upon. Time became ecstatic in this case, marking and measuring the transition of things from use into waste, from one collective relation to another, from inattention to concern. The second expression of waste, to be extended and developed in Chapter 7, acknowledges how this passing from use into disuse can also be wholly expected, engineered or observed over a period of time. In the former, the image of time is retrospectively realized; in the latter, the image of time is proleptically maintained. In both cases, the moment that waste is felt to have occurred, its power to articulate a new time or

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era, can herald the most momentous occasions – such as the arrival of a divine entity, the fall of an empire or the entropic decline of the universe. Of course, the unexpected or discontinuous and the anticipated or continuous effects of waste frequently mix with one another; what is anticipated has surprising effects, what is surprising becomes understood to have been inevitable. Acts of narration play a crucial role in legislating these mixtures, in organizing how we articulate, trace and reproduce our judgements about these waste events, their composition, repercussions, and so on. The narrative interpretation of waste reaches across an implicit threshold that divides the time of use and the time of waste, besides speculating what the object might become. The event – be it in the form of a Heideggerian interruption or a messianic anticipation of a temporal end – renders articulate the delicate division between the time of use and the time of waste. The polyvalent nature of waste's temporality, harbouring past and future events and which occurs without notice or under the tension of our expectations, will be a recurrent problem throughout the thesis that follows. In Chapters 4 and 5, we will see how this temporality of dispersal can displace writing, generating problems of material and semantic closure. In Chapters 6 and 7, we will give greater attention to the consequences that the retrospective and anticipatory employment of waste-time has in our experience of architecture. Chapter 7, in particular, will explore the future of waste in much greater detail. Throughout these chapters narrative, and the various kinds of scripts that it issues, proves crucial in disseminating the events of waste, shaping and explaining how it is made and how it relates to other times and places. It is narrative that accounts for and legislates between the continuities and discontinuities that we can recognize in waste, its rich mix of interruption and persistence.

Narrating the event of waste in the work of Cornelia Parker

Though telling tales with things seems ubiquitous, one in excess of particular ways or technical forms of narration, it is important not to overextend the status of narrative in general. Fredric Jameson once claimed that forging narratives is an 'all-informing process [and] the central function or instance of the human mind'.[21] But, as David Herman explains in his book *Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind*, research findings in developmental, psychotherapeutic and phenomenological fields suggest that first-person experiences – such as those embodied, expressive phenomena through which information is exchanged with immediacy – are not always built on a narrative scaffold. More cautiously, Herman argues that

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the capacity to fashion narratives is an achieved skill: 'narratives at once rise from and facilitate more deliberate, reasoned efforts to makes sense of persons' reasons for acting, when those reasons—or constellations of beliefs, desires, intentions and values—remain unspecified and potentially undeterminate given the available pragmatic contexts'.[22] It is this understanding of narrative, which is more than an object of interpretation but a means by which to understand and disentangle objects in the world, that I adopt in this book. Therefore, I use the term 'narrative' in an unusual and rather specific way. Separate from the explicitly textual conceptions developed through structuralist and post-structuralist schools, I do not view the process of making narratives to be reducible to texts nor do I endorse an implicit textualization of the world. I thus avoid some strict distinctions, common in narrative theory, between 'story' (all the events that are depicted), 'plot' (the chain of causation between each event) and a generalized conception of 'narrative' (the process of showing or telling these events, as well as their selection), since these distinctions cannot be easily upheld when discussing non-textual or non-filmic objects.[23] So, along with Herman's attempts to understand 'the deliberate sense-making strategies that involve situating persons in storyworlds',[24] I wish to show how narratives rise from and facilitate more a deliberate consideration of material action, the use, of objects in storyworlds whose pragmatic contexts are confused by the status as waste.

I argue that things called waste, by expressing an event that helps formulate a time separate from their using, are readily if not intrinsically linked to the formation of narratives in this broadened sense. In developing a theory of narrative that can account for the ways in which we describe the past, present and future of things, I find it productive to concentrate on the ways in which narrative mediates between the perception and organization of events. As Gérard Genette has argued, the event is the formative unit of all narratives: 'as soon as there is action or an event, even a single one, there is story because there is a transformation from an earlier state to a later resultant state'.[25] In discussing this base and ubiquitous role that events play in instigating a narrative mode of thinking, H. Porter Abbott takes an image of a shipwreck and not only underlines the necessity of events in narrative formation but also introduces the way in which conditions of waste open and divide time in order to provoke narrative engagement:

> we do see more than a ship; we see a ship*wreck*. In other words, included in the present time of the picture is a shadowy sense of time preceding it, and specifically of narrative time—that is, time composed of a succession of necessary events that leads up to, and accounts for, what we see.[26]

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As we have seen, narrating waste not only opens up a shadowy sense of preceding events but can also herald events of the future. Important to Abbott's analysis of the shipwreck is the perception of absence, a backstory, an implied but necessary succession of events. There is no overarching plot, nor is there a discernable or objective chain of causation linking these events together. With Abbott's example in mind, we might set images of waste at a slight remove from those narrative theories that assume the events a narrative describes are necessarily explicit, involve human agents and are dependent upon a manifestation in texts. As Mieke Bal has observed, 'many events, among them the most important ones, are not mentioned, only implied'.[27] The logic of the waste event and the cause of its centrality within many forms of sculpture, literature and architecture relate to how waste implies events through a temporality of dispersal, a complex intermingling of the present and the absent that instrumentalizes a lingering and uncanny permutation of temporal redundancy. It is this intermingling of the present and the absent that challenges, enchants and frustrates, and explains hesitation before artworks that make and are made from waste.

Contemporary sculpture provides opportunities to narrate the events of waste and stage the unravelling acts that delineate the varying times we ascribe to things. British sculptor Cornelia Parker is well known for her engagement with objects of varying kinds and dimensions, meditating upon their stories and the events in which they were and are entangled. There will be opportunities during later chapters to consider other kinds of narrators and narrative mediums, but for now we can turn our attention to how the temporality of waste described earlier can aid us in our approach to contemporary artworks; doing so will exemplify the role of narrative that has yet to be fully demonstrated. Both Gillian Whiteley and Vea Legrine historicize the inclusion of waste materials in sculpture as a twentieth-century phenomenon, emerging through the traditions of assemblage associated with Cubism, Dadaism, Surrealism and Arte Povera.[28] Whiteley argues that '"junk-art" is primarily associated with the idiom of *assemblage* [which involves] the composition and juxtaposition of fragments of objects, materials and images'.[29] This seems a safe definition of assemblage and yet the transformative potential Whiteley gives it is in danger of ignoring how discarded things are already assembled fragments of pasts and futures, redundancies and potentialities. Fragments, by their definition, cannot be just or only fragments, they must carry a sense of their fragmentation from something else, even if what exactly they are fragments of remains open to doubt and speculation. Assemblage, Whiteley claims, 'provid[es] trash with a new narrative, a cultural life of its own' and yet the events and temporalities of waste mean that discarded

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things provide the preconditions of sculptural assemblage.[30] Through the work of Cornelia Parker, I would like to claim that art does not provide waste a new narrative as such, since waste is, itself, a condition generative of narrative which often prefigures its inclusion within sculpture. Waste invokes the protensions and retensions of waste events and it is this capacity that brings an assemblage of time to works that include or play with the idea of waste. What follows is, therefore, not an attempt to historicize Parker's use of waste things but to provide a more thoroughgoing exploration of how objects manipulate and are manipulated by narratives of use and waste.

It should be clear that my aim is not to draw a causal relation between certain artworks and an industrial history of waste production but, instead, to elucidate what might be at stake in designating, manipulating and interpreting art when the idea of waste is at play. This mode of analysis does not represent the abandonment of historical context but aims to provide an explanation for why narrative 'contexts' are so often evoked by waste things. There are reasons for choosing Parker's work over that of her forebears or contemporaries. First, her work is full of waste things, stuff that has been dispersed, has been gathered and repositioned with respect to an action no longer performed. Second, Parker's work expresses an interest in how objects have meaning and how these meanings undergo interruptions, transformations and translations. Through objects that have undergone a careful process of arrangement and presentation, she re-approaches what might be termed the everyday or quotidian object – reworking the object by staging rather than erasing what is past. Her best-known works, *Thirty Pieces of Silver* (1988–1989), *Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View* (1991), *Avoided Object* (1995), *The Negative of Words* (1996) and *Mass: Colder Darker Matter* (1997), operate in a dispersed chorus to reassess how the time of Parker's source material becomes an engine for narrative engagement. Her work, in its broadest sense, does not so much create something new but recreates the old, the new and the future in anachronic assembly (Figure 2.1).

What kinds of narratives are at work in this piece? There is a narrative of formation, the event of its genesis or creation. But here we have already run into waste and its power to divide time; does the work begin with the thing or the event of waste, does it end with the thing or the event of waste? The work has brought about the destruction of a garden shed into hundreds of disparate shards. The careful arrangement of these shards on wire and their subsequent suspension within a gallery space might seem to take us a long distance from the ecstatic terms with which we discussed the event of waste. But Parker's *Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View* does, nonetheless, articulate an event by which

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Figure 2.1 Cornelia Parker, *Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View* (1991). Mixed media, unconfirmed: 4000 × 5000 × 5000 mm, installation view, Tate Collection, London.

the creation of waste is entirely manipulated and suggests the availability of narratives that can participate in and motivate our interaction with the work. With an orderly chaos Parker strings up an assemblage of fragments, a static mobile, but of a material in which assemblies of time and narrative inform our perception of the fragmentary itself.

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One explanation for what this messy horde might mean is immediately given to us should we glance at the gallery wall. The small piece of text, tacked or inscribed directly on the wall, tells us that Parker took a garden shed to the British Army and, with the help of an explosives team, dispersed a diminutive yet functional piece of garden architecture across the earth.[31] The title helps trace the relationship between the assemblage suspended before us and the creative work of destruction that the artwork draws upon.[32] In the first instance, we are asked to juxtapose the rich artifice of Parker's 'exploded view' with the explosion that we are told has been instrumental in its making, the work provides a position with which to view a collage of different times and places. The garden shed is rendered a porous, tantalizingly opaque spectacle, one that requires the temporal and spatial location of the gallery in order to be inscribed within the series of events found external to it. The balance between the once existent shed and its delicately presented remains is a balance brokered by the narrative techniques we employ to make the necessary leap from one time to another, from one place to another. Narrative is not simply applied to the work like some theory or ointment; narrative is felt to be latent within the work's suspension, explosiveness and semantic shadow play. Parker brings an assembly of objects and suspends them as if they are in flight, as if they are on their way to an elsewhere; waste, whether achieved by disposal or knowing destruction, always gives this elsewhere an ambivalent presence. It is this articulated yet disjointed time that makes Parker's shed a thing of waste. The shed has not simply been destroyed; it remains and yet it is no longer, it lingers yet is discontinued.

There can be no disputing the act of demolition that the shed has gone through, it could never be misunderstood as resembling the shed it once was. Parker *reassembles* her ex-shed into something that looks nothing like a healthy shed full of tools and old bits of rope and yet it is, nonetheless, an enclosed form, an enclosure that contains tools and old bits of rope within it. What kind of relationship has been established between shed and ex-shed? Jonathan Watkins argues, 'by blowing up the shed Parker is taking away such a place, throwing doubt on all that it represents. Its contents are revealed, damaged in the process and yet somehow more eloquent'.[33] For Watkins, the shed's destruction performs a kind of exorcism, removing both the location of the shed's meaning – which 'is a sort of half-way house, an overspill for such objects which, for whatever reason, aren't wanted or needed as they once were' – and its referential stability.[34] Of course, the idea that the reclusive, secluded and domestic atmosphere of the shed has been absolutely erased runs contrary to our powers to retrospectively

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engage with the work; we do not simply ask what *is* this thing, we also ask what *was* this thing. In other words, it is precisely the material remains of the shed that guarantees that an erasure of time and place has been enigmatically denied, the things remain available for our narrative assessment and speculation.

Parker has said that her work is in the business of taking the clichéd beliefs that objects transport and, by unmaking and refashioning these objects, remaking the ideas that are associated with them:

> I like the idea of the material already being loaded, or clichéd. By trying to unpick or dismantle something and remake it, somehow the perimeters get changed. What I'm trying to do is to take very clichéd monumental things, things that everybody knows what they are (or think you know what they are) and then trying to find a flip side to it or the unconscious of it.[35]

Here we might recognize echoes from our discussion of Heidegger's secular revelation: the failure of equipment produces a before and after, a plateau from which to survey what has past. But this shed has not failed in the Heideggerian sense; it was knowingly destroyed in order to provide this plateau. Neither are the fragments of the shed taken up for repair, nor are they merely 'shoved aside' as useless. The explosion is an act that is orientated towards which and for which, to adopt a Heideggerian phrase, yet productive of matter that seems either to have lost direction or taken on a temporal directionlessness. Perhaps we are closer to the anticipated, sacrificial effect of waste, to the purposive creation of time through the negation of a function. Parker has taken up the clichéd time of the shed – a store of things, a retreat, a place of quiet seclusion – and, through the mediating function of waste, strings this time up for examination.

Clearly, the remains of the shed succeed in making the shed or the trace of the shed visible, but visible in a way that is felt to be somewhat divorced from 'equipmentality'. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the shed or the places it evokes have not vanished, but have become visible in a new way; translated into narrative of absence that translates and adapts Parker's source material. This observation, closer to Parker's own concerns for the shifting perimeters of things, returns us to the revelatory event of the ready-to-hand, to the moment when the familiar and homely becomes interrupted, made strange or *unheimlich*.[36] But we cannot end there; a disrupted sense of the uncanny is a fleeting and nebulous feeling, soon absorbed by the labour of interpretation and self-assessment. If 'the piece evolves out of the ambiguity of the material',[37] as Parker herself has observed, then out of this evolutionary state issues the challenge to respond

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to this ambiguity, to turn it over and make sense of its materiality. We might retrace and take account of how this ambiguity has been formed, manipulated and presented to us – that is, we might wrestle with the relationship between all the stories we know or associate with sheds and try to make sense of Parker's exploded view using these comparisons. But to do so might be to anchor our response in precisely the clichés that Parker hopes to challenge. If we chose to acknowledge the shed as an uncanny thing that invokes the spectre of a shed but not the shed itself, we might trace the shuttling movement between the places and times of waste, the destruction of a form and its reappearance through Parker's presentational methods. In both cases narrative takes a leading role, either in compensating for the alien and unusual or articulating the doubts and contingencies that the work might issue.

Narratives require narrators or an authorial position, a delimiting perspective.[38] It is important to note how the destruction of the shed alters its ability to signify, express or demonstrate something a functioning shed could not. This raises the interesting and potentially contentious issue of where narrative authority arises in this work: does the material of waste delimit the perspectives or authorial positions available to the gallery visitor? For Watkins, the exploded shed becomes *more* eloquent for being damaged, *more* eloquent for being revealed; the fragments now have a testimonial power, an ability to produce a meaning in which the event of waste takes an essential role. The narrative limits of the work have changed and are now informed by its correspondence to the event of waste. This does not rob the work of meaning as such; in presenting these suspended things Parker's material affects a lithe and fragile collage of associations between different events, times and places by which all objects are assembled. *Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View* can therefore be understood as a mediator of these events, times and places, traced through the narrative responses that must take and makes order through the diverging times of use and waste. This should not give cause to critical abandon or blind 'anything goes' subjectivism but shows respect to our narrative habits and our familiarity with remains. Esther Leslie has claimed that the readymade allows things to enter 'a space of free play, of unbounded significance, connotation and, thus, re-personalization. Radical subjectivity is found in the abandoned because its abandonment means no one has a stake in it'.[39] And yet by recognizing Parker's material as waste to be narrated, her deliberate gesture of making, unmaking and remaking anew precludes any sense of absolute plurality. Again, we see how waste establishes estranged relationships within an object, a temporal break of its use and non-

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use, relationships that help us recognize something as 'waste' and something of 'unbounded significance'. This process of estrangement does not free meaning nor does it erase meaning; it simply makes the task of narrating the biography of things a more risky one. Parker's work enacts narratives by having a dual function as both an actor in and mediator of the narrative act, throwing us towards the questionable absence of the shed, its explosion, reconstruction and display. Yet the disjuncture between the time of its functionality and its destruction, the time of presentation and the reparative narratives that pass between these fragile positions, gives an opportunity to imagine events that are mediated by an object of sculpture.

In 1997, Parker was working as an artist in residence at ArtPace, San Antonio, Texas. She heard that a small church, the Baptist Church of Lytle, Texas, had been struck by lightning and had burnt to the ground. Having gained permission to collect the charred remains, she arranged and displayed the fragments on wire, densely grouped towards the centre and more evenly distributed towards the work's edges (Figure 2.2). The result had so much in common with her earlier work that she saw fit to make the connection explicit, naming it *Mass (Colder Darker Matter)*. As we discovered with *Cold Dark Matter*, a narrative relay operates between an architecture and the remnants that testifies to a specific event of waste. The difference between this and her earlier work is that the objects that Parker has collected, suspended and displayed to an audience produce a somewhat different narrative form, a kind of narrative ellipsis through which the sequence and structure of the waste is set at a distance from the fragments that are its remainder. Bal's sense that narrative is supported by untold events is dramatically displayed in *Mass*. Whereas in *Cold Dark Matter* many of the shed's fragments were recognizable things from a shed, making immediate our connections between shed and ex-shed, time of use and time of waste, the charred remains of the Texan church are less readily apprehended. This obscurity arises, amongst other things, in the difficulty of locating the waste event from which the work arose, its discontinuous relation to use, the point at which a past is produced and a continuity precluded. It is, in short, a problem of providing the work with a reliable narrative source and smoothing over this discontinuous effect. The temporal effect of this sense of narrative unreliability is not, as is typically ascribed to techniques of narrative ellipsis in literary fiction, to speed up time. Instead, the work has a static, haunting and suspended sense of a time slowed or stilled to the point where our attempts to explain the work require our projection of a past. That is, we must animate the work through a temporal ellipsis it refuses to complete or resolve.

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Figure 2.2 Cornelia Parker, *Mass (Colder Darker Matter)* (1997). Burnt wood, wire and string, dimensions variable, installation view, collection of Phoenix Art Museum, Arizona.

Parker had intended to mystify her audience, using the material's suggestive absence to ground our attempts at making it a legible whole. 'You can't really tell it's a church unless you read the label', she says, 'I was reconstituting it. It's now abstract'.[40] The work is certainly more 'abstract' in the sense that our flights of interpretation seem to depend less on familiar 'useful' forms as they did in *Cold Dark Matter*, but, again, Parker is careful to provide a description that locates her source materials. The label reads: 'Mass (Colder Darker Matter), 1997/Charcoal retrieved from a church struck by lightning/With thanks to the Baptist Church of Lytle, Texas'. Anyone who wishes to verify these sources will soon realize that

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Parker has deliberately directed her audience through the disjuncture that is felt between the time of use and the time of waste, that baffling and suspended ellipsis. Her gratitude to the 'Baptist Church of Lytle, Texas' simply underscores the dispersed geography of the work and emphasizes the ambivalent role the church has played in the work's composition.

What prevents Parker's work from becoming a pure abstraction, from falling beyond the reach of any sensible assessment, is the temporal relationship drawn between the event that has destroyed the church and the presentation of its charred fragments. As we noted during our discussion of *Cold Dark Matter*, the pre-existing meanings of things and the events in which these objects participate provide Parker's work its narrative energy. Churches can be many things to the imagination that Parker appeals to; they are places of worship, sanctuary, music, celebration, misery and alienation. The advent and event of waste place all these sentiments, 'clichés' as Parker would say, in a past that is felt to remain in charcoal. In distinction to Whiteley's conception of assemblage, Parker claims 'The work really makes itself; you are just rearranging the materials'.[41] As tempting as it might be to dismiss this claim as false modesty, we should take seriously the idea that her work is autopoetic, that it 'makes itself'. The invocation of an event of waste, the moment where use has ceased and waste has come into being, can be seen as one way to think through this issue of autopoiesis or the self-generating and autonomous actualization of an artwork. *Mass* makes itself because it takes the way in which time is organized around the use and non-use of objects as a point of narrative departure, as a temporal arrangement ready for rearranging. The shards of burnt church that Parker strings up carry with them a narrative invitation to tarry with the time we give and are given architectures, environments and other material things. Destruction by lightning, which we assume to be relatively quick and unexpected, means that this particular event of waste becomes aligned with the surprising, Heideggerian notion of the broken-tool; the destruction of the church lights up the projective time of the building. The sudden and perhaps violent destruction of God's house manipulates the narratalogical effects of this waste event. The blackened relics of charcoal become charged with an intense significance, these small and somewhat indeterminate things begin to evoke 'very clichéd monumental things', the clichéd, routine or monumental images of time that we deploy through objects. Parker uses garden sheds and Baptist churches to explore how we lend and are lent time by material things. Whilst the shed was destroyed by explosives and the church burnt by electricity, the similar manner in which the remnants are rearranged and displayed encourages us to see how time is productive of and produced by

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waste. We must stand before these mobiles and imagine other times and other places, mobilizing the time that lingers with these suspended things.

One might want to argue that one (the shed) was destroyed by human design whilst the other (the church) was destroyed by a natural occurrence. But it is this division between the 'human' and the 'natural' that Parker's work so powerfully confounds. By deploying material remainders and remnants, objects that acted in some way but do so no longer, complex assemblages can be traced that follow the roles of both human and non-human entities. The works of Cornelia Parker demonstrate a careful and deliberate narrative that places these myriad associations within a network. One waste event is not the exclusive work of humans and another the exclusive work of natural elements; instead, Parker's mobiles communicate an entangled mix of human and non-human actors and how these different actors relate to different times and places. To trace these mixtures is to embark upon a labour of interpretation not just to tell what, when and how a thing came to be, but to trace how each actor continues to work within an assembly of things. Parker's mobile is a narrative technique that threads actors together that no longer act in the way that they once did, constituting a past that means Parker's work operates through presences dispersed, supplemented and deferred, tenses commingled. *Mass* is historical and creates history in so far that it is a collage of time that issues a narrative demand, and yet the historical narrative that can be attached to these things is uneven and full of risk. These objects are suggestive of associations and collectives, rich in human and non-human agents – lightning strikes, burnt bits of wood, the architectural, economic, religious and geographical functions that these bits of wood were once party to, Cornelia Parker, ArtPace, the congregation of Baptist Church of Lytle – the list of possible actors widens and widens. The work mediates and translates these associations, providing a tracery of their effects, and providing an object by which to narrate the multiple trajectories of things. An important question arises: could the work do this without using waste objects? I think the answer must be yes, it could, but it would do so in a different way, with different effects, using a different series of narrative entities and without the temporal partitions imposed by obsolescence. The sculpture of waste helps stage and organize the narrative potential of a thing, the specifically discarded nature of those objects means that artists like Cornelia Parker can guide us through and perhaps beyond the clichés commonly attached to them, towards speculative stories collaboratively produced.

Heart of Darkness (2004) is a more recent work of Parker's, one that also plays out the powerful marriage between objects, time and narrative that we

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have pursued so far. It provides a useful conclusion to this chapter because it emphasizes an aspect of waste that has so far been obscured: repetition. Until now, we have focussed on how waste marks and is marked by an event, a moment or sequence of moments which produces waste through a temporality loaded with retentions, protentions, suspensions and interruptions. Narrative, amongst other things, pertains to the labour of tracing within an object its time of use and its time of waste; by describing what a waste object is we must describe what that object is and reckon with its time past and future. But Parker's repeated use of waste objects in her sculpture insists that waste is not rare and need not take us by surprise. Whilst waste always occurs within singular circumstances the temporal inscription that seems to characterize a thing of waste, the divorce between its working 'life' and its 'living death', makes the labour of narrating waste much more common than it might at first appear. Those old shoes in the street or an abandoned cottage in the country mean little without this ability to respond to a time that is both present and absent, to a thing that seems to be a leftover of time itself. *Heart of Darkness* and its companions exemplify the narrative demands that confront us on a daily basis, narrative demands that sculpture takes occasion to issue in particularly provocative ways. In a formula that should now be familiar to us, Parker strings up objects that have spent their existence in one time and yet seem capable of making a noisy demonstration of their non-use, re-use and reassembly.

Parker's description of this work, along with her morbid invocation of Conrad's novella, sets our narrative interpretation upon a particular tack. We are told that the Florida Forestry Division was 'managing' a woodland area by burning back what was adjudged overgrown, but the fire got out of control and quickly spread, burning large areas of woodland. As in *Mass*, Parker collects the remains of this event and arranged them in a cube, suspending the fragments on wire. Again, the human and the non-human are tragically interconnected; any attempt to apportion blame will soon be lost in a riddle of chance and speculation. For instance, trying to designate whose 'heart' has been darkened or where this heart is said to reside has been rendered problematic by a work composed of a multitude of actors, all of which relate to one another in subtly different ways. The work is the tip of an enormous, sprawling sequence of events and the blackened remains of these events are the substance and source of, and conclusion to, our interpretations.

The gesture of taking a 'has been' and stringing it up in order to make those objects speak in new and peculiar ways must traverse and enact the problem of the waste event. To interpret Parker's work is to engage with how objects carry,

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mould and are given time through the cessation of use. One must respond to the contingent and incomplete termination that waste objects suggest and the continuity through disruption which attempts to narrate waste objects must attend to. The employment of waste within sculpture is necessarily the result of their redundancy elsewhere, in a time and place that is also felt to be strangely redundant. These things neither become absolutely useless nor do they take back the use they once enjoyed. By becoming employed as objects of sculpture these things become open to a different sort of reading, a different scene of narration. In the same way that we can read a text in different ways according to why, when and where we might read it, we might add that we narrate objects differently when we confront them in a gallery or museum. What does not change, however, is the way we narrate and relate to time through things. The sculpture of waste is already engaged in the sculpting of these networks, these connections. That waste embodies an event where these connections have been loosened, reconfigured and made visible in a gallery simply attests to how things of waste are particularly adept in mediating both what they are and what they were.

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3

Archaeologies of Waste

My question for this chapter is, at first appearances, a simple one: What is gathered when waste is collected? We have seen what might occur when Cornelia Parker gathers up bits of wood and metal in order to narrate an absent event of waste, but there remains much more to be said about this business of hunting and gathering discarded things. The problem of collecting waste will occupy us for the rest of this section, although we will continue to develop an understanding of waste that relates to the composition and articulation of times, objects and narratives. I will continue to maintain in the following analysis that the contemplation of waste requires the mediation of events, a trace of various times and a sequence of action to be translated by acts of narration. By exploring the relationship between the times, objects and narratives that collections might mediate, we will know much more about how objects give and take time according to their use. This chapter sets up an enquiry into how collecting and organizing waste objects into collections can model the stories that might be told by those collections. It does not take for granted that collecting discarded things necessarily reverses the dispersal of waste; instead, we will see how the contestation between gathering and dispersal serves to structure the oscillating relationship between the temporalities of using and discarding.

One of the advantages of prioritizing a more philosophical approach to the subject of waste – as opposed to one dominated by an historical or economic perspective – is that it allows us to explore how waste both makes and marks time by being collected. Although I realize this method suffers from its impatience with some of the traditions of historiography, it might succeed in doing what a more historical account might neglect: to provide a working vocabulary for how collections are assemblages of time gathered together through the momentary associations between human and non-human actors. We will have an opportunity to pry into particular collections at a later stage of this chapter, with special reference given to the work of Mark Dion, but before we rush into

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assessing particular assemblages we should try to understand how collecting relates to the terms established in the previous chapter: the events of waste and the image of time that these events mediate.

To collect waste is to collect the temporality of waste and its narrative exigency. The practice of collecting must reconcile itself to things that commingle material continuities and temporal discontinuities, a commingling to which narratives of waste might respond to but not necessarily resolve. This chapter has the ambition of asking what some collectors have said about waste, about time and about the narrative interpretations that seek to chart their association, in order to overhear the ways in which the dispersal of waste interacts with the gathering, ordering and reassembly that collecting things enact. The time of use and waste become in the field of archaeology, for instance, a negotiation between what should and can be collected, as well as how and why. We assemble time through the collection of things, in part, by constructing stories about objects and narrating how things give and take times of use and waste. By exploring the collection of waste as a practice governed by particular notions of temporality and narrative, I aim to illustrate the kinds of narrative techniques that are employed to make things speak, mean and come to be. Later on, I hope to show how archaeology in particular, as an important but by no means exemplary form of waste collection, can help us know more about how art objects can enact and criticize these narrative techniques.

Gathering waste

To collect, to describe, to classify; these activities can complicate many of the statically terminal attributes (such as valuelessness, inertia, finitude and dissolution) with which objects of waste have been traditionally associated. Waste shows itself to be an enigmatic presence within the historical record. In a manner similar to the use of rubbish in contemporary art, archaeology is a practice that puts waste to work. Importantly for us, the collection of waste as an artefact, something to be collected and analysed, shows that waste is an open-ended condition, lacking the determinate or finite temporal conditions of use. One of the enchanting and enigmatic aspects of waste is this sense of availability, a temporal openness that helps structure its recovery, collection and analysis. The temporal and spatial dispersal of waste provides an immediate challenge to and definition for collectors. Waste-time is a time of indeterminate permutation, a time that spreads and migrates beyond who or what has discarded it. This is

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due, amongst other things, to how discarded objects lie open and unenclosed, to be worked upon by collectors and others who wish to attend to them.

Christopher Tilley has argued that the practice of archaeology is rooted in the present and that 'the primary event of archaeology is the event of excavation or writing, not the event of the past'.[1] Yet when working with objects of waste particular attention must be paid to how the past structures the possibility of framing the eventual, *present*ation of collected things. Through its end-loaded temporality, the time of waste and its lingering sense of postponement make an important contribution to the presencing of archaeological analysis, making the collection of waste both a measure of archaeological work and a category of thing ripe for describing the aims of that work. The actuality of waste in the historical record has given archaeologists opportunities to discuss, sometimes to justify and often to redefine the significance of their practice. For example, Matthew Johnson employs an image of waste collection to distinguish the professionalism of contemporary archaeological practice: 'What makes us archaeologists as opposed to mindless collectors of old junk is *the set of rules we use to translate those facts into meaningful accounts of the past*'.[2] This statement entertains some significant oppositions. First, that archaeology does not collect 'junk' because it is a technical discipline able to give semantic closure to what it collects, to make meaningful accounts of historical things. Second, and closely related to the first, junk is incompatible with the formation of a coherent record; junk is that stuff that is resistant to translation. Of course, Johnson uses terms like 'rubbish' or 'junk' to denote semantic incomprehensibility or valuelessness, a familiar rhetorical move that ignores the ways in which we use waste to make sense of and describe the changing value of our environment. Above all, Johnson's conception of waste reproduces oppositions – between the dispersal and collection of knowledge, between scattered waste things and valuable and preserved artefacts – that obscure the cohering effects of waste and the gathered, recuperative acts of collection.

Advancing an archaeological sub-field that specializes in excavating landfill sites, typically called 'garbology', 'The Perfume of Garbage: Modernity and the Archaeological' by Michael Shanks, David Platt and William L. Rathje argues that discarded objects are important to how we understand the past and form 'a fundamental part of the field we are calling the archaeological'.[3] This journal article represents a concerted effort to expand the theoretical basis for William Rathje's and Murphy Cullen's *Rubbish! The Archaeology of Garbage* and Rathje's *The Garbage Project* at the University of Arizona.[4] And 'The Perfume of Garbage' also ought to be contextualized within a broader polemic that berates the attitude

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of avoidance that archaeology typically takes towards objects of waste: 'In spite of garbage being the basis of archaeology, archaeologists have consistently denied or ignored the resulting implications in favor of other understandings of their project' (*PG*, 64). As noted just a moment ago, an idea of waste has not just been denied or ignored but can be used as a definition of all that stands outside archaeological practice. The authors of 'The Perfume of Garbage' argue the reverse, that archaeologists should be less reluctant to acknowledge how important waste can be, 'archaeologists (and others) are not thinking clearly about garbage' (*PG*, 66). They argue that the archaeological record is almost entirely composed of waste things:

> Garbage: 99 percent or more of what most archaeologists dig up, record, and analyze in obsessive detail is what past peoples threw away as worthless—broken ceramics, broken or dulled stone tools, tool-making debitage, food-making debris, food waste, broken glass, rusted metal, on and on. These are society's material dregs that even those most clever at salvage couldn't figure a way to use or sell. But ask archaeologists what archaeology focuses on and they will mention 'the past' and 'artifacts' and 'behavior' and 'attitudes and beliefs', but you will rarely, if ever, hear the words 'garbage' or 'refuse' or 'trash' or 'junk' (*PG*, 65).

Shanks, Platt and Rathje claim two distinct things. First, that archaeology is a sophisticated form of waste-collection and, second, that those who gather this waste rarely admit to what they 'really' collect. Objects of waste are so ubiquitous, and archaeology's denial of its importance is so prevalent, that Shanks *et al* are led to conclude: 'the material basis of history is an embarrassment to the discipline that works upon it' (*PG*, 69).[5] Elsewhere, they claim this mixture of embarrassment and self-delusion reflects a wider social vice, specific to how we regard waste in modern times: 'There is certainly little systematic understanding of garbage. People don't really see the garbage—or the implications of the garbage—that they, like everyone around them, generate every day' (*PG*, 70). To say that '99 percent or more of what archaeologists dig up, record, and analyze in obsessive detail is what past peoples threw away as worthless' is plainly wrong, since it ignores the incidental and accidental creation of waste, as well as the huge archaeological importance attached to votive deposits and funerary relics. However, I take these statements for what they tell us of collecting waste and the timely narration of things; to collect waste is not simply to collect the absent acts that make waste legible but to also consolidate a position in the present. It is the conception of the contemporary, as well as the shifting focus on objects and what those objects stand for, that interests me in this article.

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The contingencies of narrating waste

As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, we repeatedly understand objects of waste through the relationships we forge with things in time, especially when we identify things that seem to rest within the suspended, parenthetical time of waste. But the events that we associate with these objects, either in retrospection or in anticipation, are frequently made to accord with the diverse times of use to which an object might be put. For instance, if, when digging in my garden, I were to discover a bicycle, then particular narratives of use would need to be unfolded in order to provide a causal explanation for why this object became situated there. I might begin a long and potentially enthralling research project into the people who may have owned and used this thing, I could try to discover the genesis of its design and its place of manufacture and, through an assessment of the site's stratigraphy, radiocarbon profile and the bicycle's signs of wear, it might be possible to gain an idea of when it was deposited. In compiling a story of the events to which this bicycle was party to, my narrative response can assume and infer all sorts of things; I rather like the idea that this bicycle has covered extraordinarily long distances, as an object or accessory in some momentous events. If it was missing a wheel, saddle, brakes and the frame was twisted beyond redemption, then I *might* add that it was discarded as waste. My point is that this bicycle is not a piece of *de facto* waste simply by being in my garden, unused. From another perspective, we might consider the use of a bicycle as including a notion of imminent or anticipated obsolescence. Certainly, the owner of a bicycle with misshapen rims, decaying tyres and a temperamental crankshaft might anticipate the imminent failure of its functionality and project the abandonment of this object; the elegies told about material things frequently begin prior to their breakdown or dissolution, use is marked by this orientation towards temporal finitude. But to narrate ends in this way would by no means guarantee the futural status of this object. Abandonment can soon give way to repair or reuse; the bike I find in my garden might be fixed up and ridden again. In both cases, the designation of waste demands more than mere inactivity or a prescriptive analysis that can render transparent the intentions of those that discarded those things. In anticipation or in retrospection waste cannot be said to exist without narrating the discontinuous effect of suspending use, however contingent or temporary that narrative of temporal suspension might be. As we recognized in the previous chapter, waste is not always knowingly created, nor is it necessarily undertaken in a state of complete ignorance. Instead, waste is

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realized time and time again, by narrating and thus enclosing the times of use that become suspended in states of waste. Through this preclusion of utility, times of use are registered inactive; acts of narrating waste activate an inactive past. Narrative, therefore, helps fashion and respond to waste according to divergent times of use. It is not a question of whether we make, collect or encounter waste with a priori knowledge of what waste is; instead, our understanding of waste depends upon the contingent ways in which we narrate, account, script and *de*scribe the time of things. To revive an understanding of narrative provided by H. Porter Abbott in the previous chapter, the collection of waste depends upon a process of narrative assembly and reconstruction that must include the 'shadowy sense of time […] time composed of a succession of necessary events that leads up to, and accounts for, what we see'.

Although not a professional archaeologist, Mark Dion's archaeologically influenced sculptures help us reappraise the work of Shanks, Platt and Rathje to emphasize the narratalogical and temporal issues outlined above. Dion extends and expands certain arguments I made in Chapter 2, which questioned what might be at stake in displaying things of waste and suggested that particular objects can appear to occupy a dispersed sense of the contemporary by utilizing waste in the name of sculpture. Dion's work complicates the model of collecting that Shanks *et al* present by suggesting the narrative irregularities that complicate the teleology of waste that 'The Perfume of Garbage' describes. There is not a single or uniform trajectory that sees objects move from use to waste but a rich series of comings and goings, a crisscrossing in and out of the projective time of use and the slack, indeterminate and disorientated time of waste.

In one respect there is nothing especially odd, unique or revolutionary about Mark Dion's collections – they bear a resemblance to the long tradition, of which Parker is also a participant, of using found objects in works of sculpture: incidental and often inexpensive materials drawn together for public display. Dion frequently adopts pseudo-archaeological methods to make his sculptures; works such as *Flotsam and Jetsam (The End of the Game)* (1994), *History Trash Dig* (1995), *History Trash Scan* (1996) and *Raiding Neptune's Vault* (1997) show Dion drawing upon different and diverse archaeological methods, collections and collectors to organize his work. *Tate Thames Dig* (1999) has a lot in common with these works: it is a piece that collects, sorts and displays objects to enact both the history of museums and to criticize how this history has taken shape. It collects and manufactures an archive. The archaeological methods that Dion adopts to assemble this work are distinctive. The artist spent two weeks with a team of invited archaeological experts and volunteers beachcombing two sites

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on either bank of the river Thames.[6] These sites, both of them close to London's city centre, were chosen in order to gather any material that tide or wind might make available. It is a site-specific work but the materials gathered at each site were not easy to predict. The finds are remarkable for their variety: bottles, shards of glass, plastic and iron, buttons, teeth, bones, identification and credit cards, clay pipes, toys and pottery. Tate's internal reports, circulated prior to the formal acquisition of the piece, stress the work's strong connection to human activity: 'The two sites yielded a wide variety of artefacts and remnants, tokens of life as it has frequented Millbank and Southwark'.[7] Objects were cleaned, identified, catalogued and ordered according to type, weight and colour, and arranged within a large, double-sided cabinet of curiosities – a container with strong allusions to Regency and Victorian traditions of excavation, collection and display. Below the work appears in situ (Figure 3.1), on the third floor of the Tate Modern where it stood from April 2003 to October 2005.

Dion's collection provides an interesting counterpoint to the archaeology of waste and its recent theorization. Much of what Shanks *et al* claim for archaeology depends upon a particular relay between use and waste, deposition

Figure 3.1 Mark Dion, *Tate Thames Dig* (1999). Mixed media, unconfirmed: 2660 × 3700 × 1260 mm, installation view, Tate Collection, London

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and recovery, on an object being used and deposited by one person and that same object being collected at a later date by a collector or an archaeologist. For them, the biography ascribed to things is a relatively simple and inevitable one: all things go to waste, all reach the terminal point of the discarded. Objects are used and then used no longer; they become waste and are then available for archaeological assessment. Although the utility of a thing can be various, the trajectory towards a condition of waste is common to all; everything the collector collects are 'society's material dregs that even those most clever at salvage couldn't figure a way to use or sell'. A view shared by Gavin Lucas: 'what archaeologists mostly excavate is what people deliberately did not want, or discarded – their garbage'.[8] This universal, unilinear narrative stabilizes objects and gives a measure to the time distributed to them. This co-ordinating function of waste, which gathers diverse yet distinct things towards a common end, is most clearly seen when the authors discuss the spatial and temporal effects of junkyards, which 'compress space and time into a single point—artifacts from different times and places are brought into one location, to be (re)discovered' (*PG*, 79–79). Such is the organizational potential of the junkyard that, despite gathering objects that are associated with various times and places, the common condition of waste compresses these differences within 'a single point'. For Shanks *et al*, waste seems reducible to these sites of spatial and temporal termini or, put another way, as things that have no future. Implicit in this account of waste and its collection is the sense of narrative closure and compression already at work in waste. The biography of things mimics a common structure, with a beginning (manufacture), middle (use) and end (waste). The causes, the durations and the methods of narration might remain variable but waste is the familiar fate of all things.

And yet Dion's work militates against a simple correspondence between spatial and temporal sites, turning loose the narrative certainties that might give absolute coherence to collected objects. This is partly a function of the tidal river from which he drew his material. As Milne, Bates and Webber describe, river sites, especially those on tidal rivers, provide a changeable and unpredictable relationship between various sites, those that discard and those that collect: 'a river system and its associated settlement structure is part of a dynamic equation, with no constants'.[9] Corroborating this dynamicism, Robert Williams argues that Dion's excavation of tidal beaches 'confounds and challenges archaeological method, in that it is impossible to recognise a true stratigraphy. Even if the foreshore is considered to be an horizon, this co-existence of objects defies easy categorisation'.[10] To draw an example directly from *Tate Thames Dig*

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to illustrate this point, the 'message in a bottle' found in the upper left-hand drawer of the Bank Side (Site II) is certainly an object that has been cast aside. But a part of its worth issues from the fact that it has been thrown into the river. The bottle's communicative function is achieved through rather than in spite of its recovery. The places and times that it associates do not cohere to a particular point, whether construed as the site of excavation or the cabinet itself; instead, the bottle's significance through space and time depends upon a continuity of movement. This is a crucial aspect of waste, its structure of contradiction; the collection of waste does not necessarily make smooth its irregularities or make sequential the ruptures of its temporality. In later sections of this chapter we will consider how the dubious continuity of waste extends into Dion's archive, as remains that are not guaranteed to remain.

Defining precisely what has and has not been discarded can be a complicated and uncertain process, since, as we have seen, deposition can be practised for an enormous range of different and combined reasons.[11] The sheer range of reasons that an object becomes available for collection allows John Chapman to label the equivalence between waste and the discipline of archaeology a 'key foundation-myth'.[12] Chapman argues against the idea that archaeology is a formalized collection of waste for the simple reason that people, past and present, do not discard every object that makes up their lived environment. Dion's cabinet attests to this variation; even those things that seem most likely to have been discarded items – such as fragments of pottery, plastics, glass or animal bone – were not necessarily deliberately thrown away as worthless. These fragments speak of the medial events and processes that affect the condition of objects and their elliptical ability to communicate those medial occurrences. Moreover, erosion by salt water, oxidation and abrasion against other objects all suggest the non-human actions that affect how an object appears. Whilst judgements are dominated by and made intelligible through a series of retrogressive narratives, it might be argued that Shanks and his co-authors make all of these narratives follow a familiar and orderly pattern, a unilinear movement from the action of use to the conclusion of waste – a one-act play with a definitive finale.

Dion's work demonstrates that the narrative permutations that objects undergo are far more complex. There is no simple correspondence between the status of what is collected and the category of waste other than the rather painstaking and conditional acts of narration that reconstitute the effective qualities of things in time. The difference, then, so keenly felt with a work like *Tate Thames Dig*, is a sense of narrative *risk*, of provisional tales told through things that are open to assessment from a variety of perspectives. We encountered this risk in the work

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of Cornelia Parker but it arose from the legibility of the things she collected. Parker's work, especially *Mass* and *Heart of Darkness*, is striking for the relative uniformity of what it gathers and the sense that all other things are excluded; a snapshot, or rather, negative, of a specific kind of matter. Dion's materials, on the other hand, find a churning and arbitrary taxonomy, wildly heterogeneous in content. This differing sense of mixture aside, both artists mobilize narrative doubt by harnessing the dispersal of waste. The formal collection of waste in these works does not necessarily translate into a correspondingly formal, semantic coherence. Shanks *et al*, through their unidirectional understanding of how useful objects become waste objects, overlook how things take meaning by oscillating between times of use and waste. In a sense closer to Dion's work, the risky narratives told by things confuse the distinction between use and waste: what have these objects done, what remains for them to do?

Anthropologies of waste: Collecting culture, collecting time

Shanks *et al* claim that the archaeological site is 'a record of behavioral patterns, structured activities to be revealed through close analysis of contextual associations in the material remains' (*PG*, 68). To collect things is to collect the behaviour of those that used those things. The authors are repeating here the central tenets of behavioural archaeology, which argues that, in the words of its principal theorists, 'The relationships between people and artifacts [should be] discussed in terms of regularities discerned in processes of manufacture, use and disposal that make up the life histories of material things'.[13] By collecting objects, particularly objects of waste, it is hoped they might collect the 'behaviour' and 'structured activities' revealed by scrutinizing things. Objects stand as intermediaries for human behaviour, as portals into actions of the past. Objects of waste are, in their view, witnesses in spite of themselves or, as William Rathje has written elsewhere, 'what people have owned—and thrown away—can speak more eloquently, informatively, and truthfully about the lives they lead than they themselves ever may'.[14] Imbued with an authorial power, the information that objects might communicate is assumed to be more authentic and reliable than oral or written accounts. Objects, so this theory suggests, can narrate their past. Whilst the focus remains anthropocentric and interactions between objects and humans are instrumentalized to illuminate the lives of humans, the power to speak and describe what a culture is has partly shifted to things themselves. Mixed up in this account is a dynamic sense of the 'changing

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notions of the artifact in relation to the human groups or cultures that produce it, the temporality of culture change/process, and the loci of both' (*PG*, 68). Let us explore further how and why Shanks *et al* mix their more polemical claims regarding the centrality of waste in archaeological practice with a subtle form of social constructivism.

It is important to acknowledge the privilege 'The Perfume of Garbage' gives to 'culture' or 'society' as the temporal unit by which waste is comprehended. In the dispersal of things over time it is culture that gathers the multiple times and places that these things represent. With the emphasis they give to an aggregative and collective sense of cultural time, Shanks *et al* return us to the themes of the previous chapter and the temporal divisions established through waste. There we saw how objects both give and receive time according to the use to which they have been put. Through our stories about things, the events of waste distribute use-time to an object or collection of objects. And Dion's work provides an interesting parallel to those theoretical reflections because it lays bare how, without narrating specific objects and relating them to specific times and places, notions of the cultural operate to obscure the multiple materials, uses and geographies that help determine how objects are collected and understood.

For Shanks *et al* waste objects are a bridge between two cultures, divided by time and action. For them, the objects that archaeologists collect represent the collision of two temporally distinct zones, a collision that takes place between those who deposit, 'the human groups or cultures that produce', and those who collect: the waste-maker of the past and the waste-collectors of the present. They are not alone in taking this position. In relation to the deposition of a British-Roman jar, Lucas argues that a separation occurs between the time of use, its waste and recovery. By being deposited, the jar

> enters a period of limbo – effectively, suspended animation. This is not to say it does not age in the sense of suffering slow and gradual attrition from post-depositional factors, but this is a profile we retrospectively place on the jar, after it has been excavated. Its excavation marks the start of a new period in the life history of the jar.[15]

The inclusion of the pot within a pre-established archaeological record brings it a new time, a 'new period', an extension to its 'life history'. In other words, by being deposited the jar enters a deathly intermission until the collector can give it new life. In a similar manner, Shanks *et al* qualify their more inflated claims about the quantity of waste in the archaeological record with a 'culturally specific' notion of value that separates the 'then' of deposition from the 'now' of archaeological

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enquiry. Objects of waste, by issuing through events in 'the past', are understood to be structurally historical and essential to manufacturing a now: 'every single day a new batch of materials methodically emerges from the black hole of modern times into the light of archaeological research' (*PG*, 66). Each culture is differentiated through its relationship to the object under scrutiny to provide the collector a means to separate the culture that deposits from the culture that collects. The importance and convenience of waste to an effective definition of archaeological practice thus become clear. Waste objects (which connote a time that is tardy, used up or 'past it') serve to reinforce a temporal difference that means objects structure the time, marking the beginning of a narrative and the conclusion to that narrative. The bifurcation of time that waste seems to affect, severing the time of 'then' from the time of the 'now', has powerful repercussions for those who claim to collect, analyse and describe the past through these things. The present becomes distinguished by objects that appear intrinsically non-present, showing how archaeology takes a position relative to that which it collects.

It is important to acknowledge how the conception of collecting, articulated by Shanks *et al*, depends upon a rather specific view of temporal succession, one that might support the analytical and historicizing position of collectors more generally. For them, the objects that archaeologists collect can only be understood in the temporal present, since objects can only come to mean something by being from the 'non-present'. The time of archaeological analysis is thus formulated by the kind of object that it approaches; indeed, *the work of analysis demands that an object be made temporally distinct*. Paradoxically distinct from the past it is taken to represent, distinct in the present for that sense of separation. Shanks and co-authors express something of this, stating that contemporary 'culture' apportions time through the practice of collecting, analysing and reflecting upon the objects that come to enter 'the black hole of modern times'. The temporality of waste becomes intimately connected to the time of its collection and analysis, making 'the black hole of modern times' knowable through the action of archaeology upon things. Yet, if 'culture' is given the responsibility of designating the time of objects, determining whether they are useful or non-useful, the comprehension of waste becomes the privileged exercise of *contemporary* collectors and by others that stand in *present* times. As I tried to show in the previous chapter, things are neither our hostage nor do we fall entirely under their spell – the projective time of use can cease and return in a huge variety of ways and few objects fall under our unequivocal control. By 'reading' these objects in such a way, hoping to connect two sides of a familiar

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story, Shanks, Lucas and others give a sense of closure and resolution to restless things, and thereby underwrite and stabilize both the narrative provenance and co-ordinates of a thing and insure a safe passage between conditions of use, waste and artefact.

To summarize some of the arguments put forward here, we might say that the category of waste, as it is instrumentalized by some theorists of archaeology, has been used to compartmentalize those that use and those that collect the passing of that use. Moreover, objects said to be waste might be made to give order and control between differing cultures; indeed, they seem to mark a cultural and temporal difference that help make secure the simple transition between the past that stands on one side of an object and the waste that designates its availability in the present. This conception of waste only serves to extend the rather general narrative potential with which these objects can be associated. It is my conjecture that the ongoing, continuous and affective properties of waste risk being obscured in this overly culturalized conception of objects, collections and their narrative explanation. The contents of Dion's cabinet, by refusing to be readily cohered within one or a number of periods, raise the additional question surrounding the changing status of waste within an art object. In this respect, and in a way that seems to provide an important counterargument to 'The Perfume of Garbage', Dion's work seems to loosen some of the narrative anchors that Shanks *et al* impose upon objects of waste and, by extension, the anthropological imperatives mobilized in their collection. The cabinet seems less interested in displaying or encouraging narrative conclusions than it is in suggesting that the idea of narrating things depends upon the way objects are being conceived in time.

Dion's collection dramatizes the disjuncture between the appearance of an object and the times that can be inscribed within it. The cabinet, with its drawers, doors and glass, make visible and makes strange the quotidian things that Dion has assembled. Objects that were once active participants in a wide range of activities are now made to form a tableau animated by the carefully staged techniques of display. Quite unlike the texts that accompany Parker's work, Dion's *Tate Thames Dig* asks the gallery visitor to judge, identify and make associations between each object with the minimum of textual guidance – cocktail stirrers, buttons, glass, string and gnarled hunks of iron. But this mixture of things, and the inevitable difficultly in making sense of every object in the cabinet, means that opportunities are open for individual conjecture, speculation and indifference. Viewers cannot hope to identify every object, nor can they be expected to attach the same level of significance to each thing. The salient impression made by the

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work is one of mixture – an assemblage of objects recognizable and obscure, complete and in fragments. Presented together, there can be no guarantees about where the 'black hole of modern times' begins or ends, nor can there be any certainty about what 'the light of archaeological research' might take as its starting point. This is partly due to how Dion's cabinet contains within it objects that many gallery visitors might carry with them (e.g. cards, pens, keys and cosmetics) and, whilst some have deteriorated beyond use, many others seem free of the signs of wear or deterioration which would keep them from being used once more. The difference amongst those that discard, collect and observe is made indiscernible – these things do not make certain temporal differences between 'cultures' and seem to wilfully confuse the boundaries that Shanks and his co-authors propose. In Chapter 2, Heidegger's hammer gave us occasion to assess how matter, time and narrative, as well as a notion of the 'events of waste', cannot be made reducible to the idea of culture or society but relate to the specific coagulation of use, time and material that an object has or might be put to.

I would like to propose that the objects assembled in Dion's cabinet are the site of competing and mutually exclusive narrative acts that attest to the variety of times and tenses to which an object can bear witness. Although objects collected by Dion share common properties, uses and temporalities, these can just as easily transgress group consensus as articulate a common interest between individuals. Important here is the question of how and why these narratives are being expressed and not to assume that waste objects are equally recognizable to everyone that comes into contact with them. Although we might not agree about what was, is or is not an object of waste, our engagement with things does require a form of empathetic thinking which must question what an object was for, an appeal to a kind of historical ideal.[16] The hypotheses and contingencies at work in these multiple acts of imaginative re-enactment provide yet another reason to be suspicious of too rigid a division between cultures of deposition and collection – moving across and transgressing this division might prove fundamental to comprehending objects of waste and their movement through time.

Until now, our working hypothesis has been governed by the observation that for objects to be recognized as waste they require a narrative of use. However brief, anonymous or lacking in empirical foundation, this narrative participates in the description of time that is no longer felt to be evident. Through the narration of waste, the use of things is placed in temporal suspension or parenthesis. We make waste by removing a thing from use or removing use from a thing, but in

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both cases the time of that object becomes divided into a time of use and a time of waste. Whilst it might be true that different objects are used in different ways and at different times, the act of narrating these things according to periods of use and waste lends consistency to a narrative practice that does not need to be made reducible to any agreed cultural/social division between peoples. The difficulties that we might encounter in this emphasis upon the narrative effects of waste were precisely those Shanks *et al* express. In making the transition from use to waste an inevitable and, by extension, irreversible development, we might fail to acknowledge an object's propensity to change, develop and reverse this movement. This renders the position of those that narrate the end of things far less permanent or secure. The contingent nature of things more generally, and the contingent relationship to both use and waste in particular, means that instrumentalizing objects of waste to define a notion of the contemporary becomes a rather problematic project. Some archaeologists believe they contribute to the construction of a present by shining torches of analysis upon past things; for some, the contemporary *is* that process of illumination. Objects of the past are made meaningful through their apprehension in this present, the meaning of waste is a meaning apprehended in a 'now' that was, somehow, being defined in distinction to a 'pastness' (of 'culture', 'society' or 'behaviour') to which waste was being attributed. The concluding section of this chapter will attempt to suggest the continuities, permutations and dissolutions of narrative that are encountered in Dion's work. Doing so will force us to consider not just the ongoing status of Dion's collection but its necessary changes, replacements and states of redundancy.

Archives and the afterlife of collections

If, as Paul Ricœur has argued, the archive is 'constituted by the set of documents that result from the activity of an institution or of a physical or moral person', and it embodies an 'organized body of records' in an 'organized repository' that safeguards the production of historical narrative, then 'documents constitute its ultimate means of proof. They nourish its claim to be based on facts'.[17] The content of an archive, then, is the consequence of both this documentary gesture towards the events it records and the institutions from which and through which this gesture finds continuity. At stake in the archive is the relative stability of times past, present and future, a documented repository of temporal orientations that can be readily and repeatedly traced. The archive, then, is a preserved and

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preserving body, it keeps documents but it also keeps the documentary relation between object and time.

One promise of the archive might be to provide a material guarantee to a sense of duration that extends beyond the scale of individual human life. As Christopher Gosden has argued in another justification of archaeological thought, 'Longer sweeps of recursiveness are solidly material, as it is the enduring nature of material culture that makes possible life on a scale greater than that of the individual'.[18] Just as the archive was characterized by Ricœur as a collection that can be used to guarantee historical narratives, Gosden argues that objects provide the guarantee to narrative acts about the endurance of material culture. This appeal to the reliability of things suggests an image of material continuity through which humans, fearful and frustrated by their comparative transience, might achieve a form of historical transcendence. And yet we should be cautious of such a severance between the time of humans and the time of non-humans, just as we were about too rigid a separation between times of deposition and collection.[19] Indeed, the figure of waste might provide an important model by which to break down the polarities of human transience on the one hand and the endurance of material things on the other. Cutting across these poles are objects of waste that operate at the interstices of human and non-human time. I have already argued that waste pertains to a kind of untimeliness, a convolved temporality that seems to invite legislating acts of narrative engagement. As a poor advocate or analogue for any neat division between pasts, presents or futures, waste can be understood as the figuration of an incomplete and a reversible end, an 'already-and-not-yet', a residue, a remainder, a thing without a dominant tense. And if objects of waste are documents of anything in particular, then they are not especially reliable witnesses. It is this risk that entices and beguiles and that makes waste such a recurrent figure in sculpture, literature and architecture. The invitation to narrate objects according to actions they no longer perform is not easily met, not least because the category of waste is a provisional, transitional category that describes matter that comes and goes. It remains to be argued that the temporality of waste – redundantly present, retrospectively obsolete, proleptically abundant – can play havoc with the stability and reliability often attributed to archives. In addition to maintaining their own temporal enigma as transiently enduring things that mark the arrest of individual projects, desires, ambitions and lives, waste also carries contingently terminal qualities of exhaustion, mutation, breakage and decay.

James Clifford once argued, 'Collecting—at least in the West, where time is generally thought to be linear and irreversible—implies a rescue of phenomena

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from inevitable decay or loss. The collection contains what "deserves" to be kept, remembered, and treasured. Artifacts and customs are saved out of time'.[20] I'd like to argue that Dion's collection both works to preserve things that one would not usually expect to be kept, remembered or treasured, but also, and to the frustration of those that wish it to remain unchanged, is a collection that defies institutional rescue and preservation, laying scorn on the notion that anything could be saved out of time. *Tate Thames Dig* is a Russian doll of a collection. The cabinet contains an archive of an event that set out to collect the remnants of countless other crisscrossing and divergent events; it is also a collection operating within Tate's collection. The objects collected on the banks of the River Thames have now been at Tate for more than ten years. The transformation that the cabinet and its contents have undergone since their initial display at Tate Gallery's *Art Now* exhibition, between 25 November 1999 and 27 January 2000, testifies to the work's discontinuous display, as well as the soluble nature of its materiality. Commissioned by Tate in 1999 and acquired soon after its first public viewing at Tate Gallery, it takes on an important role in Tate's collections:

> The content and conception of *Tate Thames Dig* 1999 are very much specific to the Tate. It was conceived as a Tate Modern project and was displayed as part of the *Art Now* programme at Millbank. It has been offered to the Tate at a reduced price that takes account of the considerable Tate contribution to the fabrication costs of the work. A number of pressing reasons would make this a tremendously significant acquisition. It records the relaunch of the Tate in London as two sites while emphasising its nature as a single entity in one cabinet. It highlights their shared characteristic of a river frontage ant [sic] the fact that this important artery is a fundamental link between them. Secondly, it links each institution to its local community and to the history of its environment. In combining art, science, history, in an interpenetrating way it questions the very presentation of history and the Tate's part in that presentation. It is a self-conscious piece which reflects the processes of categorisation and modes of display that the Tate itself employs.[21]

Tate's rationale for collecting the work relies upon the stability of the object, reflected in a language of 'recording', 'linking' and 'combining' that somehow aims to coalesce the various reflexive tasks that Tate sets for itself. But as an assemblage of things that require a complex process of assembly and disassembly for each public viewing, *Tate Thames Dig* shows itself to be a rather unstable entity. The extensive conservation notes held in the Tate Archives relate the problems Tate's conservation department have encountered with this work, demonstrating

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the expenditure required to safeguard the stability of the work: '[*Tate Thames Dig*] Contains materials (plastic finds, pickled specimens) which are liable to degrade. Most of the finds were cleaned as part of the dig process and will be stable. Corroded iron is main exception, will require special storage (less than 18% RH) and checking as a vulnerable item'.[22] The cabinet, far from instituting a solid, permanent or reliable enclosure, is a temporary unit that contains objects that change and mutate. Not only must Tate decide when and how to assemble the work, but it must, to a certain extent, decide *what* to assemble. Take, for instance, the iron objects displayed in drawer G on the Millbank side of the cabinet. As Tate's employee, Sasa Kosinova, reports in 2005, 'Overall condition of the iron artefacts is very poor; all the pieces are heavily corroded, crumbly and/or disintegrated. A thorough treatment is required. As an emergency treatment, five loose and broken pieces were re-adhered. This drawer was not vacuumed. Damaged sliders'.[23] Albeit seen through the microcosm of a particular part of the collection, questions surround these objects and an ongoing negotiation of materials, efficacy and performance demand reconciliation. These iron objects have not simply passed into a state of waste that remains finite or conclusive but, through processes of disintegration, emphasize their potential to move into and out of use and waste. Moreover, these corroded things show the multiple occasions that an object can be discarded; the movement between use and waste is neither complete nor unidirectional. After more than two years on the third floor of the Tate Modern (April 2003–October 2005), the cabinet begins to exhibit both a collection of things and the marks of this exhibition:

> The drawers had been handled by the public for the duration of three years [sic]. Various types of damage had resulted: pieces have detached and dislodged within the drawers; corrosion of iron artefacts had carried on, sometimes to the point of disintegration; larger artefacts are jamming the glass scratching it on the side [sic]; handles have become loose; the inside of the drawers got rusty and the covering glass dirty.[24]

The kinetic form of display that Dion's cabinet performs lends the work a propensity not just to present waste but to generate it; the wasted nature of Dion's archive is capable of producing its own documents and corroding its static documentary status. The cabinet evolves continuously, an evolution to which it frames and gives measure. For its most recent exhibition, six new drawer runners were required and some drawers needed new fabrics to compensate for the damage done to them by eroding objects.[25] Oddly enough, though the old runners were discarded the replaced fabric has been kept in the Tate Archives, a

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curious souvenir of a conservation process that must continually chose what to keep, preserve or discard. When displayed at Tate Britain in July 2009 drawer G had been cleaned, the fragments removed and the more depleted yet salvageable items treated for further decay. The cabinet and the collection it stores is an entity caught in slow mutation, refusing to represent the conclusion of a particular narrative trajectory and the inertia of 'the' collection.

Although waste might be seen to mark the end of an object, Dion's work is one that harnesses and confounds this sense of ending, not just by being an object within a larger collection but by the unstable nature of the objects it gathers. In the dust that settles in polythene bags we see a possible end to the powers of these things to facilitate the narration of waste events: not an end to the material as such but an end to its documentary capacity. If Shanks and his co-authors suppose that an object must 'terminate' in order to enter the archaeological record, Dion displays the restless and mutating afterlives in which things might participate. The objects in the cabinet are carried by a more complex, continuous and fluid process of cycling in and out of the times of use and waste, attended by and expressed through assembly and disassembly, preservation and dispersal, retrospective legibility and dust. Although Alex Coles has argued, employing the language of Brechtian theatre, that the cabinet represents the 'final act' of Dion's show,[26] we cannot say definitively that the curtain has gone down. The cabinet serves as a reservoir that stores objects, to slow them down and resist the dissolution of matter. It does this with only partial success, unable to remove these things from processes of decay and decomposition. Nor, indeed, is the cabinet itself immune from these processes, as its glass, wood and metal components become eroded by the curiosity of gallery visitors. There exists a continuity of correspondences between the status of the things collected and the effects of their presentation. The cabinet serves to both frame the collection and actively influence the changing condition of this assemblage; the collection does not go unaffected by the performance that the cabinet distributes, its objects remain relative to the means of their display. This twofold function of the cabinet, ordering and reordering the objects contained within it, serves to both heighten the narrative exigency of the work overall and render problematic the material basis by which these narratives are achieved. A central paradox of *Tate Thames Dig*, then, lies in how untimely objects seem to point to a redundant time of use – an identifiable incision in their past – whilst simultaneously refusing the finality of this redundancy. Waste shows itself to be another false end, a ruse that temporarily masks the continuity of things, their development and potential for decay.

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Waste remains, dust dissolves

Let us conclude this chapter and the first section of this book with a small polythene bag that remains in Tate's Conservation File. It is labelled, 'SAMPLE LOOSE FRAGS/FROM CONSERVED DRAWER 6/2009'.[27] A representative sample of what was removed from the drawer can be found inside – small pieces of rusted iron, anonymously jumbled together. These are residues from a larger collection of residua; they suggest the silting process of stuff produced in displaying the collection. In these iron fragments we have a rather complicated example of when waste fails to perform the vestigial role set for it, the role of mediating a narrative of use and waste, co-operation and detachment, past into present. *Tate Thames Dig* provides an interesting example of waste being put to work, and yet it also provides the conditions for waste to fail and fall into the anonymous status of 'loose fragments', unable to mediate a precise relationship to actions past. If we accept Ricœur's characterization of the effective documentary trace ('ruins, remains, and documents') as one that 'combines a relation of significance, best discerned in the idea of a vestige, and a relation of causality […] a sign-effect',[28] then we can see how these loose frags are not just an outcome of the work; their indistinct anonymity represents waste's failure to give a relation of significance that would allow us to say 'this is the trace of *x* action or event'. It is not just the past that is compromised by these shards. Citing Derrida's *Archive Fever*, Mark Currie has argued, 'The archive is not a passive record, but an active producer of the present: an "archiving archive which structures the present in anticipation of its recollection"'.[29] And yet the archival present that Dion's cabinet produces for the future is one that can undermine the powers of narrative recollection or reconstruction so integral to an archive's design; the collection cannot ground the archival gesture or guarantee its testimonial promise.

The sculptural employment of waste, mediated by eventful, eventual things, provides occasions to collect and interpret the past and the future. We did not find waste and collecting to be at opposites; indeed, the collection of rubbish for various anthropological or behaviourist aims showed the informational and intellectual value in collecting things that may, at one moment, have been thrown away as surplus. Cornelia Parker and Mark Dion both play with and upon the evidential nature of waste, its capacity to provoke, supplement and make exigent narratives of temporal absence and material continuity. This is partly due to the powers of waste to prefigure an event in which use passes into abandonment, a passage from the orientations of use-time into a more polyvalent period of

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waste. And yet, it is exactly this evidential nature, which both demands narrative and fails to guarantee narrative truth, that means that the substance of waste might suggest a material conclusion but fails to provide a sense of narrative closure; waste is never and can never be felt to be absolutely simultaneous to the significance attached to it. In the collection of waste lies its dual nature as a thing that remains and a mark of dissolution, of time's persistence and its passing decay. And in the collection of waste lies its doubtful powers to serve as a document that makes a 'claim to be based on facts'.

The remaining chapters will take forward some important areas of discussion that have arisen here. The first concerns the legibility of things and the events they are taken to mediate. Our ability to comprehend and respond to the temporal transience of waste will find resistance in both the availability and the quality of material things. In the writings of T. S. Eliot and James Joyce, we will see the literary and poetic effects of waste. Just as we have just noted the conceptual challenges of sculptural wastes, we will see in the next two chapters how writing brings waste to account, by including images of waste and by absorbing the compositional wastes of writing often required in the production of texts. Waste matter, in this textual form, will be drafted into delicately ordered layers, expanding the notion of a 'work of literature' to include the textual absences that can be read into and alongside the 'final' edition. These chapters will also follow the argumentative arc laid out earlier; the position of waste, its powers to confirm the nature of composition, action, events and their narration, are contingent on the decomposition of things. Waste, its legibility in time and the labours of interpretation it invites require a material base.

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Part Two

Writing Waste

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4

The Poetic Economies of T. S. Eliot

As the sculptural work of Cornelia Parker and Mark Dion has demonstrated, the inclusion or representation of waste reveals a key, reflexive quality of incorporating temporal redundancy within an artwork. The inclusion of waste in these works of art, and in the literary works considered below, foregrounds the *positional* nature of waste – striking distinct temporal relations between processes of *de*position, *com*position and *decom*position, motivating an engagement with the work that either acknowledges an explicit severance between times of use and non-use or plays upon their uncertain commingling. Arriving at this reflexive, *pro*positional potential we might begin to comprehend the temporal positions at stake when identifying objects of waste in sculpture and literature.

Writing, as an object and a process that produces objects, can be said to give rise to various encounters with 'textual waste' and to an idea of waste as it is mediated by texts: on the one hand, a text can describe certain things, people and landscapes that have fallen from a temporally codependent relationship with human activity; on another, texts might suggest a compositional form of waste by alluding to or including drafts, excisions or textual variants; and on a third, more ghostly limb, writing may also signify its status as an object, as a thing that might be discarded, a thing to be jettisoned. This chapter and the chapter that follows will approach these different yet intrinsically related stratum of textual waste to conclude that the significance of waste in literature cannot be reduced to one strata or another; all three play a fundamental role in how we evaluate objects within texts and how we take these things to function and perform within a literary work. For the reasons outlined in my introduction, waste plays an essential role in our attempts to apportion, organize and regulate the world of things; objects and events of waste help us to trace and retrace the passage of objects through time. Rather than focusing too much on the commonplace epithets ascribed to certain literary genres, which describe particular forms of writing as 'trash' or 'pulp' fiction, the following chapters attend to the dynamic,

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propositional presence of redundant or exhausted things within canonical works of twentieth-century poetry and prose. Thus, the condition of waste is not considered an antithesis of 'literature', or writing more generally, but constitutes an essential aspect of textual formation.

Simply because a particular object has been singled out for examination, this should not exclude the formal, material or historical conditions by which that object entered a particular work of literature. The theoretical works that might guide us through this first level of textual waste, whereby objects of waste are described in a text, are relatively few in number. Francesco Orlando's *Obsolete Objects in the Literary Imagination* attends to this dilemma by accumulating an extraordinary range of literary examples to construct a complex taxonomy of literary waste, a taxonomy that stabilizes each example by comparison and normalization. In doing so, Orlando provides a remarkable number of examples from European literature where particular kinds of objects come into view and, if it achieves nothing else, confirms the enduring presence of redundancy in literary works (Figure 4.1).

In taking a rigorously structuralist approach to the idea of waste in literature, advancing through a taxonomy of things that 'consist[s] only of binary oppositions' and 'terminal contrar[ies]', Orlando argues that literary works can confirm and conform to certain set *a priori* categories.[1] This matrix orders types of waste according to whether the objects described have been collectively or individually perceived, whether they appear within a natural or supernatural environment, whether they form a significant or peripheral role in the narrative, can be considered wrought or raw, and so on. As a taxonomy that attempts to absorb every possible form of literary waste, the scheme assumes an air of infallibility; should Orlando's terms be unable to account for a particular obsolete

Figure 4.1 Orlando's Taxonomy of Literary Waste, in *Obsolete Objects in the Literary Imagination*, 205

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thing then the failure highlights a flaw in text concerned; where these categories cannot be satisfactorily applied, 'the substance of the texts is insufficient'.[2] The images of waste that we might encounter in works of literature are to be resolved and categorized within a predetermined series of categorical bifurcations; if they cannot be categorized in this way then they cannot be considered objects of waste.

The peculiar permanence that Orlando gives to the waste he reads almost exclusively relies upon the stasis of what he calls the 'nonfunctional', a term that we have already rendered problematic in various ways. In my view, concepts of waste do not simply stand in opposition to concepts of use but represent a specific relation to or augmentation of the time we make through things. So, when Orlando argues that 'What is used, what is needed, what serves a purpose, what is useful: these are the contraries of those things whose images we are studying',[3] he seeks to separate his study from the categorical volatility that makes waste a fundamentally reversible condition. And Orlando overlooks one of the central paradoxes of waste: in works of literature, images of waste are frequently needed, purposeful and useful for communicating a whole range of meanings. We are left to wonder about the *usefulness* of including images of waste, the author's intentions in mobilizing the idea of waste in their work and the various impressions available that might not be easily termed 'collective' or 'individual', 'pertinent' or 'impertinent', 'raw' or 'wrought' but might, in fact, comprise combinations of some, none or all of those terms. Textual waste is neither absolutely terminal nor absolutely contrary to the useful time that renders it articulate. And objects of waste do not necessarily herald a time of absolute or unequivocal nonfunctionality – what is discarded by one group or individual might be instrumental to another, things can change their function over time by becoming discarded, reused or recycled. And, at a less pragmatic and more conceptual level, the temporal arrangement by which waste comes into being must reconcile the use that has passed and make the idea of use present at precisely the moment where it is said to have dissolved. In other words, we cannot take for granted a polarization between use and waste, but must, instead, seek to understand the transient codependence and cross-contamination of these terms. This is as true when we confront works of sculpture and literature as it is when we confront cigarette ends found in the gutter or the refuse found at a landfill.

Whilst we have discovered some flaws with one of the few works of literary criticism that has focused on the figure of waste in literature, it provides a useful departure for what follows. In response to Orlando's attempts, I would like to suggest that when approaching the subject of waste in literature it is a mistake to isolate the object of description from the objects that make that

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descriptive act possible, that is, the inevitable waste that accompanies acts of inscription and reading. The making of texts involves the production of waste, as well as references to it – a waste in both form and in content. One of the more compelling effects of waste as it is transcribed into textual forms is its capacity 'simultaneously to create a fiction and to make a statement about the creation of that fiction'.[4] This metafictional potential encourages a relay between the various methods of making things, whether decaying, dissolving or going to waste, and the innumerable things that appear before us, either on the page or screen. Just as waste facilitated an analysis of productive destruction, decay and recovery that were felt to be intrinsic to the artistic practice of Parker and Dion, so we should try to understand the relationship between the textual descriptions of waste and the qualitative act of producing a thing called a 'text'; waste, it will be argued, is an idea that informs the construction, consumption and deconstruction of literature more broadly. These are some of the principles and ambitions that motivate the criticism below, loosening some of the burden of formal and historical variety for the sake of a more thoroughgoing theory of how waste and writing intersect. If one assumes that literature must make recourse to a material text, then the value of waste in literature resides in the relationship between its content and the textual medium.

The following chapters concentrate on the work of just two writers, T. S. Eliot and James Joyce, in order to exemplify a number of pertinent areas where ideas of 'waste' and 'literature' intersect. In restricting myself to a narrow range of authors I hope to give greater room to broader theoretical reflections and, in particular, to explore the ways in which we both compose and decompose meaning when assessing the effects of waste in and upon the literary. What might be lost in not highlighting the importance of discarded things in the work of Shakespeare, Swift, Sterne, Shelley, Keats and Dickens, as well as the modern and the contemporary writers with whom the concept of waste can be readily associated,[5] might be compensated by a more thorough-going and comprehensive analysis of how waste converses with the idea of the literary, the images that are created and the textual things that mediate their potential.

Make it waste

As a literature that contemplates the leftovers of literature, the poetry of T. S. Eliot has gained some of its distinction through the identification and mobilization of waste, both as an object of writing and a critical concept used

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to interpret that writing. At an immediate level, Eliot's poetry is composed of substances spent, discards of image and text that seem at once to achieve and to resist the condition of absolute redundancy; there appears no end 'To the drift of the sea and the drifting wreckage' (*CPP*, 186).[6] But it is not simply a literature dominated by images of discarded things, nor is it simply a literature about discarded things, but a literature that seems uncannily aware of what remains of its composition, a poetics that positions Eliot's work among the residues of his texts and countless others. And, whilst this poetics of residua absorbs within it a whole range of modernist mantras – to 'make it new' and to 'make it difficult'[7] – it keenly pursues one other, less observed imperative: to 'make it waste'. This final imperative, though partially achieved and rarely acknowledged, accounts for the difficulty of Eliot's writing as a productive and reflexive effect of wasted words.

We will not begin where one might expect but, instead, with a notebook, a notebook of early poems and poetic fragments that was sold by Eliot to the patron and collector John Quinn in 1922, as replete with vacant spaces as *The Waste Land* and an important source for that work. For many years after Quinn's death in 1924, it was thought that this notebook had been lost or destroyed. There were a number of instances when Eliot expressed his opinion of this work. The first occurs just a few months before the publication of *The Waste Land*, when Eliot sent Quinn the notebook: 'You will find a great many sets of verse which have never been printed and which I am sure you will agree never ought to be printed, and in putting them in your hands, I beg you fervently to keep them to yourself and see they are never printed'.[8] In a letter dated 28th July 1963, Eliot refers to the contents of this missing notebook as 'unpublished and unpublishable'[9] and, in another letter a year later, 'I cannot feel altogether sorry that this [typescript] and the notebook have disappeared. The unpublished poems in the notebook were not worth publishing'.[10] These poems were not lost, however, but tucked away in a box and later bought by the Berg Collection of the New York Public Library in 1958. Their acquisition was announced to the general public ten years later, on the 25th October 1968.[11] Access to these works was limited until, in 1996, they were published as the collection *Inventions of the March Hare: Poems 1909–1917* and for the first time scholars interested in Eliot's notebook were permitted to take direct quotations from it. This might seem an unremarkable case of emancipated juvenilia; work the author had hoped would remain a unique and private thing emerging into the light of public scrutiny. But the notebook's contents and unpublished status, cancellation and subsequent publication, prove highly relevant to our consideration of textual, technical and

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material value. Its passage from manuscript draft to published work shows an alternative trajectory to *The Waste Land*, which was published in *The Criterion, The Dial* and as a book in 1922, but also as manuscript facsimiles in 1971. We will have time to consider what effect the publication of *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Typescript of the Original Drafts* did for the understanding of that poem, but not before attending to the dynamic waste content of *Inventions of the March Hare*.

The notebook's title represents a synecdoche for the changing fortunes of its contents. Inscribed 'INVENTIONS OF THE MARCH HARE' on the first flyleaf, Eliot later cancelled these words and replacing them on the front free endpaper with, 'COMPLETE POEMS OF/T. S. Eliot' alongside a dedication to Jean Verdenal and an epigraph taken from Dante. Comparing Eliot's habits in naming and dedicating his work, Christopher Ricks makes the case that Eliot probably changed the title when he knew that the contents of the notebook were to go unpublished, 'between 1920 and 1925 […] when he sold it to Quinn in 1922'.[12] Double-named, no-named, one can only wonder whether Eliot deleted the former title and added the latter because he knew that 'The Complete Poems' was an unpublishable title for an undesirable publication. His notebook did not include the poem that had made him famous and the notebook's fragmentary, protean correspondence to his later, published work would show it to be wholly incomplete; an embarrassing work in progress. No doubt conscious of how an act of naming can help legitimize a new publication, Ricks recovers and reinstates the cancelled title, cancelling Eliot's cancellation. The title, 'Inventions of the March Hare', according to Ricks, is 'likely to be less inappropriate than any other [title], as memorable, and as figuring in TSE's correspondence'.[13] Such editorial interventions into the work of a dead writer are certainly not unusual and the cancellation of words, phrases and whole passages from a text are to be expected in a notebook to which time was given to 'visions and revisions'. But what seems telling about the title and its sardonic ghost intimates the temporal relation between invention and completion, between the sketches discarded as 'unpublishable' and the apparent closure of a 'complete' work, not to mention the figures of waste that Eliot so regularly employs to reflect how his work has been composed, what it describes and the material things it requires to make that process of composition and description possible.

During an interview in 1959 Eliot would observe, 'As a rule, with me an unfinished thing is a thing that might as well be rubbed out. It's better, if there's something good in it that I might make use of it elsewhere, to leave it at the back of my mind than on paper in a drawer. If I leave it in a drawer it remains

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the same thing but if it's in the memory it becomes transformed into something else'.[14] As a rule, things are rarely so simple. The poems in *Inventions of the March Hare* are works that have been rubbed out, placed in a drawer *and* transformed into something else; they reflect a number of possible material outcomes. But their presence in the wider body of Eliot's writings, as both a source and another conclusion to the works published in his lifetime, means that being left at the back of drawer means that a work can still be available for reuse; those poems that were never published by Eliot became important sources for his published work. It would seem that, as time passes, the distinctions between rubbing out, remembering or discarding draft material prove far from absolute, especially when it comes to the detritus that Eliot employs in his early poems. 'First Caprice in North Cambridge' and 'Second Caprice in North Cambridge' are both manuscripts written in blue ink, composed in November 1909 and reproduced in typescript for *Inventions of the March Hare*. Readers familiar with the work that was published during Eliot's lifetime will recognize a number of tropes and images, many of which relate to images of waste. Compare 'The yellow evening flung against the panes' ('First Caprice', 2) with the 'yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window-panes' found in 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock' (*CPP*, 13), or 'Bottles and broken glass,/Trampled mud and grass' ('First Caprice', 5–6) with the 'Our dried voices […] As wind in dry grass/or rats' feet over broken glass' found in *The Hollow Men* (*CPP*, 83). Finally, and most pertinent to this study, 'A heap of broken barrows' ('First Caprice', 7) resonates with and anticipates one of the most cited lines from *The Waste Land*: 'A heap of broken images' (I.22).[15] *Inventions of the March Hare* is full of these whispers and sketches, migratory phrases that we can recognize as being put to use 'elsewhere'. That it should be images of waste that brings this pattern of use, reuse and rubbing out to light only seems to intensify certain compositional processes of textual variation, revision and self-reference. Firstly, the appearance of 'A heap of broken barrows' shows that, thirteen years prior to the publication of *The Waste Land*, Eliot was taking serious interest in the capacity of waste to figure semantic and visual fragmentation. Secondly, the 'broken barrows' of 'First Caprice', which might signify animal, tumuli or tool, carries a productive uncertainty that feels at odds with the reparative promise of Eliot's end-rhymes (glass/grass, barrows/sparrows), foretelling a tension between lyric enclosure and figurative multiplicity that can be readily traced into *The Waste Land* and the works that followed. And it is important to note how the catalogue of waste found in 'First Caprice', an inventory of muddy and discarded matter, presses against a sense of formal poetic containment. It is the specificity of waste that

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makes this not just a formal or semantic complexity but a lingering temporal one too – these frail, dirty, broken, trampled things remain to be considered, to be reworked, reused and open to renewed assessment. Bringing a deliberate and formal momentum to the gutter, the final lines are both a statement and summary of minor tone and reflect the temporal openness of waste, a reflexive declaration of provisional exhaustion. The final ellipsis marks both the failure to say more and the promise that these images will continue to reverberate and reappear, as they do so in Eliot's next caprice.

Whilst textual scholars such as Lyndall Gordon have argued that Eliot began writing the early fragments of *The Waste Land* in 1914, reading the detritus of *Inventions of the March Hare* reveals how Eliot's interest in images of waste can be found scattered throughout his earlier work.[16] This corroborates Hannah Sullivan's observation, which can now operate on both textual and thematic levels, that Eliot's compositional method was 'retentive' and, as a result, 'he was never quick to classify any of his fragments as waste'.[17] And it is the relentless and recurrent aspects of waste, the temporal disjunctures that makes it an actively redundant thing, which allows us to trace its passage through Eliot's writing and expand the traditional, historical horizons given to the genesis of his later works. In 'Second Caprice in North Cambridge' waste is encountered as a strange and compelling object, with 'unexpected charm' (14) these 'vacant lots' (1), scattered with broken bricks and tiles, might demand pity but they also 'entreat the eye and rack the mind' (4) and give pause to the conventions of philosophic discourse. Eliot produces this sense of surprise and enchantment through a canny circularity of phrase and a rhyming self-reproach, 'With these fields that hold and rack the brain/(What: again?)' (12–13). Here matter persists in the mind in order to be taken up again in other circumstances, matter for which the future is open and without obvious closure. In the description of these vacant lots lies an involuntary aspect of Eliot's theory of composition and memory that we noted earlier; the incomplete, vacant contents of his writing are used to signify the compulsion to write, the compulsion to respond to the salient intellectual and poetic 'demands' of waste. The 'unfinished thing' causes a problem both materially and mentally for Eliot, prompting him to glean the unfinished object for anything that might be used again in another form. 'It might as well be rubbed out', if it is to be reused it must be left 'at the back of my mind'. The failure of the draft, its incompletion, makes it available for reuse, recollection and permutation; in this openness comes the force to hold and rack the mind.

The repetitions of waste in Eliot are therefore twofold, especially when reading *Inventions of the March Hare*: these poems describe the outward

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performance of gleaning wastes for their poetic effects whilst giving an implicit, reflexive performance of drafting, discarding and retaining ideas for subsequent use. In what will be a key and revisited scene, the waste land will never be entirely 'Sinister, sterile and blind' ('Second Caprice', 3) but also the scene of contemplation, meditation and unforeseen light, a waste land that holds and racks the mind in a way that will secure its reprise in later works. Both with respect to the individual poem and within the context of Eliot's wider *oeuvre*, 'Second Caprice in North Cambridge' displays a waste for repeated viewing and, typical of Eliot, one that cannot be easily understood as the 'source' for later work since it contains a passage written by another writer. It is, in this respect, at the intersection of a huge variety of textual wastes, both forwards and backwards in time. Note the tins, piles, vacant lots and rosiness found in Henry James' *The Bostonians*:

> the red sunsets of winter […] a collective impression of the meanness of boards and tin and frozen earth, sheds and rotting piles […] loose fences, vacant lots, mounds of refuse, yards bestrewn with iron pipes, telegraph poles, and bare wooden backs of places. Verena thought such a view lovely, and she was by no means without excuse when as the afternoon closed, the ugly picture was tinted with a clear, cold rosiness.[18]

These are images of animated desolation to which Eliot will again turn in when drafting 'Preludes' in his *Inventions* notebook; a poem first drafted eleven months after his first and second caprice and containing the mutated, discarded scraps, lots and images we found in those poems.[19] In section I of 'Preludes', gusts of wind wrap 'grimy scraps/Of withered leaves about your feet/And newspapers from vacant lots' (*IMH*, I.5–8), section III speaks of 'a thousand sordid images' (*IMH*, III.27) and 'the sparrows in the gutters' (*IMH*, III.32), whilst section IV will conclude with the thought that 'worlds revolve like ancient women/gathering fuel in vacant lots' (*IMH*, IV.54–55). All these images of waste and redundancy we can find in earlier work, proving that Eliot's deployment of waste occurs not by casual accident but by a discontinuous yet traceable migration from draft to draft, notebook to notebook to publication; by trial and repetition these images become animate, move, migrate and attain mutation in their multiplicity. It is in the publication of 'Preludes', first in Wyndham Lewis' *Blast* (July 1915) and then as part of *Prufrock and Other Observations* (1917), that all these images of waste become publicly distilled and consumed, meanwhile, the discarded caprices remain left in a drawer and, later, secreted in the collections of the New York Public Library until their publication by Harcourt in 1996. When Eliot argues

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that something kept in the mind is more likely to be reused elsewhere this does not detract from the fact that we can trace this process of reuse through the trail of discarded material left behind, the drawer can be reopened and patterns of use can be described through acts of disposal.

We must revisit, as Eliot did, the value of these vacant lots: the phrase alludes to spaces and objects to be bought, sold and resold, to the actual landscapes of Boston described by Henry James, to the poems that compose *Inventions of the March Hare*. It might be easy to dismiss Eliot's vacant lots as minor stanzas within the Eliot estate. Jayme Stayer has been keen to keep these poems in the drawer that Eliot cast them into. Stayer argues that the poems of *Inventions of the March Hare*, and the 'Caprice' poems in particular, show an 'insecurity on the poet's part as to whether or not his new-found tools are working […] the images of sordidness cannot be trusted to do the work he intends'.[20] Finding that various rhetorical and technical aspects of these poems to be 'unconvincing', 'forced' or 'derivative', Stayer concludes that the notebook prepared Eliot for 'the public stage of poetry' but is full of inferior and unfinished works.[21] But Stayer seems to degrade the potential of juvenilia or manuscript notebooks, reinforcing the rarity and singularity of the published and 'definitive' work over and above all the fascinating insights that draft material can provide. Failing to account for the way in which *Inventions of the March Hare* has, indeed, found publication, Stayer emphasizes the oppositional status between draft and publication and, by employing the uncertain images of sordidness that he found so unsatisfactory:

> The chaff of the notebook – its rhetorical uncertainties, self–defeating gestures, and pornographic excrescences – Eliot will sweep away, and to the public he will present the wheat that is left over: the telling allusions, hallucinatory squalor, transcendent intimations, muted suffering, eclectic fear, bilious ennui, all of it spoken, sung, or growled in virtuosic registers of irony, obliquity, deadpan, and directness.[22]

As our brief analysis of waste in the early work of Eliot has shown, *Inventions of the March Hare* is a vacant lot from which critics might gather their fuel. If there is such a thing as 'chaff', then it cannot be swept away as easily as Stayer or, perhaps, Eliot would like us to believe. This is partly due to the images of waste that are retained, reworked, refashioned and made to reverberate in more popular or accessible poems, images that describe both the transitory contents of drafts and their base materiality. It is the provisional and temporary nature of writing waste and creating the waste of writing that allows this matter to spill into and inhabit a text assumed to be free of its effects.

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Although modern manuscript studies frequently stresses the difference between published and unpublished versions of the text, to note changes in meaning, structure or effect, and often to reinforce a calculating and taxonomic separation between draft and publication, the brief analysis of Eliot's wasted revisions given above raises certain textual and interpretative challenges that complicate this separation. Tracing Eliot's preoccupation with waste from around the time that the 'Caprice' poems were written, through to, as is our aim, the publication and critical reception of *The Waste Land*, will lead us to question the exclusive and independent status of the 'published' or 'complete' work. When Eliot said that the 'unpublished poems in the notebook were not worth publishing', he might be said to overlook how his published poems frequently contained the poetic residues of those unpublished drafts and that publishing one version and not another must account for their process of validation. Such a view must lead us to confront the way in which unpublished and published materials penetrate and contaminate one another, especially when 'unpublished' drafts are then made available as published facsimiles or typescripts. Just as other chapters have been keen to stress that there can be no such thing as an absolute form of waste, just the contingent separation of use and waste in time, so it is that manuscript or draft material cannot be expected to remain inert when interpreting works of literature. Such a view of writing means that we can supplement some views about literary composition and the writing of *The Waste Land*. The first concerns the 'scene of writing' and the stories told regarding literary manufacture. For example, it is commonly held that Eliot struggled and struggled with *The Waste Land* until finally, and with a lot of help from Ezra Pound, the work came together in the miraculous summer of 1922. Some have suggested that Eliot conjured the poem from nothing; he 'found himself' writes Louis Menard, 'with nothing to construct a poem on'.[23] But by tracing the figure and figuration of waste, the discarded scraps and drafts that preceded *The Waste Land* and the phrases, images and atmospheres they conjure, we can show that the construction of the poem can be found in the deconstructed wastes of earlier works. This lends new meaning to Pound's parenthetical suggestion that the creation of *The Waste Land* manuscript represented 'years of waste time, exasperating to it author'.[24] In other words, we can reassess where the composition of *The Waste Land* is said to have begun, an important exercise when encountering a poem that throws doubt over the time of functionality. The second commonly held belief that we can supplement is the idea that *The Waste Land* should be understood primarily as an exchange between the text and the intertexts it alludes to and transforms, as a competitive game between Eliot and

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the Western canon. Whilst this sense of intertexuality is no doubt a fundamental and distinctive aspect of Eliot's poetic method, it overlooks the *intra*textual aspect of his work.[25] That is, the correspondences established between the various kinds of writing he has authored and the sedimentation and redundancy required to shore up his work. This proves an important compositional dynamic of hoarding, storage and reuse. As Richard Badenhausen observes, '[Eliot] often scribbled fragments of verse and then hoarded them for a later time when they might blossom into larger works or be inserted into another text'.[26] The compositional and interpretative importance of so-called *intra*texuality will help us appreciate not just the scene of writing but the multiple scene*s* of writing and rewriting, unearthing an author's compositional relation to the texts of others and their own, both published and unpublished.

Bringing the waste land to order

T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land* is a difficult work, even for those that have read, reread and researched the poem over many years. This difficulty is frequently discussed by employing the figure of waste. Redundant things and obsolete spaces are seen to be complicit in the experience of interpretative frustration. The idea of 'land' has not caused the same challenge, it is the status of waste that disturbs our attempts to frame, organize and comprehend the work. This has led critics to describe the poem, as Stayer did when discussing the merits of Eliot's early work, in terms of a semantically recalcitrant or cognitively insufficient condition of waste and has even helped some to define literary modernism as a new kind of writing that is notable for its failure to function. The idea of waste has been used as an explanation for the poem's construction, a key with which to unlock the moral or philosophical mysteries of the work, or, more typically, as an immediate language to assess its worth *as* literature. And, as Harriet Davidson has argued, those who seek to celebrate or condemn Eliot's work for its political or social vision have also taken the idea of waste as a point of critical departure: 'These interpretations tend to concur', writes Davidson, 'that the barren waste of the poem's title is a metaphor for the chaotic life within the poem and that the enormous longing to escape that life implies that a world of greater propriety, of stability, order, and beauty must exist somewhere'.[27] But before we consider some of these wider issues, we should ask an apparently more straightforward question: What does waste actually *do* in Eliot's poem? I argue that it is not just through the quest for meaning that the poem poses an idea of waste, although

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this is crucial, but also in exposing the dynamics of writing, composition and editing; the waste that can be read and the waste required for writing.

Whilst we can agree with Maud Ellmann when she states that '*The Waste Land* is about what it declares–waste', we must not overlook the fascinating relationship between waste and its power to declare, between objects of redundancy and the descriptive acts that render them legible. Such a view might complicate Ellmann's suggestion that the poem is 'a ceremonial purgation, it inventories all the "stony rubbish" that it strives to exorcise'[28] since it is the poem's dubious powers to itemize and exorcize waste that are at issue. In sharp distinction to the sense that the work seeks to expel, we might just as well argue that it accumulates waste in order to prevent waste's absolute departure, dramatizing a writerly tussle between processes of preservation and erasure played out over the various levels of textual waste outlined earlier. Most immediately, we can note how objects of waste find departure in recuperative acts of description. By entering a textual object such as a poem, waste signals an incomplete departure:

> The river's tent is broken: the last fingers of leaf
> Clutch and sink into the wet bank. The wind
> Crosses the brown land, unheard. The nymphs have departed
> Sweet Thames, run softly, till I end my song.
> The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers,
> Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends
> Or other testimony of summer nights. The nymphs are departed.
> And their friends, the loitering heirs of city directors;
> Departed, have left no addresses.
>
> (III.173–181)

Ellmann quotes a part of this passage to claim 'the poem teems with urban waste'[29] but fails to note that the discarded objects – the empty bottles, sandwich papers, silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes and cigarette ends – are recorded as an absent feature of this scene whilst remaining a textual 'testimony' to their poetic potential. If the poem is about what it declares, its mode of declaration is also taken over by the objects it describes. If it teems it does not teem with the sheer presence of waste but with its characteristic absences, contingencies and false endings, with a presence shot through with a temporal incoherence.

Waste's ambivalent arrivals and departures are written into the poem's opening lines. Our access to what the poem describes occurs in *media res* but leaves us in little doubt that what has occurred in the past has worked to foreclose the future. It is the undetermined future of waste that contributes to the poem's

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open and unresolved nature, an uncertainty that is mobilized by the temporal disorder of waste-time. Eliot opens his poem with the land having already been put to death, lilacs appear from 'the dead land' (I.2), temporarily dead until April breeds, mixes and stirs the earth into an action of an inexact kind. Although life and decay are immediately expressed in terms of a vegetative circularity, with land dead and roots dull until the season changes, Eliot creates a landscape that is without the clear transitions between seasons, locations or times, or the consistent pronominal relations between the poem's various voices. Left uncertain is whether those 'dried tubers' (I.7) will remain a depleted and finite force or a basis for sustained regeneration. The poems' corpses will have the same ambivalent effect, 'That corpse you planted last year in your garden,/'Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?' (II.71–72). These questions remain unanswered and indicate a doubt over waste's effects, an uncertainty that not only accompanies what waste is but what it will become and engender:

> What are the roots that clutch, that branches grow
> Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
> You cannot say or guess, for you know only
> A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
> And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,
> And the dry stone no sound of water.
>
> (I.19–24)

Written in a self-referential language that is permeated with philological allusions – of roots and branches – these images materialize a linguistic rubbish that strives for meaning. Two perspectives collide upon the idea and substance of waste; one sees roots and branches growing from stony rubbish whilst a counterpoised voice, assuming a Biblical term of address, describes a sequence of broken images. Seeming to imply a separation between things of waste and their mode of description, both are rendered simultaneously inoperative; it remains unclear whether this rubbish is like stone or is indeed made of stone, whether the images are for some reason insufficient or non-functioning, or that they constitute a catalogue of material things the form of which have become iconoclastically shattered. Are they broken in their powers to signify or are they merely damaged? Moreover, we are left to speculate whether the roots in line 19 grow because or in spite of the rubbish found in line 20. Will the land remain 'dead', will the dried tubers nourish and rejuvenate and will this stony rubbish stay in this condition? For Michael Levinson, these kinds of questions are integral to a poem that contains pools of determinacy and indeterminacy;

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not simply given over to a churning abandonment of meaning but a poetic play 'between bridges and chasms, repetitions and aggressive novelties, echoes and new voices'.[30] With its lingering departures and conditional ends, waste takes up an important role in the oscillation between interpretative ease and resistance; these images of waste are not just objects in the poem but objects which invite and suspend the work of critical closure.

The waste the poem describes can be made to operate as a synecdoche for a wider interpretative problem, one that brings us beyond the specificity of *The Waste Land* and to the temporality of reading and engaging with literature at a more general level: what is *the meaningful use of writing for which meaning appears neither concrete nor self-evident*? It is surely not the case that this rubbish renders the poem meaning*less* or in a state of absolute uselessness, but that its poetic instability brings reading few guarantees other than helping to draw attention to the interpretative risk the work manufactures. The poem's capacity to resist a smooth and direct form of reading, a form of reading that utilizes a text for interpretative security, closure and satisfaction, might make the idea of waste a complicit model for dealing with *The Waste Land*'s semantic openness. In being complicit with the wider disorientations felt to be integral to things of waste, it is neither clear to what or to whom the poem is directed, nor can a unequivocal consensus be reached regarding its outcome. We initially set out to investigate what waste might be *doing* in Eliot's poem and I have argued that the efficacy of waste is one of the poem's central doubts; it is the problematic effects of waste that makes it such a beguiling component in works of literature, sculpture or architecture. Whilst the complicit and comprehensible text – a phone book, an instruction manual, a newspaper report – might be read under the denotative temporal conditions of use, in which expectations are driven by specific temporal ends, *The Waste Land* and its powers to contain multiple times, texts, places and voices, to invite repeated readings none of which will bring the work of interpretation to a determinate end, means it is a text which withstands the organizational promise of use-time. If *The Waste Land* is what it declares then its waste transforms how we experience its declaration, to a reading without end.

Allusion, intertexuality and manuscript drafts

We have seen how the waste of *The Waste Land* invites an interpretative urgency, a critical compulsion matched by a necessary caution. We can extend this dynamic relationship, between the text that resists and the critical urgency that

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this resistance invites, by noting how the idea of waste has become a popular metaphor for understanding the poem's structure, powers of reference and intertextuality. Though different to the more linguistically radical theories of intertexuality that evolved in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva, Eliot's programme for reusing the work of other writers highlights a similar concern for how meaning becomes dispersed among texts. According to Kristeva, an author does not create meaning in their text but compiles it from those that pre-exist, an author's work is 'a permutation of texts, an intertextuality in the space of a given text' where 'several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralise one another'.[31] Kristeva stresses the plural, continuous and dialogical nature of language, a nature that 'between the different units of a sentence or narrative structure, indicat[es] a *becoming* […] a logic of analogy and nonexclusive opposition, opposed to monological levels of causality and identifying determination'.[32] Eliot's use of allusion produces a more enclosed intertextual effect, one that has led his critics to adopt metaphors of waste in order to understand the disjointed and jarring nature of *The Waste Land*'s various parts. Louis Untermeyer argues 'It is doubtful whether "The Waste Land" is anything but a set of separate poems, a piece of literary carpentry, a scholarly joiner's work, the flotsam and jetsam of desiccated culture'.[33] In a similar manner, Hugh Kenner has suggested that 'Cities are built out of the ruins of previous cities, as *The Waste Land* is built out of the remains of older poems'.[34] Both critics agree that the fragmentary nature of the work suggests the waste from which it is composed, and not just the separate fragments from which Eliot compiled the work but to the traditions of literary culture in a wider sense. Salvaged from innumerable locations, these textual fragments which establish its intertexual relations, so important to reading *The Waste Land* and influential when considering patterns of use and reuse, lend the text a latent sense of temporal permutation, a permanent 'elsewhere', that disperses any immediate or self-present meaning. But this is not an intertextuality that is in the process of *continual* becoming but one that also stresses how texts become intermittently, are passed over, erased and defaced. This is an intertextuality achieved through the temporal interruptions implied by waste.

Contrary to the theories of the Kristevan intertextual, the ironic allusions Eliot makes to Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* or Dante's *Inferno* do not leave them entirely 'neutralised', whether in relation to one another or with relation to *The Waste Land* as a composite work. Instead, Eliot's use of allusion, especially when employed for sardonic or contrary effects, creates a severance that John Riquelme likens to a laboratory for textual

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resurrection, 'Like a corpse that unexpectedly and incongruously revives as a new form of life, the transplanted textual substance means something else because of the new contexts that it inhabits'.[35] Whether the metaphor employed is one drawn from the carpenter's workshop, the processes of urban ruin and renewal, or the ghoulish revivification of dead matter, the poem's use of allusion and adaptation simultaneously confirms the texts it cites and marks them as redundant and available for reuse. By incorporating and adapting these texts in *The Waste Land*, Eliot suggests that to 'make it new' one must sometimes render other things outmoded and create 'the present moment of the past'.[36] Another way of expressing this problem might be to highlight how, in making intertextual allusions, the flotsam and jetsam, the ruins and corpses of writing become manufactured in their appropriation, rewriting and representation. What this does for the immediate present of the poem is a fundamental question, one that has divided critics between extremes of absolute continuity with the writing of the past and an endless, chaotic *différance* of signification. It is not enough to assume, as James Logenbach does, that 'the wide field of references are folded into the present to remind us of historical continuity and show us the way out of our predicament – they are "fragments … shored against my ruins"'.[37] Such a statement confuses the temporal complexity of the fragment, assumes it has a necessary and positive purchase on historical continuity and ignores the fatalistic futility implied by shoring the consequences of ruin against a process of ruination. Just as the poem wavers between stony rubbish and heaps of broken images, so it is that its intertextual nature shores fragments against further fragments. Neither is it necessarily sufficient nor entirely clear how *The Waste Land* can be read as 'an economy of excess, virtually an unreserved expenditure of semantic capital, that continually diverts citational chains into fruitfully wasteful avenues or alleyways, rendering the poem a Venice of textual prodigality'.[38] Such a view, which has more in common with Ellmann's exorcisms, neglects to note that waste is an idea that stems from a relatively delimited idea of useful duration. The poem is not just semantic sluice, just as we saw with the calculated effects of Eliot's allusions. The problem, then, becomes the precise status of Eliot's text, since it is neither entirely ruinous nor pristine, neither dead nor fully alive, but makes allusions that serve to renegotiate the efficacy of its source material and reveal a redundancy integral to its composition. This temporal tension is reflected in Eliot's theoretical and somewhat paradoxical claims regarding the nature of poetic individuality, 'the most individual parts of [the poet's] work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously'.[39] If, in using, alluding to and quoting

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these 'dead' writers, *The Waste Land* asserts their intertextual immortality, the resulting 'immortality' is nevertheless won by keeping these writers and their writing fixed in the mortal past.

It would be a mistake to assume that the only textual relationship that *The Waste Land* seeks to explore is one between Eliot's text and those of others. '*Intra*textuality' is often taken to denote the internal relations established within a text and, in that regard, it typically means the opposite of an intertexuality which locates the meaning of a text in relation to others external to it.[40] The internal/external poles associated with each term are too restrictive, however, since they both ignore the grey position that manuscript drafts take with respect to the published work. As a solution, I would like to reclaim the word intratextuality to absorb internal *and* external relationships to include manuscript drafts, or '*avant-textes*' as Joel Bellemin-Noël has called them.[41] An intratextual reading is particularly relevant to the study of Eliot's work, partly for the way he and Pound edited the manuscript drafts but also because these draft materials bear witness to Eliot's understanding of authorial criticism: 'the larger part of an author in composing his work is critical labour: the labour of sifting, combining, constructing, expunging, correcting, testing: this frightful toil is as much critical as creative'.[42] The labour of this work of compositional editing can be seen in a line that describes a multitude 'undone', an apposite word that readily associates the things, places and people undone in the poem with the editorial undoings that have gone into the poem's construction: 'Sighs, short and infrequent, were ~~expired~~, ~~exhaled~~. ~~expired~~. exhaled'.[43] This textual exhaust hasn't been allowed to fully expire but ghosts the version of the text printed in 1922; when reading the manuscript waste of *The Waste Land* we find a work intimately bound to the process of critical writing that was necessary for its composition, disclosing the textual variants that go into the writing of waste and a textual archaeology that refuses to be limited to the flotsam and jetsam that appears at the poem's surface.

The publication and availability of *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Typescript of the Original Drafts Including the Annotations of Ezra Pound* is testament to a sifting, combining, expunging, correcting kind of labour. And, above all, it shows that the creation of *The Waste Land* was achieved by a substantial effort to remove narrative passages – approximately 220 lines dominated by adverbs and conjunctions, precisely the fixative and compensatory bridges that allow us to move from passage to passage. The visual and material evidence of their removal means that readers are able to confirm the critical attitudes they often reserve instinctually; the difficulty

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of *The Waste Land* can be partly explained not by what it does but by the narrative elements it lacks. The narrative vignettes that remain, such as the pub scene at the end of 'A Game of Chess' or the typist's liaisons with the 'young man carbuncular' in 'The Fire Sermon', endure to expose the sense of narrative fragmentation felt in other sections. As Lawrence Rainey has noted of the 1922 text, '*The Waste Land* doesn't have a narrative; instead, it has the scent of a narrative, hovering in the air like a perfume after someone has left the room'.[44] Sullivan chooses a different, more spectral metaphor with which to describe the relationship between draft and printed text: 'the revisions have a ghostly status: they mark the genetic process of a poem that merely *could have been*'.[45] But olfactory or spiritualist metaphors are not really necessary. Eliot's poetics of waste is more plain-speaking, meaning that different orders of textual waste and their narrative content, like 'empty bottles, sandwich papers,/ Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends/ Or other testimony of summer nights', can be read as a departed presence. In reading these incomplete absences, *The Waste Land* declares its waste and announces the wastes of this declaration.

When the poem still operated under the working title *He do the Police in Different Voices*, 'The Burial of the Dead' opened with a night scene reminiscent of the 'Circe' episode in James Joyce's *Ulysses*, which Eliot read in draft.[46] These collected drafts of 'The Burial of the Dead', cancelled with Pound's assistance in January 1922 and unpublished during Eliot lifetime, show a poem of a very different kind:

> First we had a couple of feelers down at Tom's place,
> There was old Tom, boiled to the eyes, blind,
> (Don't you remember that time after a dance,
> Top hats and all, we and Silk Hat Harry,
> And old Tom took us behind, brought out a bottle of fizz,
> With old Jane, Tom's wife; and we got Joe to sing […]
>
> (*TWL: Facs*, 5.1–6)

With this dramatic scene peopled by drunks, girls and policemen, the poem begins with a great sense of action, location and consequence:

> We'd just gone up the alley, a fly cop came along,
> Looking for trouble; committing a nuisance, he said,
> You come on to the station. I'm sorry, I said,
> It's no use being sorry, he said; I'll get my hat, I said.
>
> (*TWL: Facs*, 5.35–39)

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Instead the published text opens with 'April is the cruellest month' and the jovial scenes with Tom, Joe, Jane and Harry are replaced with fractious 'I's, 'we's and a land failing to function. 'The thing now runs from April … to shanith without break' Pound wrote to Eliot in January 1922 after the more comprehensive structural changes had been decided, 'That is nineteen pages, and let us say the longest poem in the Englisch langwidge. Dont try to bust all records by prolonging it three pages further'.[47] Yet the publishable length of the poem at this stage did not provide the only reason for reducing its length. As Badenhausen has argued, in editing these drafts Eliot's task became one encouraged by a textual and imagistic economy that 'deleted distracting excess material in favor of distilling the image to its essential properties'.[48] These essential properties, as we have seen, return the work to itself and its power to declare its own waste – both leaving the literal images of rubbish, litter, bones and ruins more enigmatic, without clear cause or consequence, but also bringing the shadow of a textual surplus into closer proximity to the words that remain on the page. The poem's waste content contributed to a paradoxical order, an order achieved by the calculated and collaborative management of textual waste.[49] For Pound, this effort to delete surplus material was also motivated by an ideal uniqueness, a literary object unlike any other. As Eliot recalled, 'Pound said, "It's no use trying to do something that somebody else has done as well as it can be done. Do something different"'.[50] As we have seen, doing something different, making 'it' new, meant cutting and paring down to clusters and rhythmic patterns, allusions, quotations and adaptations. This economy – motivated by difference and singularity and manifesting itself, amongst other things, in images of waste – would transform what Eliot took for poetry. Commenting on the influence that Pound had on his work, Eliot said that in excising those longer narrative sections the work was changed 'from a jumble of good and bad passages into a poem'.[51] That is, in removing 220 lines, a state of completion and hence 'literature' could come into being, the process of finishing, resolving and completing 'the' work was accompanied by creating 'the' rejected aspects of manuscript material.

We can expand upon Gregory Jay's observation, that Eliot became 'the deconstructed genius loci of a textual waste land […] April stands for a new season "breading" poems out of the detritus of his literary inheritance and notebook drafts',[52] by emphasizing how these drafts provided a location and an object of textual waste making. This is not a process that is limited to just one poem but can be expanded to include the wastes of writing and description we found in *Inventions of the March Hare*. The difference, of course, is that *The*

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Waste Land drafts overwrite and provide poetic continuity between the drafts of *Inventions*; the text of 1922 is not just a waste-free stage for earlier experiments, but the epicentre of waste-writing that includes and overwhelms Eliot's earlier caprices. As we noted earlier, the discarded status of Eliot's *Inventions* notebook came about through the success of *The Waste Land*,[53] the success of which, in turn, was born from a calculated process of textual revision. This rather more nuanced approach to Eliot's literary corpus stresses the dynamic endurance of these drafts and confirms a writing process driven first by accumulation and then by elimination, condensation, paring and concentration, in other words, to composition measured by moments of systematic excision.

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5

Reading Joycean Disjecta

This chapter revisits and revises several lines of enquiry laid out in the previous chapter. It responds to the notion that the history of literature is full of works that represent waste objects but claims that few novels dramatize how waste corresponds to the production and reception of writing with the same stylistic density as James Joyce's *Ulysses*. It is a novel full of waste objects and a work that uses these objects to reflect upon the materials of writing, the time of its consumption and its composition. Despite the primacy I give to Joyce's novel, I use Joyce's *Ulysses* as an illustrative case for much broader and generalizable ideas that travel far in excess of Joyce's writing or the historical period in which he was active. Such ideas – the temporal impact that redundant objects have upon our understanding of a work or the relationship between draft and published editions – must ultimately find their ballast in the relationship between the materials of writing and the writing of materials, where 'writing appears in things, it appears from things, it is not different from things'.[1] Tony Thwaites has argued that Joyce's contribution to these fields is distinctive, not only does 'Joyce treats language itself as [an] object'[2] but Joyce treats the sum of this language, the text, the novel, as an object too, an object open to and informed by the times of use and waste. This chapter argues that if writing and things are so intimately bound, then conditions of waste mediate and articulate the material qualities of writing, bringing time to the writing of things.

As we saw in the work of T. S. Eliot, the status of writing is achieved by series of layers made up by the objects contained in a description, the linguistic objects that communicate that description and the material forms that these take (paper, books, digital files and so on). At each level of analysis, one can point towards a waste content that informs how we construct meaning through these things, and how they pattern and pace the meaning of the work. *Ulysses* is full of waste objects; rusty boots, scraps of paper, discarded clothing, corpses and bodily excreta regularly punctuate and motivate the events described in the

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novel. *Ulysses* is full of waste words; Joyce frequently manipulates his writing to suggest the absences and contortions that constitute his work. Equally, the various editions, drafts and manuscripts that can impose upon our reading of the novel encourage us to read their absence; these discarded versions ghost the 'final' text in order to compromise the security of our interpretations. In a novel in which the reader is constantly challenged to divide waste from want, I argue that the composite effect of these textual wastes makes a significant contribution to contesting the limits or borders of the work.

Waste words and throwaways

> Quietly he read, restraining himself, the first column and, yielding, but resisting, began the second. Midway, his last resistance yielding, he allowed his bowels to ease themselves quietly as he read, reading still patiently that slight constipation of yesterday quite gone. Hope it's not too big bring on piles again. No, just right. So. Ah! Costive. One tabloid of cascara sagrada. Life might be so. It did not move or touch him but it was something quick and neat. Print anything now. Silly season. He read on, seated calm above his own rising smell. Neat certainly. […] He tore away half the prize story sharply and wiped himself with it. (*U*, 4.506–513, 507; *UP*, 83–84, 85)[3]

The temporality of literature is placed under an ironic microscope towards the end of 'Calypso', both literature's use and functionality are playfully distorted. Bloom's shit in the outhouse and his concurrent digestion of Philip Beaufoy's prize story suggest a canny enmeshment between literary production, literary reception and their common waste. As Maud Ellmann has demonstrated, the passage serves as a description of Bloom's interaction with the short story and a description of his defecation.[4] Whilst Beaufoy's story and Bloom's faeces might both be judged 'neat', the activities of reading and defecation become comically mixed. Indeed, the activities become indistinguishable. The boundary between waste and the written is, as we have seen in the work of Eliot, a boundary distinguished by uncertain limits. In the outhouses of *Ulysses*, thought, story and bodily excretions occupy and contaminate one another. Bloom wipes himself the story, free indirect discourse becomes stylistically cloacal and words and waste are rendered textually and conceptually proximate. An object of the narrative and a synecdoche for the narrative act itself, Bloom's use of the Beaufoy's short story is an object in and the fulfilment of a narrative act. One might want to argue that by wiping himself with the story Bloom signals the end of the story's use as

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reading material, as 'literature' and pronounces the story's transformation into an implement of bodily hygiene. And yet, it is precisely this ambivalent category of 'literature' that persists, lingering beyond the act of reading or any other absolute or unequivocal end.[5] Joyce's material and linguistic ends are provisional, working through codas and reprises. Even though the short story is discarded along with Bloom's faeces, the language of literary narrative continues to structure how Bloom perceives his waste-making. In 'Wandering Rocks' Bloom is reminded of the Beaufoy story when he meets Mrs Breen. 'Did I pull the chain?' he asks himself, 'Yes. The last act' (*U*, 8.270; *UP*, 200). Couched in literary self-reference, we should not take Bloom's assessment for granted; his shit, like the literature he reads and features in, has a necessary and significant afterlife.

Ideas of reusing and recycling seem particularly pertinent here, especially since it is alleged that Joyce himself wrote a short story for *Titbits* and a line from this unpublished story appears in the 'Calypso' episode, '*Matcham often thinks of the masterstroke by which he won…*' (*U*, 4.513–514; *UP*, 84).[6] This autobiographical detail cannot be underestimated as it compounds the complexity of Joyce's attitude towards his own literary product, besides providing another intratextual example of how 'expunged' elements of his literary output become re-inscribed in later works. Although the *Titbits* story might seem to display a common trajectory suffered by all kinds of writing, the reappearance of a work from Joyce's adolescence affirms and confuses the reflexive gesture being made, prompting the question: precisely who's story is being wiped? The scatological employment of this 'old number of *Titbits*' (*U*, 4.467; *UP*, 82), which might be understood as an attempt on Joyce's part to exorcise the detritus of his early writing career, provides a reading which openly contradicts Lawrence Rainey's argument that the incident 'epitomizes the modernist contempt for popular culture'.[7] If contempt is being shown to Joyce/Beaufoy's story it is contempt that implicates the broader narrative of the novel. It is not, in any case, a feeling shared by Bloom who 'envie[s] kindly' the story's author (*U*, 4.516; *UP*, 84). Moreover, one might argue the opposite is true; the incident proves how *Ulysses* could not exist without the countless stories that precede it, Bloom's recycling is akin to the novel's compositional methods of narrative cycling and recycling. These narrative intertexts, authored by Joyce and countless others, render the novel a silted, intertextual and intratextual palimpsest that incessantly quotes, alludes and cites works from 'elsewhere'. And as Cheryl Herr and R. Brandon Kershner have demonstrated, popular works play a fundamental role in this silting process.[8] The commingling of these intertexts sees them inserted within a textual economy that allows both popular and avant-garde works to be

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discarded. So 'Calypso' attempts to raise more interesting issues than whether or not items of popular culture are being unfairly rubbished. A more prescient series of questions surrounds what might be the use-time of literary language, how this use-time might be understood when the materiality of language is used for radically different purposes and how categories of 'literature' respond to transitions from use to reuse.

If *Ulysses* is a novel that represents waste, it does so by making waste novel, by putting the idea of waste to work. As was claimed in the last chapter, all writing produces and relies upon the production of waste and, whilst some forms of writing are more susceptible to being physically thrown away than others, the condition of being a 'throwaway' has a dynamic immanence in the production of the literary. Steven Connor is right to suggest that in *Ulysses* 'the letter […] is always being transformed into litter',[9] but this is by no means the final transformation that Joyce's objects undergo. To discard an object is to enact one of the many potential transformations and to do so heralds only the illusion of an end. If letters, newspapers, scribbled notes, envelopes and handbills all have a propensity to be discarded, and in a novel like *Ulysses* this propensity is frequently consummated, then Joyce does not allow this litter to simply 'disappear' from the text. Although things tend to gravitate towards the rubbish heap, the outhouse or the graveyard in *Ulysses*, Joyce does not allow these objects to remain there, disappear or become inert. This sense of the functional multiplicity of things is underscored when Bloom visits the offices of the *Freeman's Journal* and observes the machinery that manufactures the paper, 'the obedient reels feeding in huge webs of paper. Clank it. Clank it. Miles of it unreeled' (*U*, 7.136–137; *UP*, 152). We glimpse the fantastic quantity of reading material being produced, generated in industrial measures. But the *Freeman's Journal* as reading material is not its only use, 'What becomes of it after?' wonders Bloom, 'O, wrap up meat, parcels: various uses, thousand and one things' (*U*, 7.137–138; *UP*, 152).[10] The production of commodities reproduces a temporal structure according to a function; the transience of this function is crucial for structuring the *after*life of things. The use-values of things are designated according to this ambivalent sense of an 'after', in this case a temporal break from the function of being read. As this book has been keen to make clear, the temporal structure that divides an object by use is integral to the invention of waste and the possibility of future uses. Bloom's use of the prize short story accentuates how literary waste remains a functioning entity that persists beyond its function as reading material. The functionality of this non-functionality is a key condition for the articulation of 'waste' in literature and an important

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paradox, one that occurs at the level of objects narrated and at the level of the narrative itself. In 'Calypso' we read about an object that has exhausted its potential to be read. But this literary exhaust is an object that becomes reused by Bloom and is a narrative object that continually engages our readings and interpretations. Efforts to interpret the text thus centre upon objects that, by no longer having value as reading material for one of the narrative's characters, intensify a problem of legibility, readability and significance. In this way, and despite appearances, waste objects have a narrative afterlife that suspends their absolute disappearance from the novel's surface. We might summarize the paradox of word-waste in the following way: representing the end of narrative objects only prolongs literature's use-time; the narrative means that fabricates the meaning of literature obstructs its absolute end. The writing of waste, the writing that has become waste, is described, distorted and made visible via the reflexive manipulation of yet more writing, yet more narrative.

It is therefore unsurprising that Joyce singles out 'freshprinted rag paper' (*U*, 5.58; *UP*, 88) as a particular object of circulation, waste and subsequent narrative extension. Of course, the serialization of Victorian novels in newspapers made the historical and technical development of the modern novel intimately bound to the circulation and profitability of newsprint. Dickens, George Eliot, Thackeray and Hardy published in this serialized format. Despite these strong ties, the status of 'literature' has often been felt to stand in opposition to the lowly newspaper. This is partly due to the short-lived nature of newsprint's use-time. One might argue that newspapers, handbills and other ephemera (from the Greek ἐφήμερα, ἐπί epi, 'on, for', and ήμέρα hemera, 'day') are especially sensitive to the temporalization of use-values. The use-time of newspapers is integrated into their status as commodities and contained by the date-marked information they communicate. The utility of this information becomes inextricably tied to the dates, events and announcements that arise from their pages: their obsolescence is inbuilt. Expressions such as 'yesterday's news' or 'today's news, tomorrow's fish and chip wrapper' only serve to emphasize how we associate newspapers with an inbuilt obsolescence. As a means of figuring the disposability of information, newspapers foreshorten the temporality of writing – the use-time of words is partly dictated by their material form, newspapers and handbills manufacture and are manufactured by the passing of their use-time. For this reason, newspapers and fliers provide a convenient analogue to the transience of language and meaning, a transience to which 'literature' supposedly stands in opposition. For Connor, 'the newspaper points in *Ulysses* to a mysterious textual economy whose purpose is to process detritus

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into meaning, and meaning into detritus. Seen in this way, the newspaper is not the textual adversary of the novel, but its secret model'.[11] This textual economy is one played out materially and linguistically; newspapers and other pieces of ephemera provide a way of signifying the residues of language and the remnants that give it shape. This is an analogue the novel amplifies in two distinct ways. The first of these comes about through Joyce's replication of the date-function that we have just used to characterize the temporality of newsprint. This date-function occurs in two principal forms. First, the novel presents the events of a single day, an act of inscription made plain by Miss Dunne as she 'clicked on the keyboard: —16 June 1904' (*U*, 10.376; *UP*, 294). This novel is undeniably marked by a date, branded with signature that announces news that has already past. Second, and at a more general level, *Ulysses* closes its account of things by underlining the period of its production '*Trieste-Zurich-Paris*, 1914–1921' (*U*, 18.161–1611; *UP*, 933). Together, these dates mark the time being represented and the period taken for this representation to be realized. For Karen R. Lawrence this date-function renders the novel 'a souvenir of a time and place passing and gone. The city is arrested, dated, in its pre-modern phase. The spatial and temporal distance between the city and its novelistic image, between "home" and Joyce, is captured in Joyce's signature at the end of the novel'.[12] *Ulysses* represents a time apart, a time that is always 'after'. Whilst newspapers are always falling or have already fallen into the informational obsolescence by which they take their meaning, *Ulysses* takes its meaning by already being obsolete, by being a souvenir of a time that can only be felt at a greater and greater distance. By dating his fiction in this way Joyce captures the dialectical movement between the writing of time and the time of writing; meaning is attributed to time through writing whilst time makes the process of writing meaningful. But these prominent dates, which appear to order our sense of time in *Ulysses*, are by no means fixed; they are subject to an elastic tension. The action of the novel spills into 17 June 1904 and the progressive composition of *Ulysses* has continued long after 1922. Although the date-function of newspapers and handbills secures or even hastens their passage into a state of waste, the double dating of *Ulysses* places a disjunction between the times of use and the time by which that use can become obsolete.

The second reason that newspapers and handbills provide a model rather than an adversary for *Ulysses* is that the transience of newspapers and handbills, what we might call 'disposable writing', structures and participates within the composition and decomposition of the narrative. In 'Lotus-eaters' a famous misunderstanding occurs that rests upon the disposability of Bloom's *Freeman*

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and the name of a horse called 'Throwaway' that would later win the Gold Cup. Bantam Lyons is eager to see Bloom's copy of the *Freeman* to scan its form guide and Bloom tells him twice that he can keep the paper as he was 'going to throw it away' (*U*, 5.534; *UP*, 106). Bantam takes this to be a coded tip for the race and scurries off, leaving Bloom with his throwaway but without the knowledge with which to convert its financial reward. It is a misunderstanding that we only come to realize has occurred much later in the novel in 'Lestrygonians' when Bantam Lyons announces that Bloom gave him a tip and that he intends to place five bob on it (*U*, 8.1016; *UP*, 228). Even at this stage we cannot be entirely sure what has gone on until, in 'Cyclops', Lenehan provides the missing information – Bloom gave Bantam Lyons the winner of the Gold Cup, Throwaway, the 'rank outsider' (*U*, 12.1219; *UP*, 422). As Tony Thwaites documents, the evolution of this textual puzzle occurs over hundreds of pages and to even begin the process of resolving the riddle one must read and reread the novel several times.[13] The reader's work of reconstruction is not aided by the appearance of another 'throwaway', another textual puzzle that issues from a disposable form of writing. At the beginning of 'Wandering Rocks' Bloom meets a 'sombre Y.M.C.A. young man' – described later as the 'distributor of throwaways' (*U*, 17.1490; *UP*, 855) – who places 'a throwaway in the hand of Mr Bloom' (*U*, 8.6; *UP*, 190). The handbill announces, 'Elijah is coming. Dr Alexander Dowie, restorer of the church in Zion, is coming' (*U*, 8.13–14; *UP*, 190). As he walks, Bloom reads the handbill in his typically elliptical, interrupted and tangential manner. When he comes to O'Connell Bridge he looks down to the Liffey below, observing barges and swooping gulls. Bloom cuts short his wandering thoughts to fulfil the inherent disposability of this handbill: 'He threw down among them a crumpled paper ball. Elijah thirtytwo feet per sec is com. Not a bit. The ball bobbed unheeded on the wake of swells, floated under by the bridgepiers' (*U*, 8.57–59; *UP*, 192). In stark opposition to the two Banbury cakes that Bloom also throws down to the gulls, which are swiftly taken, 'Every morsel' (*U*, 8.77; *UP*, 192), the paper ball bobs and drifts upon the water's surface. The afterlife of this writing flows through the novel as a remainder, changing its appearance and its levels of signification with its geographical position, which are given according to the bridges, buildings and other landmarks it passes on its way:

> A skiff, a crumpled throwaway, Elijah is coming, rode lightly down the Liffey, under Loopline bridge, shooting the rapids where water chafed around the bridgepiers, sailing eastwards past hulls and anchorchains, between the Customhouse old dock and George's quay. (*U*, 10.294–297; *UP*, 291)

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> North wall and sir John Rogerson's quay, with hulls and anchorchains, sailing westward, sailed by a skiff, a crumpled throwaway, rocked on the ferrywash, Elijah is coming. (*U*, 10.752–754; *UP*, 308)

> Elijah, skiff, light crumpled throwaway, sailed eastward by flanks of ships and trawlers, amid an archipelago of corks, beyond new Wapping street past Benson's ferry, and by the threemasted schooner *Rosevean* from Bridgewater with bricks. (*U*, 10.1096–1099; *UP*, 321)

This is a kind of waste writing that is made to reverberate through the text. The throwaway takes on an ambiguous, intensely enigmatic role within the episode, replicating the passage of human bodies as they pass into Joyce's textual labyrinth. Again, we meet with the paradox of writing that becomes waste; as an object to interpret its importance seems to become intensified because its original use, as reading material, has passed. We will soon see how the same is true of the manuscript drafts that record the composition of this usefulness, this legibility. For Maud Ellmann this ball of paper signals Joyce's 'throwaway economy of writing – Joyce wastes words'.[14] But the words that have become waste do not and cannot disappear from the text; they become puzzles and enigmas that the reader is invited to unravel. Richard Ellmann draws out a Homeric parallel – the skiff successfully passes through the labyrinth and 'floats down like the *Argo* between the two Symplegadean banks, as between the North and South walls of the Liffey, and out to sea'.[15] Between these observations lies an obvious tension; between annihilation and survival, disappearance and endurance, the throwaway seems to be an object of lowly value and an object of singular importance. The condition of written waste is the uneasy synthesis of these extremes. Jacques Derrida has given an elaborate discussion of the Elijah figure, suggesting that the prophet orders and mediates communication, overseeing rites of circumcision and, thus, the expansion and legitimation of community. But, Derrida writes, whatever he might represent, Elijah serves as 'a synecdoche of Ulyssean narration, at once smaller and greater than the whole'.[16] Although Derrida does not say as much we might carry this observation into our discussion of waste, not least because Elijah's arrival is announced on a throwaway handbill, a disposable form of writing. The throwaway, like the newspaper, has a direct material relationship to the condition of the novel; they are material manifestations of language entered into the temporal structures of use and waste. What *Ulysses* demonstrates by taking these objects and narrating their passage into the outhouse or along the surface of the river is that the category of waste is a category full of false endings and illusory disappearances. Moreover, the passage of writing into a category of waste does not mean that this writing loses or has lost meaning. In Joyce at least, the opposite is true.

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A language of flotsam and jetsam

'Proteus', the episode in which Stephen Dedalus walks along Sandymount Strand, gives witness to a complex and disjointed meditation upon the materiality of words, the contingent history of narrative objects and to the temporality of language. It is a paradigmatic episode in a novel that we have already found to be full of lingering waste. Narrative connections and temporal relations, so important to the idea of waste, are made to pulse throughout Joyce's work and find particular intensity in this episode. Despite Stephen's phenomenological experiments, Joyce is careful to remind his readers that the ineluctable modality of the senses is understood through the ineluctable modality of language. This has important repercussions for how we view the subject of waste and how it enters and reverberates within the novel. Throughout *Ulysses* we see how the subject of waste is formed in productive negotiation with the language that composes and decomposes its presence, the base matter of words. Since the idea of waste transforms the meaning of language, the problem of waste in Joyce is also a problem of legibility, comprehension and representation. As my reading of *Ulysses* will demonstrate, waste concerns what can be known in and through the wastes of texts.

'These heavy sands', observes Stephen, 'are language tide and wind have silted here' (*U*, 3.298–299; *UP*, 55). Drawing on an explicit comparison between the nature of language and his immediate physical environment, Stephen notes the beach appears heavy with linguistic deposits. We follow his exploration of the beach and are simultaneously introduced to time's materiality as it is mediated linguistically. Language is described as a natural object, a material worked upon by processes of erosion and accretion, processes that are inevitable, continuous, elemental and thus inherently temporal. By characterizing the development of language as a project under natural and continuous change, a change that sees words subtly shift their forms, textures and meanings over time, Stephen can be understood to entertain a certain form of linguistic Romanticism.[17] The relationship between words and things is punctuated by an indeterminate series of comings and goings, a linguistic reflection of the chaos of the universe.[18] Through a fundamentally unstable notion of the physical environment this Romantic conception of language constantly seeks an organic equivalence in organic chaos. Whilst providing a useful way of realizing the nebulous relationship between material and linguistic matter, too great a reliance on this Romantic view of language loses sight of two important factors. The first concerns the sort of linguistic beach, 'these heavy sands', that Stephen encounters. The

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beach is not represented as a space of *pure* flux. It is, instead, a silted, articulated and differentiated field, heavy with objects that no longer function, heavy of the past. The second factor arises from the status of Joyce's work and the genesis of a particular textual formation: 'These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here'. The textual archaeology that can be performed on this line reveals how, whilst the beach might be heavy with language, Joyce's text has passed through its own process of waste management that is equally sedimented, articulated, differentiated. If we take these factors together, Joyce demonstrates what might be considered the textual space reserved for waste matter. Like Eliot, he uses the idea of waste to explore the constructedness of his works, the textual waste it engenders and suppresses and the materials of writing that links objects of representation with the objects represented. 'Proteus' suggests a material and textual space full of temporal objects, accounting for the composition of both narrative things and the text that realizes and represents those things. Having assessed both of these factors, we will be in a better position to analyse how Joyce represents waste as a problem of figuration, of representation and of the temporality of writing.

Narrating the place of textual waste

Ulysses is a novel that incessantly depicts acts of disposal and defecation, so much so that Leopold Bloom longs to profit from the 'waste paper, fells of sewer rodents, human excrement' (*U*, 17.1702; *UP*, 845–846) that Dublin produces on a daily basis. This would be a financial venture to which Bloom himself would make regular investment, from his outhouse in 'Calypso' to his and Stephen's 'first sequent, then simultaneous, urinations' (*U*, 17.1192; *UP*, 825) in 'Eumaeus'.[19] Similarly, in 'Scylla and Charybdis' we witness Bloom observing and then contributing to the Liffey's sewage (*U*, 8.57; *UP*, 192) which he later condemns in 'Nausicaa' for its pollution and threat to human life, 'The sewage. Hopeless' (*U*, 13.1233; *UP*, 497). The idea of the urban is not simply a matter of topography for Joyce; it closely corresponds to how objects, both animate and inanimate, move through the space that the text describes. Even during the protean stages of the novel we are invited to assess how Dublin's sparsely inhabited spaces are connected to the city's more densely populated areas. It is in the 'Proteus' episode that we see where this sewage ends up, all these diverse acts of waste-making occur *after* Stephen's visit to one of Dublin's many unofficial dumping grounds. In a mocking tribute to Homer's narrative structure, Joyce represents

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the destination of Dublin's waste before we see the act, or acts, of deposition that have exiled it from the city. This is not to say that we view the beach's waste in isolation to these actions; non-functioning objects always suggest a time of useful activity, a time that no longer occurs; the concept of waste presupposes the cessation of a time and a place of use. As we shall see, Stephen immediately associates the presence of waste with the presence of narrative, a story or history. So, although much of the rubbish at Sandymount is impressionistically rendered, and Stephen gives little thought to precisely how and why this waste is present, the specificity of the objects he recognizes suggests a history, a time of use that is no longer in operation. He sees that these things are heavy with the past, heavy with a narrative that situates and activates the activity of reading.

> Unwholesome sandflats waited to suck his treading soles, breathing upward sewage breath, a pocket of seaweed smouldered in seafire under a midden of man's ashes. He coasted them, walking warily. A porterbottle stood up, stogged to its waist, in the cakey sand dough. A sentinel: isle of dreadful thirst. Broken hoops on the shore; at the land a maze of dark cunning nets; farther away chalkscrawled backdoors and on the higher beach a dryingline with two crucified shirts. Ringsend: wigwams of brown steersmen and master mariners. Human shells. (*U*, 3.150–157; *UP*, 50)

Stephen's exploration of the seashore demonstrates how waste does not have a singular place in a bounded, structuralist taxonomy; rather, waste takes its meaning through movement and circulation. The unwholesome, convolved, and collagic waste space of the beach may offer another way of approaching Mary Douglas's definition of dirt as 'matter out of place'.[20] By this, Douglas suggests that waste objects are inherently spatial; waste attains its identity through a physical world that is spatially regulated. According to Douglas, we make and maintain our taxonomies of material value according to bounded notions of place. By discarding an object we implicitly acknowledge that it no longer fits, it no longer has a place in our immediate environment. This spatial understanding of waste sees the value of objects as a 'by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements'.[21] The spatial management of things legislates space in this manner, safeguarding orderly and knowable places through the distribution of objects. If I discard an empty porter-bottle I maintain a kind of spatial hygiene and implicitly seek to patrol a border between objects of waste and objects of want, spaces of waste and spaces of want. So, Douglas defines dirty things as those objects capable of transgressing established borders; acts of

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deposition regulate this contagious, destabilizing potential. But the value of an object is not simply constituted by the space it inhabits; the meaning of waste is drawn from where it is and where it is no longer. The identity of things is always a matter of what a thing is, what it may have been and what it might yet be. Despite our best attempts, we do not and cannot regulate the objects that appear before us at any time, and in any environment (at least not in the overdetermined way that Douglas suggests). By no longer being bound to a singular place – the bottle and barroom, the door and building, net and fishing boat – waste sees its relationship with place multiply. As a place maintained by a polymorphic traffic of waste material, the beach waste that helps to form Sandymount is both inert and mobile, in and out of place. This does not make its waste 'placeless' or even 'out of place' but shows the relationship between place-making and waste-making to be a little more complicated than Douglas's schema suggests.

It is not just sand that gives the textual beach its density, its weight. Rather than as a place of constant and dynamic flux, Sandymount Strand is a place that is heavy and getting heavier, a place of unequivocal deposition. In describing a place heavy with waste, Stephen is also able to contemplate the weight of the past:

> A bloated carcass of a dog lay lolled on bladderwrack. Before him the gunwale of a boat, sunk in sand. *Un coche ensablé* Louis Veuillot called Gautier's prose. These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here. And there, the stoneheaps of dead builders, a warren of weasel rats. Hide gold there. Try it. You have some. Sands and stones. Heavy of the past. (*U*, 3.286–291; *UP*, 55–56)

The carcass of the dog, the fragment of the boat, even the piles of stones unwanted by dead builders are objects of waste that have found their way to the shore. Although literary waste objects are figured as non-functioning, they do function in the text as signifying objects, by and through their apparent non-functionality; they no longer figure in the time of human activity. Whilst these objects have found a form of temporary obsolescence in the novel, their power to signify continues unabated. If language is to be compared to Sandymount Strand, indeed if language *is* this environment as Stephen seems to suggest, then it is important to note that it is a language full of redundancies, leftovers or remainders. Words and things share a potential to be washed up, broken down and discarded into a place that signals their persisting obsolescence. What is striking about the passage above is that the sands of the Strand are composed of a multitude of waste objects, by untimely things that once performed a function and perform that function no longer. Joyce represents the seashore

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as a composite waste space full of flotsam and jetsam. The important point to be drawn from Stephen's encounter with the language of the seaside is that Sandymount is described as a space of intentional and unintentional disposal; a material and linguistic waste both purposively and incidentally achieved. The rubbish-laden appearance of the Strand invites us to reconsider the place of waste, to give a narrative determination of an object's possible origin and terminus, its time of use and time of waste. This invitation is brought about, in part, by the tangled concoction of organic and inorganic matter found on the beach. Stephen perceives a confused assemblage of things that does not cohere into a particular whole but rests in fragments, a collage of rats and gold, cadavers and crustaceans, objects that have spread, travelled and migrated from a diverse range of spatial and temporal locations. Netting, bottles, clothing and doors are 'human shells', related to the time and place of their human use whilst signifying these divorce from former times and places. Stephen thinks the sandflats 'unwholesome' (*U*, 3.150; *UP*, 50); they lack sanitary and spatial completion. The beach, for all its associations with leisure, light industry and the natural elements, is also an incoherent place which amasses the detritus of a variety of places, times, activities or events. 'Never know what you might find', summarizes Bloom when he visits the Strand during the 'Nausicaa' episode, 'Bottle with story of a treasure thrown from a wreck' (*U*, 13.1249–1250; *UP*, 497). Perhaps all this articulated chaos points towards the peculiar sort of waste space that beaches offer, a space that could just as well hold buried treasure as it could the corpse of a dead dog. It might be easier to ask what is *im*proper to the beach, what, if anything, would one be surprised to find there? This issue, the novel's relationship to novelty, reaches a literary conundrum that Joyce sought to articulate: how is the incongruous, the surprising, the unexpected or enigmatic to be absorbed systematically? We shall explore this issue in greater detail; it proves relevant to the intrusions of 'low' or 'inconsequential' matter that floods the pages of the novel.

When perceiving, reading and recording the objects on the beach Stephen suggests they possess a *nacheinander* to be narratalogically unravelled. This is one of the many instances where Stephen reads time secreted in the things that surround him: 'Signatures of things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawreck, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs' (*U*, 3.2–4; *UP*, 45). He suggests a conception of time that figures temporality as an externally constant entity, a thing to be read in the objects washed up on the shore. Time is reflected in the things perceived, the things of sight, in the things that can be read. In this way, waste becomes inextricably linked to the

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things available to Stephen's field of vision, to the ineluctable modality of the visual. This readerliness foregrounds the narrative content implicit in Stephen's philosophy of perception; he does not simply express the language *of* objects so much as the language that appear *in* objects – the narratives that appear integral to the very perceptibility of things. Notably, waste objects help Stephen to this phenomenological position – a seawreck, a rusty boot – alerting Joyce's reader to the active role taken in placing and narrating objects that no longer function. In this respect, 'These heavy sands are language' is more than just a quaint metaphor; it succinctly articulates a materialist economy of meaning which foregrounds the object in the interpretation of narrative.

Stephen's reading of material signatures soon prompts his writing as he 'scribble[s] words' on a piece of paper torn from Deasy's letter (*U*, 3.406–407; *UP*, 60). Reading and writing are kinetically separate activities here, but the acts of narrative projection necessary for interpreting material things are integral to how Stephen understands the world. This is part of the interpretative challenge of the novel; to tarry with the aberrant effects of its contents. If, for instance, we are to interpret the presence of the dead dog, and enter into the co-creative aspect of Joyce's text, we must write and inscribe our reading within the text, participating in the temporal explanation of this object's presence on the beach. We might assume that this sea-bloated, seaweed-covered carcass might have been washed up by the tide. We might even go further and attempt to decipher how the dog might have expired and, by doing so, supply the kind of speculation that perpetuates and extends the novel's narrative discourse beyond the body of the text. This is precisely the form of interpretative gaming that Stephen enters into, as he suspects Florence MacCabe's bag might contain 'A misbirth with a trailing navelcord' (*U*, 3.36; *UP*, 46) that she intends to discard on the beach. Later in the episode, Stephen imagines the Strand as a place where a corpse might be found, 'rising saltwhite from the undertow, bobbing a pace a pace a porpoise landward' (*U*, 3.472–473; *UP*, 63). Stephen's style of interpretation, his reading of the 'signatures of things', shows the 'writerliness' of his interpretations and his resistance to the ineluctable modality of the visible.[22] Significantly, McCoy excuses himself from Paddy Dignam's funeral because 'a drowning case at Sandycove may turn up' (*U*, 5.170–171; *UP*, 92). Stephen's Tiresian premonition, which elliptically connects the Telemachiad with the novel's later episodes, and once again ties the beach with the city, confirms that the beach is a place of waste through a diverse manipulation of narrative projection and retrospection. Whilst Stephen sees the dog carcass, he suspects the stillborn and he imagines the 'bag of corpsegas sopping in

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foul brine' (*U*, 3.476; *UP*, 63). A comparison can thus be made as to how all three situations require narrative to project the waste material onto the beach, charting the movement of objects from a virtual or implicit source to a textually contingent place of unrest. From this point of view, the heavy sands at Sandymount Strand 'are language' for two related reasons. First, the sands are heavy with objects that appear as signatures to be read, requiring a labour of reading and interpretation. These are messy, polyvalent objects that seem to be both in and out of place. Second, these sands are heavy with a certain kind of waste object that demand narratives to traverse and pattern the time of things, shell-like objects severed from a time of human activity but ineluctably reconnected within the activity of human perception.

Waste in progress

'*Corpus*. Body. Corpse. Good idea the Latin' (*U*, 5.350; *UP*, 99). Both as a fleeting quip about the Catholic Church's preference for a 'dead' language and as a comment upon the body language of the Catholic sacraments, this Bloomian aside suggests how language is material, in life as in death. Until now we have set aside the object of Joyce's literary corpus, the thingly status of his text, but it has always been there, in the language that has silted, in the physical properties that Joyce uses to give things the power to sign their presence; in one way or another the material status of his work is an issue that rests at the heart of every study of his works. By making a detour through the textual status of the novel we can return to the passage from 'Proteus' that has exercised us thus far, and, by doing so, we will return with a greater sense of how material and linguistic wastes correspond with one another.

With the availability of Eliot's *Inventions* and *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Typescript* we found it possible to theorize the inclusion of discarded texts in our analysis of Eliot's work and their absent presence in the reading text. In a like manner, we must seek a richer equivalence between textual content and textual genetics, between the content of Joyce's writing and the material conditions of that work. Jean-Michel Rabaté characterizes the maddening task of engaging with Joyce as a constant acknowledgement of the reader's inability to bring the work under control: 'we keep misreading, missing meanings, producing forced interpretations, seeing things which are not there'.[23] For Rabaté, the instability of the text brings a new form of reading and a new species of reader, the genetic or 'genreader'. Significantly for us, the genreader

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progresses 'through an excess of intentions and meanings that never adequately match each other [the genreader confronts] literature as a mound of rubbish from which meaning will be extracted'.[24] Although they may appear unlikely points of comparison, Rabaté's characterization of Joyce's work as a 'mound of rubbish' has a lot in common with how Wyndham Lewis dismissed *Ulysses* for its material incoherence, as an 'incredible bric-á-brac in which a dense mass of dead stuff is collected'.[25] Indeed, Lewis goes so far as to suggest that *Ulysses* is 'a suffocating, mœtoc expanse of objects, all them lifeless, the sewage of a Past twenty years old, all neatly arranged in a meticulous sequence'.[26] Both Rabaté and Lewis understand the act of reading Joyce as a difficulty of designating what does and does not function in the text. The work of reading is seen as an endeavour to recover or 'extract' meaning from linguistic objects that seem obsolete; reading is a form of linguistic resuscitation, an optimistic rummage through a 'middenhide hoard of objects'.[27] The great difference between Rabaté and Lewis is that Lewis feels that Joyce's corpus will remain true to the etymology to which Bloom alludes ('*Corpus*. Body. Corpse') – a disorderly assemblage of undifferentiated matter, without the life of significance or signification. Rabaté, however, sees the value in asking a question posed in *Finnegans Wake*: 'where in the waste is the wisdom?' (*FW*, 114). We might take this further by suggesting that the experience of reading Joyce is to comprehend how an encounter with textual waste *is* the wisdom; the activities of literary composition and reception necessarily carry a meaningful waste content, the question is how this waste content might shape our understanding of the work.

'There is no single edition of *Ulysses*', argues Sam Slote, 'that could honestly be called "definitive" [it] exists in multiple forms, in different editions, with differences both great and small in the printed texts'.[28] *Ulysses* is a corpus of indeterminate size. Without wanting to rehearse its long and complex publishing history, I follow George Bornstein's observation that a work like *Ulysses* represents 'a series of texts built up like a layered palimpsest over a variety of compositional stages; further, they [the annotated synoptic editions] signal that any text is already a constructed object, and that other constructions would have been (and are) possible'.[29] The vast number of manuscripts, notebooks, proofs and typescripts, along with the contested existence of 'synoptic' and 'corrected' editions, all attest to the semantic reservoir produced by Joyce's 'stratigraphic method of writing'[30] and the elastic power of the author-function to expand the waistline of his literary corpus.[31] Every text is selectively assembled, reassembled and disassembled, and *Ulysses*, like Eliot's *The Waste Land*, represents a particularly striking example of how compositional process and

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the variants it creates inform our experience of this work. The composition of *Ulysses* corresponds to the sands that Stephen encounters in 'Proteus'; the novel is an assemblage of language not silted by wind and tide but shored by Joyce, Sylvia Beech's amateur typesetters, Odyssey Press, Random House, Garland Publishing, Hans Walter Gabler and countless other individuals, groups and institutions, a process of assembly that continues into the present and remains a hotly contested issue.[32] Again, like Eliot's ambiguous deployment of waste in verse, the presence of waste has an immediate relation to the textual stability of Joyce's work, informing how one chooses to demarcate the novel's boundaries and situate ourselves as consumers of its fiction.

One way that many readers have attempted to stabilize the instabilities of Joyce's narrative techniques is to rely on the various systems implied in its construction. The schematic authored by Stuart Gilbert and authorized by Joyce details how each chapter carries a Homeric parallel, an emblematic organ, a symbol and a narrative technique. The promise of such a scheme is that it will offer a guide by which to organize the novel's diverse material.[33] Reading *Ulysses* in this context becomes a work of hunting, gathering and matching in order to find ballast in external points of reference. For some early readers, this mode of reading was what secured the novel's endurance and provided a justification for its literary reputation. For T. S. Eliot, the use of Homeric parallels provides a means 'of controlling, ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history'.[34] By providing a referential framework based on the myth of antiquity, Eliot believed that the dense mass of stuff, which secured the novel's failure for Lewis, is made to make sense. Such a critical position relies on analogy or, more importantly, on the *promise* of analogy to resolve the novel's numerous mysteries. Whilst Gilbert's schematic offers a paratextual framework, Eliot's reliance on myth operates in a similar fashion; each object or event can be absorbed within a referential web, pinning down the novel's aberrant potential. Some have even argued that the mythic and symbolic structure of *Ulysses* removes all trace of semantic excess. Ruben Borg writes,

> The sense that a mythic or symbolic significance necessarily underlies each and every action performed on Bloomsday remains a defining feature of the novel [this] mythic structure always makes it possible to rearrange coincidences, and thus recuperate the singular from meaninglessness by way of retrospective application of a fixed concept or code. It is the grimness of Bloom's situation that the most trivial gestures, or the most quotidian of thoughts, *cannot help having to signify something* – something timeless and communal other than itself.[35]

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Of course, the fixity with which Eliot and Borg characterize the mythic or symbolic is open to debate. For Borg, this framework constitutes some kind of 'fixed concept or code' that stabilizes the text for the reader. The diverse range of critical opinion that has gathered around the *Odyssey*, not to mention more genetic problems associated with transcription, translation and adaptation that compromise its textual stability, mean that the 'mythic' offers little in the way of stability to this text or any other. Even from a purely narrative point of view, the *Odyssey* does not offer the security of a 'primitive narrative' through which to orientate our readings of other works. As Tzvetan Todorov has observed of the *Odyssey*, 'Few contemporary works reveal such an accumulation of "perversities", so many methods and devices which make this work anything and everything but a simple narrative'.[36] Nevertheless, even if everything that happens in *Ulysses* could be recuperated within the mythic or the symbolic, we could still not account for the expanding corpus of Joycean texts. In other words, these schemes and codes might contribute to our understanding of the work's content but do not help us comprehend how this content relates to acts of writing; they do not give us an understanding of the work as it occurs in time. It would not, for example, help us negotiate the compositional process that allowed Joyce to write, 'These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here', or to register the textual evolution of this line within the syntactical arrangement we take from the Rosenbach manuscript. Moreover, part of the problem raised by a novel like *Ulysses* is trying to designate what might constitute a 'quotidian thought' when, as the following analysis will demonstrate, Joyce's text interrupts the quotidian to reveal its textual construction. It is not that *Ulysses* 'cannot help to signify something' but that it might be able to signify the waste of its own composition.

Bringing issues of textual interpretation into closer proximity with textual wastes returns us to issues explored in Chapter 3. By looking at Joyce's drafts, it is possible to see him working with textual waste, playing with and manipulating it, allowing his excisions and revisions to accrete and sediment. Our passage from 'Proteus', 'These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here', exemplifies a compositional reflexivity which affirms how Stephen perceives Sandymount Strand to be a textual environment that silts and is silted by language. The enotebooks currently held at the National Library of Ireland (see Figure 5.1) contain an early draft of 'Proteus' that renders the sentence in the following form:

> Heavy on this sand is all language which tide and wind have silted up,[37]

In a later draft held at Buffalo, New York, we find a slightly different version:

> The heavy sands are language that tide and wind have silted here.[38]

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

Figure 5.1 Typescript of James Joyce, *The Joyce Papers 2002*. National Library of Ireland. MS 36,639. II.ii.1: 1. Image 07–001

Keep in mind the large quantities of discarded material on this beach and the differences between the three versions of this line reveal some subtle shifts in meaning. In the NLI draft 'all' language sits 'on' the sand; language is a heap that is separate from the sand itself. In the Buffalo and Rosenbach versions, the sand*s* are more explicitly equated with language; indeed, the sands and language become one and the same object. In addition to this, the NLI version suggests that language has 'silted up', whereas later versions maintain a more continual process. In addition to describing the condition of language as it slowly accretes meaning over time, an ongoing palimpsest of layering and sedimentation, this image also provides a way of appreciating the slow accretion of meaning that Joyce achieves through his revisions. As Sam Slote eloquently puts it, 'Stephen's description of silting language is thus an apt metaphor for the linguistic changes made between the drafts of a work in progress. Between drafts, a new text comes that silts up and over the language of the preceding, receding draft […] In other words, and with other words, the epiphany is silted'.[39] For Slote, the analogue between textual beach and compositional revision is one of erasure, the language silts over the previous version. Yet the deliberate erasure of 'which' in the NLI draft and 'that' in the Buffalo is mutely registered in the awkward syntactic arrangement Joyce's published text achieves, 'These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here'. By losing the relative pronoun the line becomes converted into regular iambs, the reading of which operates in contradiction to the line's embedded subclause. This grammatical and rhythmic tension becomes

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compounded by the carefully divided sentences that precede and follow this one, encouraging an impulse to read through rather than across/over the clause and resist the line's fluent rhythm. The effect is to expose a lack, an absence of punctuation or preposition. Joyce adopts this technique in a more emphatic way throughout 'Penelope'. Molly's monologue progresses with constant interruption; despite its lack of formal punctuation the reader is aware of the marks and measures inherent in the text and how this reading supplements the presence of a textual absence.[40] In a similar manner, our genetic analysis of 'Proteus' confirms the peculiar existence and persistence of waste; past versions of the text do not 'disappear' but are retained, held in suspended animation. What remains in the Rosenbach version is a syntactic trace of a textual absence, not an absence as such. In this manner, Joyce draws attention to words and textual marks that have *not* silted there, to a tracery of textual detritus that forms the necessary condition of his work in progress. By signifying absent words, words that no longer function in the text but maintain their ghostly demarcations, *Ulysses* contests the teleological boundaries of the singular edition.

Let us attempt to include these issues of textual waste and genetics with the more longstanding question of interpretative difficulty. That which is silted within Joyce's work marks a redundancy that gains signification *because* it has been discarded; to dismiss these redundancies as superfluous, meaningless or an intractable excess would be to dismiss how meaning is formed through the presence of an intrinsic literary obsolescence. We encountered in critics of Eliot an erroneous correspondence drawn between semantic excess and difficulty – where waste provided a convenient but flawed metaphor for a *loss* or *absence* of meaning that obscured how texts are constructed through the subtle production of textual wastes. If we are to attend to the waste content of literature in this way we must abandon the negativity typically attached to waste, showing how the 'linguistic corpses' contained in notebook drafts were never really dead in the first place. In this sense, Joyce's language is an open language of residues, a language that is formed according to the coagulation of active and obsolete constituents. In the analysis of silted seaside language we found a grammar of waste in operation that was underpinned by the materiality of the written word, intensely aware of the material marks, the traces and signatures that mark up a work of fiction. The signatures available for us to read are simultaneously the signatures of innumerable textual absences, absences that might be recovered through a comparative analysis of Joyce's manuscripts, drafts and notebooks and supplemented according to the conventions of written English. This reformulates the idea that the novel requires its reader to convert waste *into*

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'meaning'; wisdom is in the waste, waste is the wisdom. In 'Proteus' Joyce emphasizes how his text is a product of and a participant in a language heavy with waste. The value of this 'silt' is intimately bound to the dynamic process that stores, secretes and discloses the traces of the past. Since the word 'silt' derives from the Teutonic base '*sult-*' or 'salt',[41] we should be particularly mindful of the ways that Joyce insists on what is preserved in linguistic objects, open to the *salarium* that might be gained from a close attention to how his text has been and continues to be formed.

Eliot and Joyce: Writing into disappearance

Exploring the textual wastes of Eliot and Joyce has opened an issue, common in literary studies, regarding the narrative beginnings and the ends of texts. The idea of waste provokes a useful reconsideration of this problem because it provides an image of temporal retention, where textual residues mediate both a tardy beginning and an incomplete end to the published work. Genetic criticism is the critical programme that has gone in search of these compromised ends and mixed beginnings. As Louis Hay has outlined, by working with drafts and notebook materials, genetic criticism turns its attention to those texts 'that have disappeared along the way and forever haunt the finished compositions'.[42] Throwing similar doubt over the veracity of the complete product, Pierre-Marc de Biasi has argued that analysing manuscript drafts shows 'writing in the act of being born […] Manuscript analysis therefore claims to reconstruct, in various forms depending upon the texts studied, as exact prehistory of the text as possible. From this point of view, the final goal of research projects in textual genetics is, almost indissociably, to enable studies of genesis'.[43] The central claim of these chapters is that textual 'disappearance' and textual 'birth', as they are figured in the residues and remains in and of a text, are temporally contingent processes that authors can actively register, employ and use to reflect upon the nature of their work. One might object that one outcome of analysing *avant-textes* is to partially reverse their haunting, waste effect; unearthing and recuperating literary detritus takes what was waste and tries to reinsert this back into an expanded and historicized notion of 'the work'. Indeed, this has become a common criticism of genetic studies; textual geneticists might not pursue an ideal version of the text sanctioned by the author, but they do pursue an authoritative version that reveals an ideal image of the author's productivity. As Finn Fordham has pointed out, 'Even though an author can be seen as having

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intended to delete, even render inaccessible, early versions of a later text, the genetic critic will willingly disregard such intentions and reinstate any material that reveals process, since it is process that is most relevant to genetic pursuits'.[44] Such a tension between the finitude of authorial intention, where the author has the last word, and the ideal continuity of critical labour which hopes to revise, stretch and redevelop the possible outcomes of a work is of particular relevance to a study of Eliot and Joyce. Sceptical about the publication of the *Four Quartets* manuscripts, Eliot reasoned, 'As a general rule […] it seems to me that posterity should be left with the product, and not be encumbered with a record of the process'.[45] But, given the foregoing analysis, we might reasonably question whether the product can be so easily distinguished from the process, especially when process and product foreground the importance of literature's by-products as a common outcome, fixation and resource.

Clearly the examination of so-called 'textual waste' depends upon the requisite manuscript materials being available, lingering on. 'Who ever anywhere will read these written words?' (*U*, 3.415–416; *UP*, 60), thinks Stephen as he scribbles verse on Sandymount Strand. Whilst Bloom, on the same beach, will begin to write a message in the sand for Gerty MacDowell and then stop himself, 'Some flatfoot tramp on it in the morning. Useless. Washed away. Tide comes here […] Mr Bloom effaced the letters with his slow boot. Hopeless thing sand. Nothing grows in it. All fades' (*U*, 13.1266–1267; *UP*, 498).[46] The temporality of the legible preoccupies Joyce's characters as much as it does his readers and critics; writing requires readers to coincide with material marks and traces. Written waste remains. When drafting *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce would write to his patron and sometime archivist, Harriet Shaw Weaver: 'I send you a little waste paper to get it out of the way'.[47] Our understanding of the *Wake* is all the richer for Joyce 'discarding' these drafts and allowing them to be preserved. Had Joyce burnt these pages, annihilating those material traces of the *Wake*'s composition, then its compositional waste content would have to be assumed rather than physically examined. Here we might also point to the historical specificity of the argument I have elaborated across the last two chapters – both Eliot and Joyce tended to be careful in preserving their *avant-textes*, often storing, selling or gifting them to friends and collectors. Continuous with the unabated interest in manuscript studies, they lived in a time when manuscripts were valuable amongst individuals, groups and institutions. Not only did they have arrangements in place for the management of their drafts when they died, those people responsible for executing their literary estates acknowledged their value and remain active in their control.

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Although more is thought lost of Eliot's and Joyce's working drafts than preserved, the relative availability of their draft materials means that there remains a fantasy at work in the economy of the notebook draft that makes it a guarantor of process and composition, an insurance against the absolute erasure of the published work or the time taken for its creation. When considering the difference between what he called 'the Album' (draft/notebook) and 'the Book' (volume/published edition), Roland Barthes recognized the guarantee the notebook provided, 'the future of the Album, then, is the Book; but the author can die in the process: what remains is the Album, and, through its virtual design, that Album is already the Book'.[48] This makes draft materials both the waste of subsequent work and the means by which to explore and imagine textual alternatives to published editions. Alive to this duality, Barthes gives a bridging point to the ruinous section that concludes this book: 'At the other end of the time-scale, the completed Book becomes an Album again: the future of the Book is the Album, just as the ruin is the future of the monument'.[49] Immanent in texts lie their material ruin, possible reconstruction and further deconstruction, the contingency of which is mediated by the temporal openness of waste.

I have argued that 'literature' demands forms of waste. Access to the textual traces of Eliot's and Joyce's compositional processes shows how manuscript drafts serve as *avant-textes* and *après-textes*; they not only evidence work done but also qualify work known and later available as printed facsimile editions. Reading the draft in the work, the waste in the words, is to read a textual waste that precedes and qualifies the finitude of reading. Eliot used it to describe things that have passed, to instrumentalize the temporal enigmas of redundancy and engage with and contribute to what he took as his literary inheritance. Joyce's powers of narration found things to be travelling and moving, making throwaway matter central to writing that gains significance for its informational obsolescence. Both writers declare their writing through waste, a writing that remains to bob and dissolve like a crumpled skiff on the river Liffey, moving towards discovery by some eager reader or towards the wide open sea of complete disappearance.

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Part Three

Building Ruins

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6

Ruins Past

The remaining chapters investigate the relationship between ruins, time and narrative. I aim to consider how we give, make and take time through our interactions with ruins, and how these distinctly temporal interactions conjure acts of narration, acts that allow us to translate the effects of ruination. To understand ruins in this way demands that we think through the paradoxes and contradictions they associate, remaining attentive to the way in which these structures are placed in time and the kinds of storytelling this emplacement requires. These concluding chapters, then, represent a contribution to the steady increase in theoretical reflections on ruins in recent years, which tend to focus on the aesthetic, philosophical and political potential that ruins evoke.[1] If this book has something in common with these recently published works, then it is in viewing ruins as generative, beguiling phenomena. It thus extends that long, contemplative tradition which has isolated ruins as a distinct category of architecture. Ruins, it seems, are useful things to think with, and a cast with which to understand an enormous range of religious, philosophical, ethical and political analogues. Unlike other studies, however, I absorb the idea and actuality of ruin into the temporal analysis of waste that is the main charge of this work. The conclusions I draw about and with the ruin are, therefore, quite distinct. To conclude on the ruin is to draw a measure from the time that can be gained from the temporality of waste. It seems only right, then, that in these concluding chapters we should consider what might be the termination of waste as a thing to be experienced, analysed and represented. As we shall see, waste might be a thing that lingers but it is not something that remains in perpetuity.

Walter Benjamin recognized how ruins seem to give us a thing to think through, a location achieved through the dislocation, fragmentation and dissolution of narrative material:

> In the ruin history has physically merged into the setting. And in this guise history does not assume the process of eternal life so much as that of irresistible

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> decay. Allegory thereby declares itself to be beyond beauty. Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things.[2]

Narrating ruins constitutes a fragmentary response to fragmentary objects. For Benjamin, we make sense of ruins by making fragmentary and allegorical parallels by them; ruins, in turn, show us the incomplete narrative constructions that are necessary for us to translate events of destruction. Thus, ruins often seem to operate at a remove, seeming to generate little intrinsic meaning in their own right. The ruin is hermeneutically 'elsewhere'; composed of decomposing things, giving us locations by establishing relations between dislocated objects. And, for Benjamin, our explanations of these crumbling buildings are equally unstable. Our experience and consequent interpretation of ruined places become dominated by structures of metonymic correspondence, supplementarity and deferral, an experience of architecture metered by a rich interplay between absent and present entities. Christopher Woodward has argued that, precisely because ruins are materially incomplete, 'each spectator is forced to supply the missing pieces from his or her own imagination'.[3] This observation works on visual as well as epistemological levels; we do not necessarily 'experience' ruins directly or by miraculous isolation, but do so by mediating their liminal effects that transport our attention beyond and across the material we encounter. This helps, in part, to explain the ruin's capacity to stand as an intermediary for ethical, religious, nationalist or philosophical ideas, at once the anchor and the point of departure for a whole host of extrinsic issues. The absence that seems such an integral part of identifying ruins forms the means by which they become objects of our narrative engagement; the disintegration of architectural forms provides the means by which narrative forms are made active.

Because of the complex, productive and mysterious potential that ruins appear to both generate and mediate, they might be misapprehended as being somehow inherently metaphorical. As buildings that are viewed through their composites, as fragments that only find coherence through an incoherent imbroglio of absent things, times and ideas, their associative power seems to overwhelm their independence. Matter and meaning are put into flux by the ruin. Although this view certainly helps us identify why it is that ruins attract our consideration, it overlooks what structures our comprehension and manipulation of ruins. It is certainly not the case that ruins can mean *anything*, that, untethered from the demands of function, ruined buildings become liberated from any fixed, shared or agreed meaning. Instead, I argue that part of their dynamic, evocative ability to suggest a wide range of associations issues from the temporal divisions between their use and their status as waste. It is the diverging temporal relations

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between buildings that accord to a time of functionality, a use-time, and the slack and indeterminate time of waste, or waste-time, that makes the ruin an architecture of intercession. It is insufficient simply to identify the semiotic plurality of ruins. Instead, we should ask what gives these structures their power to signify, their range and limitations.

Before we can make sense of a ruin, before we can utilize and contemplate its forms, we must apportion it a time according to times of use and waste, necessity and surplus. Ruins differentiate themselves from other kinds of buildings by being made conspicuous *in time*, by being located in a time felt to differ from architecture which accords to a use or function. We anchor our narrative accounts of a built environment with respect to the uses to which it can or cannot be put, to the progress between using and wasting, maintenance and abandonment. The semiotic registers of the ruin are oddly prefixional in this respect. The ruin is always a ruin *of* something – a ruined castle, an abandoned factory, a derelict cottage or warehouse – a remnant of past utility that has been decommissioned, made meaningful in its current state of suspension. So a ruin announces a time that no longer occurs, a time when the building functioned according to human intention and design. And yet the ruin is something that has come to be by having been, making present a time of non-performance. Although the castle no longer defends, the house no longer gives shelter, the sports arena no longer provides a space for gaming or competition, these purposes and functions remain bound up in the identity of what is left behind. Ruins seem to us remarkable, horrifying, nostalgic or sublime for the relation they strike between use and disuse. As we noted in earlier chapters, categories of waste register and rely upon the passage between use and disuse, which is not necessarily linear or sequential but require a sense of separation between what has, what has not and what could have been – it is this partition within the idea of waste an affective object. Indeed, in my earliest memories of visiting ruins I remember the immediate task was always to transform toppled stones into spaces of combat, romance or horror: to give a function to objects that no longer functioned, to give time to a thing that had somehow fallen out of time. In both form and function ruins engage precisely because of an absence they make present, or a presence enlivened by absence. With the purposive time of human action and activity at an end, ruins, simply by being labelled a 'ruin', suggest this cinder of a former time, an absent time made present by collapse and decay. Whilst Robert Ginsberg might be right to argue that the exigency of ruin issues from its relation to use, 'The attitude of reverie with which we greet a ruin owes much to the detection of function floating free of purpose',[4] this free-floating

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function lingers enough for us to detect (or suspect) a purpose no longer in operation. Function reveals itself not to be 'free-floating' but merely dislocated in time – inactive, set apart, kept in abeyance. This sense of temporal dislocation between a ruin and its use, a confused mixture of a past purpose lingering in the present, gives ruins a time that cannot be said to be homogenous, coherent or entirely contemporary.

The peculiar sense of temporality that characterizes ruins is one that registers both the termination and the survival of matter, as a finitude that endures and a continuity interrupted. Here we reach a crucial contribution to the theorization of ruin: the fragments that constitute the fabric of ruins seem to have both withstood time and fallen prey to time's relentless wearing and wasting, meaning that ruins figure both transience and durability, the entropic dissolution of all material things and the survival of remainders that seem to outlive this dissolution. Ruins, then, pull us in several temporal directions – to a use that has passed, to a present ruled by this absence and thus to a use that gives significance to material that no longer performs an equivocal function. This is why ruins are things that seem to gather and disperse time, provoking narratives that attend to, replicate and represent this paradoxical temporal condition. Before taking a closer look at some particular ruins we should outline how 'use-time' and 'waste-time' characterize, and are characterized by, architecture.

The temporality of use

Without getting too concerned about the relationship between design and *intended* use – the conceptual intentions of a designer and the material action of a building – it is important to acknowledge the way in which a building's function generates significant, temporal conditions under which we experience built environments. As one contemporary introduction to construction argues, 'Whether the aim is simply to provide more space or to make a financial gain from speculative development, all building projects need to fulfil a function and meet set performance criteria'.[5] Implicitly, the temporality of architecture is written into this description, the building project represents the projective convergence of a building's material and use. A building that performs a function does so under these purposive and teleological imperatives, a teleology that Derrida argues 'is always a putting architecture *in service*, and *at service*'.[6] Driven by the completion of ends and the fulfilment of tasks, buildings come

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under contract with a particular understanding of the future that concerns their complicit involvement within human activity. A tension of objectives loads them with expectations, all of which require the building to be projected towards a future in which goals are achieved. This functional orientation is one that is not satisfied once the building process has reached its nominal conclusion; as John Dewey has argued, the newly built house is replete with anticipation: 'new purposes, ends-in-view, are entertained; they are embodied in the coordination of the thing built, now reduced to material, although significant material, along with other materials, and thus transmuted into means'.[7] To build is, in part, to draw a temporal blueprint for the use of those materials, the deployment of events and the structural anticipation of activity and affect. Through use buildings gain their orientation through time.

A discussion of what might be the ethically 'proper' use of an architecture is surely too broad a subject to outline here, but we can be certain that buildings are frequently thought of as useful, or pertaining to some kind of purpose. These need not be reduced to a singular function – bridges for bridging, houses for shelter or factories for production, for instance – since buildings develop, increase and decrease their quality and quantity of uses over time.[8] But the relative mutability of a building's function does not detract from the importance of use in defining the activities that characterize a building and the places they help us delineate. Take, for instance, the house. One might argue that the principal use-values that dominate our experience of houses are their ability to offer shelter and a place of dwelling. This is Heidegger's view – the 'goal' of the house is to foster a place of 'dwelling'.[9] Dwelling, he argues, is to building what ends are to means, to construct and cultivate a place of dwelling is to make, maintain and conserve a protective place. The building, for Heidegger, is, in the broadest sense of the word, an *enclosure*; temporally and spatially the house that participates in the activity of dwelling encloses. To protect place through construction – producing 'things as locations' – leads Heidegger to argue, '*The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving*'.[10] In these terms, the preservation of place through dwelling emphasizes how the purposive nature of architecture can interact with and give expression to places, thus directing buildings through time and space. For Heidegger, places gain their distinction amongst a multiplicity of other places according to how they reflect use:

> Equipment has its *place* [*Platz*] or else it 'lies around'; this must be distinguished in principle from just occurring at random in some spatial position. When equipment for something or other has its place, this place defines itself as the place of this equipment—as one place out of a whole totality of places

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> directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the context of equipment that is environmentally ready-to-hand.[11]

The significance of the building becomes twofold: it is a useful piece of equipment that fulfils a need for shelter – a means to an end – and it is the distinct place where this shelter occurs. In Heidegger's view, dwelling maintains this place through repetition; indeed, the sense of location that we attach to a building is secured by repeated use and utilization of material objects: 'dwelling itself is always staying with things'.[12] In other words, the useful building is recognized as both equipment and the place for that equipment. There is, then, a complex exchange operating between use and place in Heidegger's notion of dwelling, one that proves important to a consideration of time and architecture. Heidegger's understanding of buildings, as situated, directed, future-orientated, instrumentalized things, places them within a particular spatial and temporal taxonomy. Use or 'equipmentality' both differentiates places and individuates objects as useful things, implying the 'instrumental complexes'[13] that order, limit and regulate our approach to the world.

Unlike our earlier consideration of individual objects, a building makes explicit a particular, enclosed relationship between use, place and environment, which might unravel if and when a building goes to ruin. As we shall see later in this chapter, buildings differ from other objects in that, when they go to waste, they retain their place but alter how the enclosure of space and time might be experienced. Household waste, on the other hand, can confirm its value by a particular kind of mobility – a movement gained and maintained through its waste status. The ruined building, however, becomes conspicuous for its situatedness, for its stasis, for keeping and at times intensifying its relationship to a place no longer orientated by the teleology of use. This means that the way in which we discern time in a building is not just a question of how that building is employed within various activities but how those activities elucidate, maintain and preserve places. When Heidegger argues that to build is to spare and preserve, he means that our experience of useful buildings informs our perception of their place and purpose. Heidegger's understanding of dwelling opens up the relationship between how we recognize buildings according to their functions and recognize how use makes conspicuous certain places over others. It also brings to bear certain continuities and symmetries in Heidegger's conception of dwelling, which appear without difference or interruption, without room for the condition of waste that is my principal concern. I add that the complicit correspondence between purpose and place that characterizes 'dwelling' for Heidegger represents a temporal consequence of use-time, the

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future-orientated time that we invest in buildings and the locations that they occupy. The convergence we feel between place and purpose reflects the way in which the finite time of use serves to enclose function and location. Building, then, does not mean simply dwelling – sparing and preserving – but doing so according to how we discern the relationship between these activities and their conclusion, according to their propensity for ruin. It is not enough, then, to define use by action alone, but according to the future that these actions imply.

Heidegger's notion of dwelling finds a temporal inflection through Tim Ingold's work on landscape. Ingold argues that dwelling is not a passive or spontaneously self-generating process but one born out of the futural, projective tasks of human action: 'tasks', he argues, 'are the constitutive acts of dwelling'.[14] Dwelling is given its shape and duration according to these activities, to the kinetic and unfolding projects that network human and non-human entities into action. He uses the term 'taskscape' to emphasize the co-creative relationship between landscape and activity. Indeed, Ingold writes, 'the taskscape exists only so long as people are actually engaged in the activities of dwelling'.[15] As the sum of separate yet interrelated activities, the taskscape represents an evolution of land *with* labour, the intricate and continuous interaction between human and non-human elements: 'the activities that comprise the taskscape are unending, the landscape is never complete: neither "built" nor "unbuilt", it is perpetually under construction'.[16] Ingold explicates his theory of time, action and landscape by analysing *The Harvesters* (1565) by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. After a careful discussion of how the tree and the church function in Bruegel's landscape, Ingold describes how the temporality of each constituent element fashions and is fashioned by the rhythms of the environment represented. Instead of seeing these entities as absolutely differentiated – divided by notions of the 'man-made' and the 'natural' – Ingold argues that they share a common and unfolding relation with human presence:

> the[ir] form is the embodiment of a developmental or historical process, and is rooted in the context of human dwelling in the world […] The preservation of the church in its existing, 'finished' form in the face of these forces, however substantial it may be in its materials and construction, requires a regular input of effort in maintenance and repair. Once this human input lapses, leaving it at the mercy of other forms of life and of the weather, it will soon cease to be a building and become a ruin.[17]

Regular 'human input' marries well with Heidegger's conception of dwelling, where building is never a complete entity unless it is made to correspond with human action. Reflecting upon the etymological relationship between *bauen*,

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to build, and *Ich bin*, I am, Heidegger argued: 'the imperative form *bis*, be […] The old word *bauen*, to which *bin* belongs, answers: *ich bin, du bist* mean: I dwell, you dwell'.[18] And yet, the potential for ruin and the termination of this regular human input seem to stand at odds with the continuity of dwelling that Heidegger imagines or the 'unending' nature of Ingold's 'taskscape'. The church does not form part of an inevitable continuity or synchronicity between man and material but shows how the time invested in buildings requires maintenance, sparing and preserving. Ingold speaks of the landscape as an 'ensemble of use-values',[19] with an emphasis on a continuous process of assembly through action. Yet this should be qualified by the potentially asymmetric and discontinuous relationship between building and human activity. The breakdown of objects or the failure of human projects means that if there ever exists an 'ensemble of use values', then it proceeds with a measure of discord. If the landscape represents an ensemble of use-values then it is important to recognize that these uses are of a contingent and temporally finite quality. As Bruno Latour has observed, 'objects appear associable with one another and with social ties momentarily'.[20] Even if the continuity of landscape is to be upheld, then one must recognize that this is a continuity that can absorb the potentially discontinuous relationship between tasks and the materials required for their completion. Ingold sees the church in Breugel's painting as immediately temporal; borrowing from Mikhail Bakhtin the term 'chronotope' to describe the church's capacity to gather together both spatial and temporal co-ordinates. Ingold's adoption of this term is telling, since Bakhtinian chronotopes denote how 'spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history'.[21] But as we have seen, the church can only be said to cohere in time if it is said to participate in and is maintained by the course of human activity, if its relationship within space and time is made coherent by use. It is *use-time* that describes how use informs the temporal co-ordinates of a building in this way; it is the relation between use and temporality that renders buildings chronotopic. Ruin, then, marks the building's removal from this co-creative, temporally cohesive influence. Heidegger and Ingold largely consider the active and continuous task of dwelling, but in their description of the interstices between buildings, time and environment both imply that dwelling can fail, that shelter can lead to exile and what was preserved might fall into a state of ruination. In later sections of this chapter, we will consider how ruins are often preserved without assuming the smooth and straightforward continuities of dwelling.

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We do not always experience architecture as a temporally symmetrical or complicit thing. Hannah Arendt once wrote that the 'reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by which they are produced'.[22] Arendt is sensitive to the way in which we measure time according to the things that we make and use, doing so within the temporal strictures of human mortality. The time we associate with architecture seems particularly relevant in this case, where the disparity can be great between the time it takes to build and the duration of use-time expected from that building. If we are to speak of the permanence of things *vis-à-vis* the relative duration of human labour, then buildings represent some of the more enduring objects that humans create. We might, however, reconsider Arendt's statement in light of the foregoing analysis; we do not simply contrast a building with the activity required to build it, but against the ongoing activity that keeps it in the purposive and proleptic time of use, the time in which it is dwelt. In contrast to the great majority of modern electronics, clothing, transportation, ornament or fuel, buildings are not expected to fail before we do. Shoes, for instance, are acquired with the expectation that they will wear out, be discarded and replaced; they are objects enveloped within the temporal horizons of mortality. That we expect the usefulness of a building to outlast the demands of an individual user only seems to intensify the disparity felt between the time of buildings and the duration of human life. This rather odd, codependent yet divergent relationship between the time of human existence and the time of architecture proves crucial for any assessment of ruins because it explains a building's potential to both metonymically represent human endeavour, to intercede and intermediate between the architectural and the human, and to also appear solidly indifferent to the rhythms of human activity. Whilst we maintain the use-time of buildings by networking them within the time of our tasks and activities, doing so does not exhaust their propensity for action.

In so far as buildings participate in and anticipate human needs, the time of buildings is human-dependent, yet a building's propensity to participate in this way frequently exceeds any given network or chronotopic relation. For David Lowenthal and a vast number of European writers, artists and travellers, 'The dominant association with [architectural] decay is our own transience. Marks of dissolution figure as *memento mori*, compelling reminders of death's imminence […] remainders of the evanescence of life and the futility of effort'.[23] And yet ruins represent death only in so far as they contravene the material expectations we have of buildings, the time we assign them and the time we assign ourselves. This failure to act under implicit obligations can take two

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forms: first, that buildings no longer show themselves to comply with the futural, projective tasks that we set for them; and second, that some buildings should cease before we do. Should they fail to participate in the 'reality and reliability of the human world' we are reminded of the bearings we take from buildings, from the sense of spatial organization and temporal assembly that functioning architecture gives us.

The temporality of ruins

This chapter began with some general statements about how ruins seem to stand between survival and termination, continuity and annihilation; the ruin is a building caught between times, gesturing to a confused number of temporal co-ordinates. But what are these times and what are the consequences of identifying them? What is it that places the ruin 'between' differing temporal states? By characterising the useful building as inhabiting a particular kind of time, one that is dominated by the relationship between the purposive teleology of human action, we saw how architecture could find orientation that can explain the diverse meanings attributed to ruination. It is not enough to simply reverse these temporal relations in order to reveal what defines the condition of ruin. This has been a tendency in recent writing on ruins that argue that 'removal from assigned functions and placings means that what is beheld escapes from the dominant encodings of the city[,] confound[ing] attempts to pin down spatial essence, to classify and categorise through representation and discourse'.[24] Variously aware of the paradox that their works feed into, writers about ruin frequently write about the impossibility of writing about ruin, often supported by a more general claim about its troubling meaninglessness. As Julia Hell and Andreas Schönle state, 'The ruin is a ruin precisely because it seems to have lost its function or meaning in the present, while retaining a suggestive, unstable semantic potential [it is] uniquely ill-defined'.[25] In a similar way, Robert Ginsberg argues that 'the ruin is always unfamiliar and ever exceptional',[26] always felt to be at odds with the orderly, the knowable or the categorical. Besides failing to acknowledge how such commentary might compromise the ineffable character of ruin, the danger of these statements is that they tend to lead us to a rather fruitless celebration of play, chance and contingency that is often achieved by ascribing useful architecture a fixed or overdetermined meaning. Edensor argues that 'under conditions of ruination, the previously obvious meanings and utility of objects becomes increasingly

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tenuous. Suddenly detached from a stabilising network which facilitated epistemological and practical security, the designated meanings and purposes of things evaporate'.[27] Ruins and the objects that they harbour become 'free from the constraining effects of norms surrounding their value or form'.[28] As if falling into a black hole, any previous function, utility or meaning is suddenly erased, surrendering the ruin to the traditions of radical undecidability. But this ineffable quality of ruin is bought at the costs of stating what might be common to them, or acknowledging the continuities we seek between useful and ruinous places. Moreover, stressing the plural, indecisive aspects of the ruin ignores how readily we recognize and ascribe the 'ruin' category. Take, for instance, the ancient Mayan ruins at Palenque, Mexico (Figure 6.1), and, for contrast's sake, the ruined village of Tyneham in Dorset, England (Figure 6.2).

Although expressing vastly different historical and architectural trajectories, Palenque and Tyneham seem immediately and uncomplicatedly ruinous – open yet enclosed, fragmentary yet structured, certainly at odds with the 'dominant encodings of the city' and yet, because of this incongruent and unusual singularity, obtaining a peculiar distinction. In their state of dis-structure these sites might seem to pose us difficult questions about the relationship between the man made and the natural, the inside and the outside, relative decay and preservation, but these questions are secondary to whether or not they contain ruins or are ruinous. Granted, instances arise when the veracity of ruins is

Figure 6.1 Palenque, Chiapas, Mexico. Author's photograph, 2006

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Figure 6.2 Tyneham, Dorset, England. © Paul Hodges, 2013. See http://freakyfolktales.wordpress.com

placed under scrutiny (we shall explore these shortly), but the vast majority of ruins are easily identified. It is not that ruins are free from meaning or function, are intrinsically unfamiliar or, by being so, confound attempts to come under a system of classification. Rather, the complexity and unfamiliarity that we might find in these structures help us recognize and identify them, locating the ruin's simple familiarity, making them distinct from other kinds of buildings. As various as they are, in form, cause, location or age, ruins share a common set of temporal relations that develop from the instrumentalization of our built environment.

Ruins are not simply buildings free from co-ordination in time or space; waste-time, the time ruins share with other kinds of discarded matter, does not oppose use-time but represents a particular augmentation and development of those temporal structures set to work within the useful. Waste, as we have noted in earlier chapters, does not provide an oppositional pairing to use but is representative of a particular relationship with the functional. If, as Roger Scruton has argued, 'The value of a building simply cannot be understood independently of its utility',[29] then so it is that the ruin cannot be viewed without considering the function it no longer performs. As a commingling of tenses, waste-time

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articulates a slack and dispersed time, revealing a material structure without clear definition or direction but set against the formative backdrop of a use-time no longer in operation. Through the presence of an absent use, an absence of that temporal relation which makes the building appear contemporary with human action, the ruin becomes anchored by what it is not, or by that what it can do no longer. The ruin, then, is not entirely undirected; it gains its strange and arrested orientation from the use it no longer performs. Georg Simmel recognized something of this temporal conflict when he noted that, '[in the ruin,] the past with its destinies and transformations have been gathered in to this instant of aesthetically perceptible present'.[30] For Simmel, the ruin is 'the site of life from which life has departed […] the present form of past life'.[31] If we consider the houses at Palenque and Tyneham we can recognize this presentation of the past, a past that marks the cessation of the sparing and preserving with which Heidegger characterized the project of dwelling. And yet we can detect in Simmel something of the doubt that these structures give rise to – is this the perceptible past or a 'present form of the past'? Perhaps the difference is slight, and it certainly does not dissolve the means to categorize or classify ruins in the way that Edensor suggests. But the disjuncture felt between what the ruin is and was articulates the uncanny, untimely and frequently paradoxical time that gives the ruin its categorical distinction that differentiates it from other forms of architecture. Paradoxically, the ruin becomes distinct through an atmosphere of temporal indistinction. Not only does the ruin become 'disjointed from time', as Dylan Trigg has written, but disjointed from the use-time that underwrites its status as a ruin: 'untimeliness is evident in how past, present, and future conspire to converge in the ruin. Having outlived its functional existence, the ruin's persistence in time disproves outright extinction'.[32] For this reason, states of in-betweeness, hesitancy and deliberation predominate when amongst ruins, leading Byron to write, 'A grey wall, a green ruin, rusty pike,/Make my soul pass the equinoctial line/Between the present and past worlds, and hover/Upon their airy confine, half-seas-over'.[33] This tipsy sense of temporal complexity, a disjuncture felt in the time of the ruin, makes us feel at odds with a unilinear conception of time that is made up of a series of Nows held together like beads on a piece of string. If use-time gives the building an illusion of being strung up and towards certain expressions of the Now, waste-time folds the ruin upon itself and dissolves the temporal punctuation of use. Indeed, by eroding the singularity of the present by signalling a quasi-absent past, ruins appeal to a conception of temporality that is replete with a time of retentions, protentions and disruptions, one that situates the individual in an environment of competing

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and commingled tenses. Nevertheless, the temporal blueprint of use-time gives the ruin its backward-looking aspect; our familiarity with the condition of use-time means that we say 'it is a ruined church' or 'it is a ruined house'. The idea of ruin is structurally dependent on the time of use so that, although this time is no longer in operation, it is no less significant for being so. In the next chapter, we will have an opportunity to consider the futural or projective manipulation of ruins, but for the remainder of this chapter we will question the retrospective power of ruins as an outcome of use-time's interaction with the time of waste.

Ruins and the past

The severance between the times of use and waste that ruins undergo endows them with a powerful ability to signify a past, and to make this past an exigent object of narration. We have already noted the relation between the ruin and its former use. We might also argue that, whilst use-time orientates the building towards the future, the ruin is anchored to a use-time that has passed, a temporal relationship without the teleology of use. This might explain the retrogressive narratives that ruins entertain; the categorical and explanatory content of the ruin requires a narrative relation between a past no longer in evidence and a present dominated by the presence of this past. This demand for narrative might also suggest the complicated relationship ruins have with questions of reliability and authenticity; ruins become contested objects embroiled within a variety of interpretations both documentary and fantastic. The allegorical position of the ruin, as an object that appears to be structured by a system of referents, means that the past that the ruin offers is one predicated on a narrative transition between use and waste. If, as Benjamin noted, 'In the ruin history has physically merged into the setting',[34] then this merger is one that can be manipulated, the setting can be rendered a stage to expose the narratives that it mediates.

The ways in which ruins have been utilized to suggest a past have often capitalized on the temporal divisions that ruins can effect. The trend, in Renaissance painting, of placing ruins in nativity and adoration scenes, provides a fine example of how ruins can manipulate and be manipulated by the kind of history on display. Although the practice of using ruins in religious works was extremely widespread,[35] two works by Sandro Botticelli should demonstrate how ruins typically function in these scenes. In *Adoration of the Magi* (c.1472–1475), held at the National Gallery, London, the drama is enclosed by the lofting ruins that extend beyond the space provided by the canvas, creating an effect

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of depth and scale that overwhelms the aperture provided by the tondo. The use of ruins in this painting serves a number of functions, the least of which is to disrupt the horizon and provide an unusual backdrop to the nativity in the lower half of the image. But the ruins depicted here also serve to conflate spatial and temporal distance, a feature common to a great range of picturesque works that feature ruins in the far or middle distance. Seemingly remote, both spatially and temporally, these ruins provide a useful contrast to the focal and frequently *human* concerns elsewhere on the canvas; they are capable of reinforcing a distance of space and translating that spatial distance into a distance felt in time (Figure 6.3).

With a central nave-like formation running down the centre of the picture, and with other points of access from the left and right, Botticelli's scene occurs

Figure 6.3 Sandro Botticelli, *Adoration of the Magi* (c.1472–1475). National Gallery, London

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within ruins built on ecclesiastical proportions. Instead of being born in a stable or a cave, as scriptures have tended to stress, Botticelli's Christ is born in a ruined temple. Of course, as Michel Makarius has noted, this is a structure that is made complicit in the inauguration of the Christian era.[36] These ruins provide a stage set for narrative, a certain kind of triumphant, theological transition between the pagan past and a new, Christian present. For Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood, this ability for works of this period to allow divergent times to contest one another is an important characteristic of what they call the 'anachronic' potential of art: 'The ability of the work of art to hold incompatible models in suspension without deciding is the key anachronic quality, its ability to "fetch" a past, create a past, perhaps even fetch a future'.[37] In this characterization of the artwork, Nagle and Wood have not drifted far from the analysis I gave in earlier chapters through the work of Cornelia Parker and Mark Dion; the capacity to mix and contest times was found to be a key quality of their sculpture. What Nagel and Wood do, however, is to make this anachronic potential an intrinsic quality of artistic production and downplay the way in which the image and reality of ruin, for example, already carries with it a sense of temporal separation, a sense of time divided. The temporal divisions already at work in the ruin are mobilized by Botticelli to signify the passing of the old system, to articulate a *New* Testament, but also register persisting reality of this passing. The classical arches and shattered pillars are, of course, an architectural style contemporary to the painting's creation. The anachronic history of the work is made all the more folded and irregular for the overt ruination of these structures. The ruin does not just help the work 'fetch' a past, the recognition of ruin means that a past, however duplicitous, has already been fetched.

Another work by Botticelli, also called *Adoration of the Magi* (c.1474–1475) though held at the Uffizi in Florence, shows a similar interplay between the time depicted and the time of ruin that lurks as its self-divided shadow (Figure 6.4) .Here there are three stone structures in view: the ruined arches in the upper left-hand corner; the fragile walls that meet together to the right of the painting; and, finally, the imposing rock that stands behind the figures in the foreground. The antique walls and arches stand dilapidated, with sprigs of vegetation forcing through their fissures, in contrast to the shadowy stone that serves to block the wider panorama beyond the enclosure. Architecturally speaking, Botticelli seems keen to present various kinds of rock formation, all of them open to a disintegration wrought by time. Indeed, amongst the various architectural features found in Figure 6.3 one can locate the keystone of the central arch dislodged, hanging delicately over the animal stalls below.

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Figure 6.4 Sandro Botticelli, *Adoration of the Magi* (c.1474–1475). Uffizi, Florence

We are reminded of the in-between states that helped us characterize the ruin, caught between survival and dissolution, the 'already-and-not-yet' of arrested annihilation. Specific to this genre of paintings are the ways in which these figurations of ruin are incorporated within an economy of scriptural reference that stresses different conceptions of time. With these Biblical intertexts in mind, Christ takes the position of yet another, more permanent rock, as both the rock upon which the church is based (Mt 16: 18–20, 1Cor 10: 1–4) and the discarded stone that has been temporarily discarded becomes the sign of eternal completion: 'The stone the builders rejected/has become the capstone;/the Lord has done this,/and it is marvellous in our eyes' (Ps 118: 22–33, Mt 21: 42, Mk 12: 10, Lk 20: 17). Whilst this might lead us to conclude that Christian iconography has a distinctly architectural content, which announces and maintains new epochs according to the presence of ruins, it is also one that reinforces the dichotomy between the fleetingly temporal and the eternally spiritual. Brought into view are the etymological roots of 'temporality'; from the Latin, *temporalis*, 'pertaining to time as a sphere of human life; terrestrial as opp. to heavenly; of man's present life; worldly,

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earthly. (Opp. to eternal or spiritual)'[38] Hence, in the writings of St. Paul we find the following distinction: 'for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal' (2Cor 4: 18). An additional doctrinal motivation behind depicting ruins in these works might be the division between the *ruinam* – the fall – of unbelievers and the *resurrectionem* of the faithful.[39] In both cases, these ruins represent all that has passed or has the capacity to pass, and therefore represent a passage of time as it is made manifest by things. Alongside the birth of Christ, Botticelli's ruinous, terrestrial structures show how the transience of the built environment serves to emphasize how Christ exists outside the temporal conditions of use and waste and, by doing so, seems to reinforce those temporal conditions for all other things. Under this paradoxical economy, Christ becomes the basis by which all other entities are measured and, being eternal and without a past as such, the temporality of ruins in these images becomes defined by that which cannot go to waste. Rather than simply providing an unusual stage upon which Biblical events might be played out, ruins have helped differentiate the human from the divine. Indeed, one might cite these paintings as examples of how the human is being defined by its propensity to create things that go to waste. More generally, the pagan, pre-Christian ruins that frequently adorn Renaissance nativity and adoration images display clear attempts to mobilize a powerful quality of the ruin: to invoke a series of unobtainable pasts to whatever present is being expressed. Ruins, then, can consign architectural elements into a past, in order to consolidate a narrative about present times.

We have seen that ruins do not simply represent time, but can help formulate the time of other things, to usher in new beginnings or establish, often in uncertain terms, the time of the now. They can stand as the presence of a past, emblematic of a narrative passage between and across times. They do so, in part, because of their untimeliness, their sense of not being exclusively 'in' or 'of' the time in which they are experienced. This is because ruins have an enfolded, negated present that seems to say, 'I am no longer what I once was, but what I once was still defines what I am'. Ruins signify and make articulate their convolved condition, in a way that sets them apart from architecture that operates under the temporal strictures of use. Useful buildings signify whilst ruined buildings make us hesitate over their powers of signification and what it is that makes them articulate. For all their retrogressive, fragmentary and allegorical import, it is by being at odds with a sense of the contemporary that ruins seem to gain their power to suggest a past and thus punctuate time through the condition of disuse. Ruins show a potential to distribute, make and mark time.

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Making and marking time also forms a crucial component in the building of ruinous follies and folly gardens. Although strongly associated with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some argue that the building of sham ruins has a far longer history.[40] Vasari notes the interventions of Girolamo Genga, an architect of the early fifteenth century who was in the employment of the Duke of Urbino. Genga was commissioned to build a palace, 'a well-planned fabric, and full of apartments, colonnades, courts, loggie, fountains, and most delightful gardens, there is no Prince that passes that does not go to see it […] From the design of this same master, the Duke caused the Palace at Pesaro to be restored, and also the little park, making within it a house representing a ruin, which is a very beautiful thing to see'.[41] Genga's building project was one that included the construction of a ruin, a visual diversion for the Duke's visitors. It is worth noting that Genga's ruin is approximately contemporary with Botticelli's nativity works and this ruinous folly might be considered a secular equivalent to the temporal distinctions witnessed in those paintings. Later in the eighteenth century, spurred by Grand Tourism, the rise of the European picturesque and made manifest in both formal and irregular garden design, fabricated ruins became a common feature on the property of Europe's fashionable elite. Writing in 1728, the writer and garden designer Batty Langley recommended ruins as a way to terminate avenues or vistas:

> *Ruins* may either be *painted upon Canvas*, or actually built in that manner with *Brick*, and *cover'd with Plaistering* in Imitation of Stone. And since we are to build no more thereof than as much of the shell, as is next to our view, I therefore recommend their building before their painting, not only as the *most durable*, but *least expensive* (if the Painting is performed by a skilful Hand) and much more to the real Purport intended.[42]

Ruins provide a practical solution to the limitations of garden space and Langley preferred classical ruins for this role – 'After the Old Roman Manner for the termination of Walks, Avenues &c'.[43] Again, the ruin is employed to resolve spatial distances with temporal distances. David Lockley's simple etchings, which accompany Langley's influential work, include mouldering structures to fill the gaps and channels created by ornate hedgerows. The effect of these ruins must have been to provide a telescopic vista, which gathers the manicured present within a theatrical past. Turned towards vantage points that would emphasize the ruin's capacity to stand at odds with (and simultaneously within) the domestic space that surrounds it, these sham ruins serve to disclose many of the ruin's narratological effects. The deployment of ruins in European gardens can

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be seen to follow the diktats of the picturesque as they were laid out by William Gilpin later in the century, 'the picturesque eye is perhaps most inquisitive after the *elegant relics of ancient architecture*; the ruined tower, the Gothic arch, the remains of castles and abbeys. *They are consecrated by time*; and almost deserve the veneration we pay to the works of nature itself'.[44] Gilpin's sense of the picturesque is deeply invested in the veneration of a past that ruins mediate. Engaging in the contrasts, transience and permanence that they suggest, ruins leave the historical to be 'physically merged into the setting', allowing ruin to become the visual index or material manifestation of time (Figure 6.5).

As the locations reserved for sham ruins expanded beyond the formal spaces of English gardens, they became deployed across the land of the wealthy. The ruin built in the grounds of Hagley Hall provides a useful example, perched upon a hill and set apart from the main house of George Lyttelton who commissioned Sanderson Miller to build the folly in the 1750s. It is interesting to note Joseph Heely's observations surrounding the historical effects of the structure, when he described the ruin several decades later:

> Upon first glimpse of this becoming object, which adds so much dignity to the scene, one cannot resist an involuntary pause — struck with its character,

Figure 6.5 Folly at Hagley Hall, Worcester, built by Sanderson Miller, 1749–1750. A. F. Kersting, n.d. Courtesy of Courtauld Institute of Art

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> the mind naturally falls into reflections, while curiosity is on the wing, to be acquainted with its history; and I make no doubt that an antiquarian like my friend, would sigh to know what era it was founded, and by whom: — what sieges is had sustained; — and would lament that hostile discord, or the iron hand of all-mouldering time, should so rapaciously destroy it.[45]

Heely's response to the folly, by way of his anonymous and antiquarian 'friend', is an involuntarily narrative one, a response sensitive to the absent time that ruins make quasi-present. The 'dignity' bestowed by Miller's folly might owe something to the contrast gained from the strict Palladian styling of Hagley Hall. As Horace Walpole wrote to Richard Bentley in 1753, the folly has 'the true rust of the baron's wars',[46] making a clear reference to a baronial, Catholic England felt to have been superseded by the Protestant neo-Classicalism of Lyttelton and his circle.[47] There is a broader case to be made for the preference for Gothic follies *vis-à-vis* the Classical, as James Howley argues, 'for many advocates of the classical taste, the rival Gothic style was only acceptable in a ruined and defeated state'.[48] The ruin, in this capacity, performs precisely the same function as the ruins found in fifteenth-century paintings, affecting a severance between the time of a 'then' and a time of a 'now'. Although the motivating forces might differ, the role of ruin to divide time remains consistent. The benefit of comparing the use of these ruins, in both paint and in landscape design, is that we are given a clear view of how ruin facilitates the distinction of thought and belief. It not that there is something inherent in these ideas – New Testament theology and paganism, neo-Classicism and Catholic medievalism – that makes them readily associated with the ruin, but these ideas gain their narrative distinction through the structural effects of ruins and the temporal oppositions they are made to mediate.

As eye-catchers, displays of wealth, politically and architecturally loaded statements of style, follies provide important occurrences when images of waste have profound and explicit use. How does this affect its position within the 'taskscape' – is the ruinous folly an agent in or antagonist to a chronotopic understanding of our environment? Whether real or fabricated, the application of waste in the ruinous folly provides just another reason why this present work avoids making 'non-use' an intrinsic capability of things, but, instead, a reversible and contingent temporal effect. In terms of Heideggerian 'dwelling', the folly is spared and preserved, but only in so far as it serves an ambiguous 'goal', insofar as it maintains the temporal complexity of waste. Whilst the folly is a maintained ruin in one sense, its teleological imperative as a ruin is to be ruinous, to be detached from the temporal nature of maintained use. The ruinous effect, its capacity for picturesque pleasure for instance, depends on *not being*

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orientated towards use. This is also true of the ubiquitous practice of preserving ruins, which are preserved only in so far as they continue being ruinous and continue to stand in temporal distinction to the architecture of use. In the next chapter, we shall explore in finer detail the delicate conclusions of the ruin that is left to dissolve into indistinction. Until then, we should acknowledge that our understandings of ruin rely upon preserving certain narratalogical structures of recursivity and anticipation. Attempts to stabilize, spare and preserve ruins do not simultaneously impose the temporal enclosure, the 'goal' that we associate with use. Instead, to preserve the ruin is, in part, to keep this goal at bay, to preserve and potentially intensify the mediatory, unenclosed effect of ruin.

So, whilst part of the charm of a fabricated ruin issues precisely from fabrication, from artificiality, another facet arises from their successful simulation of ruin's effects. Andreas Huyssen has argued that we can contrast modern ruins with those of the eighteenth century according to notions of authenticity. Huyssen argues that the celebration of ruins in the eighteenth century was driven by notions of 'authorship, genius, originality, selfhood, uniqueness, and subjectivity' – by ruins that 'seem to guarantee origins'.[49] Huyssen claims that the appeal made to authenticity that these ruins seemed to enact are now all but eliminated in, for instance, the contemporary use of Roman ruins for opera performances or the use of medieval castles for hotel accommodation.[50] But even a superficial examination of eighteenth- or nineteenth-century follies shows that trying to periodize ruins according to 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' effects will prove unproductive, particularly since follies were celebrated for their ability to fuse authentic *and* inauthentic effects, staging both a challenge to notions of authorship, genius and originality, and a means to maintain and uphold these terms. It is better, in my view, to stress the dynamic role that narrative plays in every experience of ruin, each encounter must accept the way in which the ruin makes exigent particular time-bound narratives. Ruinous follies do not simply 'guarantee origins' but are capable of fabricating a fictitious past, an inauthentic origin, a time of use that never has and never will occur. In addition to the recycled quality of Sanderson Miller's folly at Hagley, which took windows from the ruin from nearby Halesowen Abbey,[51] we might consider Jeffry Wyatt's use of Roman ruins at Virginia Water. Wyatt reused architectural fragments shipped from Leptis Magna on the Libyan coast in 1818. Without a clear plan of the original Roman construction, and making no attempt to represent their organization at Leptis, Wyatt refashioned these fragments into what he called the 'Temple of Augustus'. These ruins are, in a material sense, entirely 'genuine', 'ancient' and 'original', but their relocation and reassembly erode any clear

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distinction between the authentic and inauthentic, or indeed between ruin and *fabrique*. The fabrication of the ruin reveals, in Sophie Thomas's view, 'the ruin's necessarily *constructed* relationship to questions of history, and its importance in the creation of the present'.[52] This propensity to stage the past, a past that responds to the way in which the ruin is bound to diverging and *de*constructed times of use and waste, shows the ruin not to guarantee an authentic origin but to provide a provocation to many possible narrative constructions.

The ruin then, and its manifestation in the folly in particular, discloses one of the principal effects of waste; it suggests a disunity of time and a temporal counterpoint to those objects that surround it. William Ockenden, writing when the popularity of follies was nearing its height, chooses to stress the contemplative attraction of ruins:

> All remains excite an enquiry into the former state of the edifice, and fix the mind in a contemplation on the use it was applied to; besides the characters expressed by their style and position, they suggest ideas which would not arise from the buildings, if entire. The purposes of many have ceased; an abbey, or a castle, if complete, can no more than a dwelling; the memory of the times, and of the manners, to which they were adapted, is preserved only in history, and in ruins […].[53]

This contemplative potential is, for the large part, a potential born from the comparative and narratological impulse that drives our experience of ruins. 'Whatever building we see in decay', continues Ockenden, 'we naturally contrast its present to its former state, and delight to ruminate on the comparison.'[54] In eighteenth-century garden design, as it was on the Grand Tour, the lure of the ruin owes something to the temporal problems it poses. Ockenden does, however, concede a difference between 'genuine' and fictitious ruins, 'It is true that such effects properly belong to real ruins; but they are produced in a certain degree by those which are fictitious; the impressions are not so strong, but they are exactly similar; and the representation, though it does not present facts to the memory, yet suggests subjects to the imagination.'[55] Those responsible for authoring and experiencing some of the best-known examples of ruin building certainly seem to accept a continuity of effect between ruins and their fabricated counterparts; what remains consistent is the narrative quality common to both.

Our final example of how the folly and the ruin converged in the eighteenth century intensifies the temporal and narratological problems we associate with ruins, or the ruin follies we have examined thus far. The ruins at Désert de Retz, built between 1774 and 1789 by François Racine de Monville, present a far richer

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and temporally complex example of how the idea of ruin might be put into action, one far closer to Schlegel's famous observation, 'the works of the ancients have become fragments; the works of the moderns are fragments at their inception'.[56] Although Diana Ketcham might call the Désert an 'architecture of fantasy',[57] it is a fantasy rooted in the figures and forms of architectural history. Spatially reminiscent of Paninni's *Capriccio with the Most Important Monuments and Sculptures of Ancient Rome* (1735), the Désert contains over 17 follies packed within just 35 acres of landscape garden. In it Monville juxtaposed the ruins of a gothic church with an Egyptian pyramid, a decaying Greek temple and a series of rustic altars. At the centre of the garden lies the Broken Column, an enormous Doric column 50-feet wide and 55-feet high (Figures 6.6 and 6.7). The column contains a spiral staircase that connects five floors and approximately 20 rooms to make Monville's column a ruin that challenges and, ultimately, seeks to undo

Figure 6.6 Le Desert de Retz, Study #9, France. © Michael Kenna, 1988

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

Figure 6.7 The Broken Column, Le Désert de Retz – Elevation. From Georges Louis Le Rouge, 1785. Online, http://gallica.bnf.fr

the temporal effects of use. Its *folie* is to waver between the future and the past, to encounter a present torn in several directions and, by being so, find comfort in neither tense. The ruin unlocks a rich fictional potential; the formal, antiquarian response to the column might be to follow the proportions of the Doric order to imaginatively reconstruct the 400-foot temple the column suggests. The column creates a past and a time both gargantuan and fantastic, disclosing the plasticity of its narrative demand and the explanation of its presence.

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Monville's follies fit within the criteria of Louis de Carmontelle, originator of the term 'pays d'illusions' and designer of an earlier example of the French folly garden at Parc Monceau. 'Let us bring to our gardens the changing sets of the opera', wrote Carmontelle, 'let us see there, in reality, what the most able painters could offer as decoration, all times and all places'.[58] Monville's *pays d'illusions* not only create a synthesis of all times and all places but also generate and disclose the narrative action we impose upon objects. The synthetic provocation rendered by the Column goes some distance in exemplifying the narratological, semantic productivity of ruins and the retrogressive effects they generate. Bounded by the relationship between use-time and waste-time, the Désert gives a performance of the untimely convergence between past, present and future; it suggests a use-time that could never have existed. And, most significantly, Monville's Column demonstrates the fundamental non-coincidence between the ruin's outer appearance, the fragmentary distance it places between past and present and the narrative attempts to reconcile this non-coincidence. In a way that radically intensifies the effects of our previous examples, the ruin displays its ability to demand an impossible narrative and reconcile these dispersed and converging times. The Désert becomes spectral in Derrida's sense, prompting the 'disjointure in the very presence of the present, this sort of non-contemporaneity of present time with itself'.[59] If we make sense of ruins by imposing the temporal frames that take their shape from the projective time of human activity, then Désert de Retz frames those frames and brings their plastic imposition to our attention.

In the course of this chapter, we have discussed the time of ruin as a time that generates narratives, narratives that respond to and make instrumental the breaks felt in the time of things. Unlike the chronotopic relation brought between useful architecture and the active time of human action, ruins disrupt continuities and provide a means to contrast the present and the past, the human and the divine, and so on. Ruins, then, are produced by and are a product of a narratological exigency that operates through the distinction but not the absolute opposition between the time of use and the time of waste. To recognize a ruin is to recognize how non-functional objects fall outside the finitude of purpose, and to comprehend the ruin is to put the temporal structure that divides use and waste to work. The fabrication of ruins puts the productive power of this temporal division into stark relief. Whilst the ruin makes and narrates the passing of time, the making of ruins discloses how materiality is always matter both in and of time.

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7

Ruins of the Future

Such are the retrospective qualities of waste that we might overlook its futural dimensions; since waste is always the waste *of* something, of some other object, process or event, we tend to endow it with an ability to mediate a past that becomes synonymous with its condition of disuse. Waste, it seems, is predisposed towards a reconstructive mode of analysis, which seeks to explain objects of waste by what they have done or do so no longer. This mode of analysis involves narrative insofar that it seeks to relocate and reconstitute the time of use that has passed. As we saw in Chapter 2, the circumstances by which waste occurs can be variously conceived, but, whether in retrospection or in anticipation, the advent of waste appears to disclose momentary relations between objects, the times invested in these relations and the narrative translations and trajectories associated with them. The previous chapter saw how the divergence between times of use and times of waste can be put to work, with an emphasis placed on the past that ruins can conjure as they signal the absence that it is so integral to their being. The retrospective quality of ruins became particularly apparent through their fabrication and, in turn, to the absent past made present through these performative objects. But ruins are not simply peculiar windows into the past; they also offer a vision or model of the future. This chapter investigates the types of future-thinking at work in the ruin and discusses a number of occasions where a ruinous future has been imagined, represented or reproduced. It seeks to investigate the consequences of using ruins when imagining the future. Concepts of use-time and waste-time will not withdraw but will confirm themselves as temporal models by which we distinguish, divide and distribute time, not just to things or to buildings but to the collectives, groups and empires invested in these objects.

If waste is taken to denote change, a coming to be by having been, then to anticipate ruins can mark out the present as the condition of the future. One of the narratological effects of imagining the present in a ruined condition is the strong emphasis that this places on ruins' relation to the present and the dynamic vigour of ending. As I have noted throughout this book, waste is both an end

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and a continuity, both the end to use and the muted remainder of that activity. Whilst future ruins frequently suggest the termination of some time, people or structure, there is a lingering or remaining sense of time, a time that is particular to the condition of being 'leftover'. This waste-time, which marks the termination of use *and* its cindering persistence, means that projected ruins represent a disrupted continuation of present events. Projecting ruins discloses the duration and shape of time and dramatizes a conflict between material permanence and material transience. This conflict between continuity and cessation makes the ruin an end that remains, an end that is imperfect, unreliable. The ruin marks that sense of termination that has not quite come to its end. I call this temporal unreliability a narratological effect because imagining the ruins of the future gives a means to envision a story that both locates a possible landscape and relates that landscape to present surroundings. This is not only done in order to imagine what the future might look like but, as we shall see throughout this chapter, provides an opportunity to re-examine the present. As Ricœur writes, 'In reading the ending in the beginning and the beginning in the ending, we also learn to read time itself backwards, as the recapitulation of the initial conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences'.[1] In fiction, film and the painterly arts, the anticipation of a ruinous end is frequently a narratological means by which to return to and make sense of the present; by 'traveling to the future' we might make and give meaning to the present (Figure 7.1).

When in *The Planet of the Apes* (1968) Charlton Heston's character confronts the toppled remnant of The Statue of Liberty, he exclaims, 'Oh my God! I'm back. I'm home'.[2] In the comparative exercise of managing the disrupted continuity of the future ruin, between imaginary times and familiar places, we encounter not only a future in itself but also a future in which the present has

Figure 7.1 Still from *The Planet of the Apes*, dir. Franklin J. Schaffner (1968)

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been abandoned, cut off, terminated or forsaken. This is the broken continuity, the interrupted endurance that the future ruin offers. The consummation that a ruin might represent does not necessarily become imminent to the present, but ruins are felt to become immanent in present events; thus, we come to see the ruinous potential of things that have not yet been discarded and identify the long-held association between ruins and *vanitas*. It is precisely this uncanny distance, achieved through a sense of arriving at and travelling to the estranged familiar, that gives the future ruin the power to relay the present and the future as an object that persists by passing away.

Apocalypse, then

Confronting the future in ruins is by no means a formulaic exercise. Interpretative gaps, hermeneutic rents and fissures energize and make this encounter with waste generative. Particularly in their painterly and cinematic manifestations, ruins of the future frequently leave out how or when or for what reason these structures have reached their terminal condition. For instance, in the paintings of Hubert Robert and Joseph Gandy we are given no explicit explanation for why the structures they depict have fallen into ruin; their visual impact plays upon the disjuncture felt between the building existent and the future ruin represented. Robert's *Design for the Grand Gallery in the Louvre* and his *An Imaginary View of the Ruins of the Grand Gallery in Ruins* (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3) manipulate a dual vision of the future: one image presents a new and ideal view of a Republican art institution, and the other represents a more ruinous and terminal condition of this institution. As such, the work has often been read as an ambiguous commentary on France's new and emerging attitude to the public control of artworks and, by implication, condemns the futility of the Revolution.[3] For Daniel Brewer, Robert seems to dramatize 'the inevitable transience of precisely the institution whose current function is to preserve the artwork from physical [deterioration]'.[4] Furthermore, viewing the images together – as they were at the 1796 *salon* – emphasizes the transition between architectural shelter and exposure, museum and ruin. The spared and preserved, enclosed and goal-orientated nature of *Design for the Grand Gallery* (to employ many of the terms introduced in the previous chapter) find rich contrast to the airy openness and infinite regress that is disclosed in *An Imaginary View*. But the nature of this transition, the causal events by which one moves from one condition to another, is a transition rich in absence and enigma. Time has been accelerated in *An*

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Figure 7.2 Hubert Robert, *Design for the Grand Gallery* in the *Louvre* (1796). Louvre Museum, Paris

Figure 7.3 Hubert Robert, *An Imaginary View* of the *Grand Gallery in Ruins* (1796). Louvre Museum, Paris

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Imaginary View, leaving the Louvre at both the end of time and at a place where time seems to have resumed. The inclusion of the Apollo Belvedere, seen in the foreground of Figure 7.3, is just one indication of the intervening years and the exigent potential of imagining ruins. The statue came to the Louvre with Napoleon a year after Robert pre-emptively included it in this painting. In this small detail, we see how Robert does not simply give an image of his present as ruin, but a particular, albeit elliptical, history by which the future ruin can be contextualized. The presence of the Apollo Belvedere is one indication of this causal absence, which the ruins of the future envelop.

The English parallel to Robert's work might be found in another double vision of future ruins. Joseph Gandy's *A Vision of Sir John Soane's Design for the Rotunda of the Bank of England as a Ruin* (1798) and *Soane's Bank of England as a Ruin* (1830) constitute attempts to imagine ruin in construction, ruin which marks the conception and completion of Soane's bank. In his painting of 1798 (Figure 7.4), Gandy was commissioned by Soane to project the building into a future state of ruin. Gandy draws directly from the picturesque style of Robert to give the material foundation of the bank a corresponding ruin. The painting's companion piece, which Brian Lukacher has described as a 'Piranesian ruinscape',[5] was commissioned by Soane when the building of the bank was nearing its completion in 1830 (Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.4 Joseph Gandy, *A Vision of Sir John Soane's Design for the Rotunda of the* Bank of *England as a Ruin* (1789). John Soane Museum, London

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Figure 7.5 Joseph Gandy, *Soane's Bank of England* as a *Ruin* (1830). John Soane Museum, London

Just as Robert's images of the Louvre were viewed together to emphasize their chronological yet antagonistic pairing – in which ruin is conceived of as the beginning and the end of a creative process – so Gandy's paintings of the Bank of England were displayed together at the Royal Academy in 1832.[6] The genesis of Soane's bank, its design, construction and eventual use, was surrounded by images of its dissolution; the imagination of its present was permeated by the state of ruin it would fall into.[7] Again, the idea of the ruin is used to fashion the future and narrate the trajectory of built environments. But, to renovate a formulation exercised earlier in this work, whilst these images of future ruin invite us to consider the idea of 'waste', the *events* of waste and the particular sequence of events whereby the useful is transformed into the non-useful is a transition frequently left to our imaginations. In the paintings by Joseph Gandy, for instance, a subtle exchange occurs between the time the image seems to represent and the present time of the viewer, where the temporal absence implied by the image is directly shaped by the perspective upon and texture of the ruin represented. The abundant vegetation contained in *A Vision* and the rustic scene occurring within the sanctuary of the rotunda mean that we are led to assume that this future ruin has come about slowly or without catastrophe, left to collapse gently like the ruins of antiquity. *Soane's Bank of England as a Ruin*, on the other hand, with its elevated perspective, the bare and uninhabitable interior and the confrontational figure in the lower right-hand corner, suggests fire, earthquake

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or holocaust – in short a cataclysmic event that has brought the bank to ruin. In this respect, ruins of the future provide a means to visualize consequences before knowing precisely what their cause might be. They are images of the future that stand prior to our reconstructive acts of narration, yet their ruins shape and inform our interpretative responses. Robert's and Gandy's future ruins provide us with objects within incomplete narratives, narratives with absent middles. Whilst suggesting a material continuity between the contemporary and the futural, the future ruin can also appear as cast off from any neat or continuous reconstruction of events.

Thus far we have considered the narratological provocation of future ruins, but these compensatory acts of narration implicitly search for ends, to the temporal terminus that ruins promise and frustrate. In their capacity to stand as the foreclosure and continuity of the present, future ruins form part of a visual repertoire of an end. And yet our ability to contemplate this end, for it to be imagined and represented, means that we experience the future ruin as an end that has not fully ended. This is, as we have noted in previous chapters, a key condition of waste-time. It must suggest both an end and the contingency of that end, a stuttering form of material and temporal punctuation; the already-and-not-yet that makes waste an articulate thing in time. This makes the ruin, particularly the future ruin, a very odd object for historical contemplation. Michel Serres has argued that historical thought searches for an impossible zero point in time, 'That point inaccessible – it is a point of accumulation; another point always interpolates itself, iteratively, in front of it'.[8] This is because, for Serres, historical thought 'seems linear, as if progressional, as if it followed the current of time'.[9] Serres here is describing the historical activity of working backwards through time, towards the zero point of an origin, but we might take this characterization of historicism and consider how the future ruin interacts with the accumulative, progressional, extrapolative nature of future thinking; that is, the way in which ruins help us think towards an end. In a way not dissimilar to the ever-receding vanishing point of Robert's paintings, Serres describes the impossible and ever-receding point of the origin; just as we might think that, finally, we have determined the source we find another, a time yet more remote that frustrates our neat conclusions.[10] Historiography, argues Serres, takes for granted a transition from the indeterminate to determinate, 'indetermination precedes the determinate'.[11] Moving this intuition into the problem of writing history, we might say that the historian's explicatory task is to transform the indeterminate into the knowable, the chaotic into the scripted and sequential. What, then, is the historical quality of the future ruin? As an

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intrinsically narrated thing, the ruin of the future neither fulfils this trajectory from indeterminacy to determinacy nor flatly contradicts this progression. As Robert's works demonstrate, there is an implicit relation between the Louvre represented as a functioning space for the public display of objects and its consequent condition as a ruin. In one sense the ruin is always that which comes afterwards; as we have noted before, it is always the ruin *of* something. In one sense, ruins are the outcome of a linear, progressional transition from use to waste; future ruins are an outcome of the present. On the other hand, they are frequently the outcome of events that we do not witness, the cast-offs from a time that is yet to occur. In this respect, the fragile terminus of the future ruin is laid bare; the indeterminate does not necessarily precede the determinate when the future ruin frustrates the continuity of thought between the determinate present and an indeterminate future. These ruins are enchanting yet nebulous things with which to make history.

The future ruin, then, is an incomplete end achieved by an incomplete transition between now and then. It might fill us with a 'sense of ending', to borrow a famous phrase from Frank Kermode, but it is not quite the end itself. The politically, theologically and philosophically rich gesture of projecting ruins, of prophesying the demise of a building, as well as the people and activities associated with it, depends upon an end that can be experienced, a sense of dénouement that is not absolutely terminal. This is not the apocalypse as such, but an end to be seen, to be retold and represented – an end at issue. The didactic, moralizing potential of the future ruin depends upon its *evidential* nature. Kermode writes that, 'We project ourselves–a small, humble elect, perhaps–past the End, so as to see the structure whole, a thing we cannot do from our spot of time in the middle'.[12] Whilst projecting ends might give us a sense of the whole and a position before this time, projecting oneself *past* the end proves that this is no end at all, but just one step further from the ever-receding zero of the end. Moreover, the future ruin frequently plays upon the fact that 'the whole' is not immediately apparent, meaning that the end it is held to represent becomes even more provisional. This is, in part, a consequence of the 'empty middle' mentioned earlier, which is the narrative structure of end-orientated things in which an emptiness stands between the now and the then. Kermode links *peripeteia*, the unexpected and penultimate twist in the plot that motivates a narrative's finale, to this sense of ending. If *peripeteia*, by definition, is something we do not expect, then by assimilating the unexpected Kermode argues that we are 'enacting that readjustment of expectations which is so notable a feature of naive apocalyptic'.[13] Imagined ruins, in contrast, do not show us the end of

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the world or an apocalypse as such, but the end of a temporally codependent relation between humans and their architecture – a particular mode of narration that harnesses the temporality of use and waste. Looking upon images of ruin we might experience a readjustment of expectations – feelings of shock or surprise – and we might even assume the *peripeteia* whereby structures of use fall into objects of waste, but the relationship between ruinous futures, the ruins of the future and our narrative response must traverse the mid-time between the use of the present and waste of the future. The periods of time that ruins seem to call to an end allow us to read ends and beginnings into time; the future ruin, then, performs an important periodizing function and represents an ally and potential antagonist in our attempts to bring the future to order.

Although these truncated narrative structures might not be the sole domain of the future ruin, the divergence felt between the projective times of use and the slack times of waste exaggerates the terminus that ruins are so frequently held to represent. And as we noted in Chapter 6, the comparative relationship between human and architectural time means that the futural dissolution of architecture, beyond our own dissolution, confirms the relative endurance associated with buildings and the temporal distance their ruination creates. Indeed, the future ruin depends upon our expectation that the usefulness of a building should outlast the demands of an individual user, intensifying the disparity we feel between the time of buildings and the duration of human life, as well as increasing a building's propensity to stand for collective use. The sense of the end that the future ruin generates plays upon the way in which buildings are felt to outlast these multiple relationships with individual users, reflecting an accumulation of uses and users. In doing so, the most pertinent notion that is associated with the future ruin comes to light: the idea of progress.

The Ozymandias complex

A notion of progress seems hollow without including a sense of historical transition and, with it, a sense of material transmission. The purposive, calculating, active, future-orientated condition of use-time is readily aligned to ideas of progress, to a time synonymous with the instrumentalization of things. The permanence and continuity of change that characterizes notions of progress mean that the concept of use-time, which has given distinction to individual objects or architectures of waste, can now take on a wider application to questions of collectives, societies, nations and empires. Temporally congruent

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with the increasingly efficient production and consumption of resources, with an increasingly rational distribution of resources and rapid rates of technological innovation, use-time and its determined and projective relationship to the future are readily appropriated by the imperatives of progress.[14] Whilst progress might denote continuous change – and 'creative destruction' – it only does so provided that *things are being put to use*. In short, social progress in its most simple manifestation requires the time of use to maintain a drive towards improving living conditions; the useful employment of things is a sign of social health.[15] And, just as use-time has given shape and clarity to the time of waste, so it is that the progress associated with use-time gives clarity to the decline and cessation of this progress, to the dissolution, decay and waste of things.

Anthropologist Gastón Gordillo complains that contemporary debates myopically exalt ruins, so they are felt to be 'a bounded, self-contained, dead object, a relic of the past severed from the living geographies of the present'.[16] Instead, Gordillo argues that we should attend to the violent, economic and progress-driven circumstances that keep buildings in a state of abandonment. Essentially a dispute about the ethically correct way in which we engage with the temporality of ruins, Gordillo's biting distaste for a lingering, 'modern, bourgeois worship of ruins', which rehearses an outmoded 'romantic, non-commodified version of an equally modernist reification', fails to account for the complex engagement with ruins in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the importance of the future tense when responding to places 'destroyed by progress'.[17] It might appear strange to choose Percy Bysshe Shelley's 'Ozymandias' to exemplify this point, but a closer look at this work shows how questions of progress, time and the monumental become inextricably linked by a particular gesture to and exchange with the future that is far from apolitical. One might also expect a poem like 'Ozymandias' to appear in the previous chapter, as a work that speaks more of the past than of the future. However, it is precisely the futural dimension of the work that creates its moral ambivalence towards and communicative oscillation between monuments of permanence and monuments to transience. It is, in short, a study of ruin's relationship to the monumental – and the future of that monumental gesture – that rescues the poem from mere antiquarianism or a simple condemnation of the past, opening the work to explore both past and futural aspects of the ruin.

I met a traveller from an antique land,
Who said – 'Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert … near them on the sand,

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Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;
And on the pedestal these words appear:
My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings,
Look on my Works ye Mighty, and despair!
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away'.–[18]

What I term the 'Ozymandias Complex' attempts to gather together the twofold gesture of consummation and dissolution that the 'King of Kings' presents to the 'traveller'.[19] At one level, the tyrant's claims to permanence and omnipotence are affirmed – the command to stand before and look upon his works, which, of course, includes the command itself, is dutifully acknowledged not just by the traveller but by the enunciating 'I' of the poem. Although far from complete, the statue continues to communicate the features and passions of its subject, as well as the skill of those that sculpted it. A more traditional reading, however, points to how Ozymandias' boasting pedestal is inverted by the dilapidation to which it has fallen. For Kelvin Everest, the ruinous condition of the statue means, 'Ozymandias's message to posterity has ended up articulating just exactly the opposite to what was intended', suggesting how the colossal wreck of the statue highlights 'the deluded vanity of thwarted human ambition'.[20] Herein lie two sides to an 'Ozymandias Complex': ruin can be judged as both a monument to endurance and a monument to transience, a testimony to progress or its refutation. Against these dichotomies lies a notion of an ideal monument with an infinite potential to transmit into the future. In the ode that begins, 'Exegi monumentum aere perennius', Horace suggests a definition of the perfect monument as one that does not ruin, one that 'cannot be destroyed by gnawing rain/nor the wild north wind, or by the unnumbered/procession of the years and flight of time./I shall not wholly die'.[21] The dream, here, is of an object so unchanging that it becomes simultaneous with all time. Horace describes a monument that is timeless, in so far as decay no longer gives it time. Whilst these varying positions on the relationship between ruination, progress and the monumental might seem mutually exclusive, all depend on the anticipation of an evaluating subject, a 'message to posterity' and, crucially, a varying attitude to the question of waste.

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Does the Ozymandias statue remain a testimony to the king's 'Works' or a refutation of them? Interestingly, much depends upon how we read the word 'remains'. As both substantive and verb, a tension exists as to whether we understand 'remains' to describe the 'lone and level sands' or the statue itself, a tension that exaggerates the conditional and incomplete endings found in the ruin. Does what remain of the statue represent an outpost of last resistance against the corrosive demands of time, or do the sands show the eroded future of the stones? The answer to this question should account for how the temporal permutations of waste – as a false ending, as a monument to consummation and transience – organize the temporal ambivalence we encounter. This is an ambivalence that finds equivalence in the poem itself. The poem is, after all, an act of memorialization and monumentalization; a testimony to a remainder. However fictional the enunciating 'I' of the opening line or his wandering interlocutor might be, the poem finds metafictional resonance with the legend inscribed on the statue. Everest characterizes this resonance between poem and the statue described in the poem as one predicated on the capacity for both to endure: '"Ozymandias", the poem, offers an instance, cognate with that offered by the ruined statue we read of in the poem, of a human activity which is genuinely able to transcend time, to outlast the conditions and occasions of its making'.[22] This textual and evidential quality of the work serves to accentuate the temporal quality of these 'remains', calling attention to the way in which remainders develop over time and attract the judgement of posterity. Moreover, the expressive, outward and forward-looking constitution of the Ozymandias statue and, in consequence, the various responses that the poem might elicit depend upon the narrative structures discussed earlier: a sense of an end, the unexplained cause of decay or 'absent middle', and the ruin's relationship to the individuals and the collectives it is taken to represent.

The power of ruins to architecturally foreclose the present, to void aspirations or expectations of progress and to punctuate the present with an immanent sense of the end has provided modern and contemporary fiction and film with an enduring dystopian trope. Whether it be the half-submerged figure of the Statue of Liberty found in the closing scenes of *The Planet of the Apes*, the urban wastes of *Blade Runner* (1982) and *Terminator* (1984; 1991) or the dank ruins of 'The Zone' in Andrei Tarkovsky's *Stalker* (1979), the futural figure of ruin serves to provide a disrupted continuity between the now and the then. Steven Connor has argued that this order of narrating ends and representing the impossibility resolving a representation of absolute termination creates a fiction that 'does not allow itself clearly to distinguish the stages of anticipated ending, the event

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of ending, and the aftermath of ending […] it attends to and itself enacts the paradoxical convulsions induced within the temporal continuum by the very experience of waiting for such an absolute ending'.[23] But it is not simply 'history' in a general sense that ends in these compromised narratives of ending, but a relationship with the present becomes threatened with foreclosure. H. G. Wells' Time Traveller journeys to a future somewhere near Richmond, carrying with him the expectations of his age, 'the absurd assumption that the men of the Future would certainly be infinitely ahead of ourselves in all their appliances'.[24] Temporal advancement, it is assumed, brings with it social advancement. But it is ruin that visually and materially separates the former from the latter. In *The Time Machine* (1898), Wells emphasizes the dilapidated condition of the future by characterizing the world as ruinous; indeed, ruins are the foremost puzzle the Time Traveller attempts to unravel: 'I was watchful for every impression that could possibly help to explain the condition of ruinous splendour in which I found the world—for ruinous it was' (*TM*, 32). Elsewhere, the Time Traveller remarks upon the 'big abundant ruins' (*TM*, 37) and, later, he visits the dusty and corroded remains of a large museum, 'the ruins of some latter-day South Kensington!' (*TM*, 71). The traveller then wanders through 'gallery after gallery, dusty, silent, often ruinous, the exhibits sometimes mere heaps of rust and lignite' (*TM*, 76). By dint of repetition, the sheer scale and number of ruins only seem to reinforce the uniformity of decline; like the inhabitants of this future world, evolution through time does not necessarily assume the 'improvement' of material conditions. Here, the certainties of a progressive, monumental and technologically advanced Victorian England have entered into regression; it is ruin that gives this sense of regression an unequivocal, terminal image.

In later life, and writing under the influence of Edward Gibbon's *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* and Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West*, Wells made this association between social and architectural disintegration even more explicit: 'Mankind which began in a cave and behind a windbreak will end in the disease-soaked ruins of a slum'.[25] In the full Judeo-Christian tradition of manipulating waste in order to describe ends, the Wellsian ruin marks the material end of humanity and the decline of human progress. For George Orwell on the other hand, the ruinous future was closer at hand and provided a means to highlight a material continuity rather than an end. The 'rotting nineteenth-century houses' of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, 'where the plaster dust swirled in the air and the willow herb straggled over the heaps of rubble',[26] do not represent future ruins in the same way that Wells imagined buildings *becoming* or *having become* ruin. Instead, Orwell gives the inverse – his ruins

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are the ruins of the present, the ruins of the Blitz perpetuating into the stasis of a dystopian future. And yet the effect of waste in each instance is comparable for the close relationship each strikes between human progress and the ruin. Although *The Time Machine* imagines ruins as the mark of social decline, representing a change for the worse, Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* imagines ruins as a mark of social decline by *not* representing change and allowing squalid, post-war conditions to continue where one might expect them to have disappeared. The new and the used are, in both texts, seen to be antithetical to notions of social progression.

One further example, taken from the many dystopian works in which ruins figure, should help widen and give added emphasis to the role that ruins play in these fictions. We have seen how future ruins are used to signify change, too much or too little. And yet the other issue that frequently arises with the future ruin is the power to describe their condition and the terminal state in which the world is being imagined. Reported through a dry and unrelenting epistle, Paul Auster's *In the Country of Last Things* (1988) provides an inscrutable image of the near future, assumed to be less than a generation's remove from our own. Narrator-protagonist Anna Blume describes how the city in which she lives is dominated by the death of human and thing: 'Things fall apart and vanish, and nothing new is made. People die, and babies refuse to be born'.[27] The ways the city's population die only seems to underline the material parallels Auster draws between the built environment and the human body. So-called 'Leapers', who jump from buildings, and 'Runners', who career through the streets until they die of exhaustion, suggest falling bodies that approximate and mimic the city's architecture; a fall to earth that litters the streets with the corpses of bodies and buildings. The streets are 'reduced to rubble' and 'Dead bodies are therefore everywhere you turn – on the sidewalk, in the doorways, in the street itself' (*ICLT*, 289). The urban environment is one dominated by the sterility of waste. Katherine Washburn has described this condition in both the terms of periods and cultures, a society at the 'terminal stage of collapse and ruin'[28] and, as in Wells' *Time Machine*, a novel portraying 'the wreck of Western culture'.[29] And yet the novel suggests something rather more sophisticated than this 'terminal' view:

> The closer you come to the end, the more there is to say. The end is only imaginary, a destination you invent to keep yourself going, but a point comes when you realize you will never get there. You have to stop, but that is only because you have run out of time. You stop, but that does not mean you have come to the end. (*ICLT*, 401)

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The created and creative elements of the end, as well as the historiographic paradoxes at stake, are well framed in this passage. 'Life as we know it', writes Anna elsewhere, 'has ended, and yet no one is able to grasp what has taken its place' (*ICLT*, 291). Anna is conscious that, whilst she writes for and about an end, it is a condition she herself can never experience. Whilst the ruinous landscapes she moves through provide an image or sign of the end, her descriptions of them suggest that this end is being pushed further into the future. Ruins do not mark an end here, but signal how the end is being deferred, supplemented by the material chronography of things falling out of use. So long as ruins can be described, the powers of description that make them legible cannot be themselves ruinous.

Having fleshed out the way in which future ruins suggest the negation of progress to function as 'monuments to transience', we can now turn to the other side of the Ozymandias Complex: the ruinous yet enduring monuments to past success. Born from a more cyclical and determined view of history, these projected ruins stand as a testimony to the grandeur of fallen empire and fulfil the familiar trajectory of famed groups, dynasties and diasporas. One of the central paradoxes of these projected ruins is the way in which, as against the ideal Horacian monument, decay serves to secure the awestruck appreciation of future generations. A contemporary of Shelley, Joseph Bounden, sums up this view of ruin in a succinct couplet: 'In splendid ruin still alive to flame/Thy giant wreck shall long preserve thy fame!'[30] The destruction and dissolution of buildings do not so much negate the values of those who no longer inhabit them, but, instead, ruin takes on an important communicative function. We saw something of this gesture to the grandeur of ruin in our examination of folly ruins; however, these buildings claimed a past and present, whereas the projection of ruins claims a particular image of the future.

The ruin does not necessarily provide the means to imagine an end; it can also be a means to perpetuate and safeguard its future. Imagining future ruins in this way can prove to be counterintuitive with respect to our ideas of the monumental, particularly if we fail to keep in mind the dual nature of the ruinous monument. Writing in 1903, Alois Riegl describes the efficacy of monuments in terms of their relationship to waste: 'The historical value of a monument arises from the particular, individual stage it represents in the development of human activity in a certain field […] The more faithfully a monument's original state is preserved, the greater its historical value: disfiguration and decay detract from it'.[31] But, as our analysis of Shelley's 'Ozymandias' has shown, the historical value of the monument cannot be simply opposed to, but frequently evolves with, the process of its dissolution. Moreover, Riegl fails to account for how

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ruin has permitted some to imagine their material endurance. Let us turn to one of the more fantastical projections of future ruin – in the memoirs of Adolf Hitler's architect, Albert Speer – to discover how the ruins of the future and their communicative function remain deeply immersed in the traditions of *Ruinstimmung* explored in the previous chapter.

Invested in the control and manipulation of both the present and the future, Albert Speer was tasked with influencing the judgements of those thousands of years into posterity. 'Hitler liked to say that the purpose of his building', wrote Speer, 'was to transmit his time and its spirit to posterity. Ultimately, all that remained to remind men of the great epochs of history was their monumental architecture'.[32] Speer, troubled by the sight of debris created whilst clearing the site for the Nuremburg Zeppelin Field – 'It was hard to imagine that rusting heaps of rubble could communicate these heroic inspirations which Hitler admired in the monuments of the past' (*ITR*, 97), responded with what he termed his 'Theory of Ruin Value'. Speer's ambition was to construct buildings that would ruin 'effectively' and safeguard a positive image of the Reich for those of the future. In order to do this, he avoided all the typical innovations of modern construction – especially steel girders and reinforced concrete – that might belie the solid, neo-Classical and upstanding self-image that the Reich gave itself. For example, walls were built so wide that even if roofs and ceilings collapsed, the walls would remain (*ITR*, n.2, 702). To convince his colleagues, Speer had a 'romantic drawing prepared' showing the Zeppelin Field in a ruinous condition, 'after generations of neglect, overgrown with ivy, its columns fallen, the walls crumbling here and there, but the outlines still clearly recognizable' (*ITR*, 97). Whilst many found this image of the future in bad taste, Hitler accepted Speer's theory of ruins as a 'logical' stage in his conception of Nazi imperialism (*ITR*, 98). Based on an admiring view of Classical architecture, ruins become the central object by which a regime, empire or society can narrate its future. Indeed, by assuming that one's architecture will be recognized in the same attitude as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europeans acknowledged the ruins of antiquity is to place oneself at the foundations of the future; ruins do not form the end but also the basis for a new beginning.

With Speer, we have reached a particularly clear example of how ruins operate as an object of politics. Choosing between the two sides of the Ozymandias Complex – deciding what can be done with the ruins of the future – is a decision fraught with the politics of remains, their creation, projection, preservation and interpretation. This is true of the dystopian ruination of the future as an indictment of the present, as well as the celebration of ruin as the glorious

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conclusion to and recognition of a civilisation. This is a politics of duration and persistence, disappearance and recognition, a politics of traces and their management. Architectural movements in the twentieth century were never far away from defining themselves according to their propensity to waste, various in their attempts to erase, preserve or leave no remainders. This seems particularly relevant when considering the radical aspirations of modernist architects and agitators. In Antonio Sant'Elia's *Manifesto of Futurist Architecture* (1914), it is claimed that the 'fundamental characteristics of Futurist architecture will be its impermanence and transience'.[33] Rather than the durable and solid, Futurism should pursue architecture that could sweep aside all that was old, to build upon the understanding that the next generation will be just as radical, allowing the 'constant renewal of the architectonic environment' […] 'Things will endure less than us. Every generation must build its own city'.[34] As Owen Hatherley observes, this is a theory of architecture with both a fetish for inbuilt obsolescence and a desire to erase every trace of the old – 'outrunning the old world before it has the chance to catch up on you'.[35] As with Speer, the mandate assumed for intervention is one founded upon the destruction of present conditions on the one hand, and their replacement with an architecture that will last for a requisite period on the other. For Speer, this anticipated period stretches generations and involves the participation of waste; for Sant'Elia it is based on a generational rhythm that sought the erasure of waste. Whilst Speer and Sant'Elia might appear at the opposite ends of an Ozymandian spectrum, the relative endurance or erasure of future ruin stands as their common object and the condition by which they measure their progress and their legacy.

Le Corbusier, too, was profoundly aware of the stifling effects of the past and equally keen to define his projects according to and against ruin: 'Our world, like a charnel-house, is strewn with the detritus of dead epochs. The great task incumbent on us is that of making a proper environment for our existence, and *clearing away from our cities the dead bones that putrefy them*'.[36] Elsewhere, he writes, recalling his famous pronouncement that our houses are machines for living in: 'We have become like the rusty engine of some out-of-date motor-car; the chassis, the body, the seats (the peripheries of our cities) can carry on still, but the motor (the centre) is *seized!* This means complete breakdown'.[37] Suffice to say that Le Corbusier's vision of the future city is entirely free of the signs of the past and of ruins in particular. So, when favouring a style of town planning that was dominated by rectilinear and geometrical forms, that follow the imperatives of order and rationality, Le Corbusier claims that the 'modern sentiment is a spirit of geometry, a spirit of construction and synthesis. Exactitude and order are its

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essential condition'. Anything opposed to this rational imperative – which might seek to celebrate the contingent, messy or magical side of the city – 'lead[s] to the ruin of cities and districts and of entire countries […] to deprive us of our proper environment and annihilate us'.[38] Rhetorically, Le Corbusier puts the ruin into the present and the future, giving him a mandate to intervene on the behalf of both; occasionally he claims that the present is a ruin and 'something must be done about it', but he also claims that the future will go to ruin if something is not done about the state of contemporary cities. 'Exactitude and order' are set against a sense of ruinous non-performance.

Those, like Le Corbusier, who direct their architectural manifestos against the problem of ruin invariably attract criticism that focuses on how the solutions they propose have their own potential for waste and decay. A critique that depends on the figure of ruin provides an image for its own conceptual and rhetorical undoing. The influence of Le Corbusier continues to be appraised according to how his buildings have or have not decayed.[39] Employing the image of ruin as both a figure of compliment and critique, J. G. Ballard described his eponymous high-rise as 'a huge machine designed to serve'.[40] This Le Corbusian structure is a machine capable of failure in precisely the morbid terms that Le Corbusier reserves to criticize the modern city.[41] For Ballard, this emergent ruin indicates a model of the future, 'the run-down nature of the high-rise was a model of the world into which the future was carrying them, a landscape beyond technology where everything was either derelict or, more ambiguously, recombined in unexpected but more meaningful ways'.[42] The ruin of this technologically advanced but socially and politically flawed mode of living suggests that, whilst modern architecture might be conceived against the ruins of the past as well as the anticipated ruins of the future, their propensity for waste presents an unrelenting potentiality. It was with this fatalistic sentiment in mind that, just a year after publishing *High-Rise*, Ballard completed a novella equally obsessed by the future ruin, 'The Ultimate City'. Set in the near future, the defining contrast of this work issues from the docile pastoralism of the Garden City – another playful inversion of Le Corbusier's ideals – and the aggressive, petroleum-driven industrialism now past, represented by an abandoned metropolis. The Garden City's manufacturers are so exact that 'everything [is] so well made that it last[s] for ever',[43] what refuse is produced is efficiently recycled. The future, in short, is a society no longer capable of creating waste. The old metropolis, on the other hand, is an enormous monument to the discarded, a ruinous wasteland strewn with abandoned cars, televisions, washing machines and other commodities. Halloway, the story's protagonist, becomes disillusioned with the stifling pace of life in the Garden City

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and journeys to the derelict metropolis. Exploring the city and its carefully formed 'pyramids' of waste, Halloway discovers 'the undimmed beauty of industrial wastes produced by skills and imaginations far richer than nature's, more splendid than any Arcadian meadow. Unlike nature, here was no death.'[44] In Ballard's 'The Ultimate City' – which is 'ultimate' both causally and temporally – waste takes on a Horacian permanence: an enduring monument to its own transience. Whilst the Garden City is the city of the future, it is incapable of creating a legacy for itself, incapable of achieving the monumental gesture available through making waste.

Encountering last things

In considering the examples above we have completed a circle that has taken in two sides of the Ozymandias Complex, where ruin has been seen to represent an ambivalence of ending, as an object of transience and endurance, of failure and consummation. But we should not overlook that Shelley was not the only poet writing about Ozymandias in 1819; Horace Smith also wrote for *The Examiner* on the theme of ruin:

> In Egypt's sandy silence, all alone,
> Stands a gigantic Leg, which far off throws
> The only shadow that the Desart knows:—
> "I am great OZYMANDIAS," saith the stone,
> "The King of Kings; this mighty City shows
> "The wonders of my hand."—The City's gone,—
> Nought but the Leg remaining to disclose
> The site of this forgotten Babylon.
>
> We wonder,—and some Hunter may express
> Wonder like ours, when thro' the wilderness
> Where London stood, holding the Wolf in chace,
> He meets some fragment huge, and stops to guess
> What powerful but unrecorded race
> Once dwelt in that annihilated place.[45]

The productive oscillation between permanence and decay is evident again, with questions of showing, disappearing, disclosing and forgetting underpinning the rhyme scheme of the second quatrain.[46] However, the sonnet's volta introduces a departure from Shelley and provides a fresh theme for our consideration of future ruin, as the confrontation with ruin provokes a moralizing image of London in an imagined state of ruin, seen through the eyes of 'some Hunter'. Whilst Shelley's

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'Ozymandias' left us curious as to the precise status of the remains described, Smith's makes explicit the synonymous relationship between the ruins of the past and the ruins of the future. Smith's poem, then, includes a view of Ozymandias and a more knowing, projective and empathetic consideration of what it means to be an Ozymandias in the making. What accompanies this circular movement from empire building, to ruination and eventual discovery is a sequence of disappearance and assessment; in short, another means to fabricate self-distance through ruin. And, unlike the ruins of the near future, such as those described in the fiction of J. G. Ballard, W. G. Sebald or the essays of Robert Smithson,[47] these are ruins of the distant future precisely because they are discovered by an individual entirely alien to our present, an outsider that can look upon the works of the present and judge their worth with an objectivity unavailable to those of the present. This technique, in which the outsider's view is proleptically incorporated within the self-regard of the present, provides an uncanny vantage point. As a kind of archaeology of the future, the evidential quality of the ruin and the experience of testimony and remembrance that they might inspire become a central (and often paranoid) preoccupation. Of course, anxiety arises not just about what kind of testimony might be told by this fictional figure, but whether there will remain any trace of the past to be viewed. We have entered into a final phase in both our analysis of the future ruin and in our broader attempt to consider the temporal problem of waste. What remains for us to consider is precisely this question of remainders and their limited capacity to be interpreted.

David Skilton has traced the representation of tourists visiting a ruinous London to the letters of Horace Walpole and the poetry of Thomas Lyttelton, but elsewhere acknowledges that this figure, particularly that of the 'New Zealander,' raised to its extraordinary popularity during the mid-nineteenth century.[48] The trope of the New Zealander entered into popular discourse with Thomas Macaulay, who concluded an article in the *Edinburgh Review* with the prediction that Catholicism 'may still exist in undiminished vigour when some traveller from New Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's'.[49] So prevalent was Macaulay's idea of the inquisitive and judgmental New Zealander, capable of measuring the duration of things, that by 1865 *Punch* had placed it at the top of their list of ruined rhetoric, literary devices 'used up, exhausted, threadbare, stale and hackneyed'.[50] Appearing in every imaginable kind of publication, the New Zealander was still visiting future ruins over 30 years after Macaulay's initial invocation, and it was left to Gustave Doré to seal the New Zealander's reputation by publishing a famous etching (Figure 7.6).

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Figure 7.6 Gustave Doré, "The New Zealander", in *London: A Pilgrimage*, ed. Blanchard Jerrold (London: Grant, 1872)

By evaluating the fantastical products of a ruined present, the New Zealander – invariably male, typically of Maori rather than European descent – dramatizes both a familiar perspective and a perspective entirely remote to us, an impossible view.[51] As Skilton writes, 'although Britain seems to have reached a state of power and prosperity unparalleled in the history of the world, it is in the nature of things to be impermanent. The New Zealander is less a harbinger of doom than a prompt to self-awareness and self-criticism'.[52] It is, however, rarely noted how this effort towards self-awareness and self-criticism involves the New Zealander's own act of artistic production. Unlike Smith's hunter, who views the fragment of a 'powerful but unrecorded race', both Macaulay and Doré have their New Zealander carefully recording whatever is available to him, visually producing and reproducing a view. Besides giving an explicit sense of the traveller's labour of assessment, his interpretative response, the emphasis on the visual reproduction of future ruins means that the legacy of British imperialism is artistically perpetuated and critically appraised as a legacy in ruin. In a gesture that might recall the figure towards the centre of Robert's *An Imaginary View of the Grand Gallery in Ruins*, in which artistic endeavour is seen as an intrinsic companion to material decay, the New Zealander enacts a form of Grand Tourism that displaces the Classical world with the modern. And, not unlike Speer's ruin theory of value, the allusion to a Classical precedent means

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that the New Zealander also perpetuates a circularity of travel, transcription and return. If, as Anne Janowitz has argued, 'the national images of both England and of Great Britain are built on Roman ruins', then these national images are also built on the classical ruins that Britons were projecting for and of themselves.[53] One function of the New Zealander, then, aims to reconcile the spatial and temporal foreignness of ruin and the material continuity implied between one experience of ruin and another – mediating one experience of empire's ruin with another. The New Zealander also provides a broader corrective to Walter Benjamin's suggestion that the turbulent momentum of history, 'which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage' at the feet of the Angel of History, is not simply experienced in retrospect. Benjamin describes how his angel is 'irresistibly propel[led] *into the future to which his back is turned*, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward'.[54] The historiographic device of the New Zealander shows how we also gain perspective on the rubble that history creates by facing towards what has not yet occurred, searching for ways to punctuate and divide time by turning ourselves towards the prospect of future ruin.

'It is not unimaginable that our future archæologist may have no other means of reconstructing our civilization', wrote Montgomery Schuyler in 1883, deploying the New Zealander to consider the technological grandeur of New York's Brooklyn Bridge, 'than that which is furnished him by the tower on which he stands. What will his judgment of us be?'[55] One of the principal functions of the New Zealander is to ask such rhetorical questions, to provide an opportunity to evaluate and *reconstruct* the contemporary. Explicit here is an anxiety about leftovers, about what those leftovers might look like and where they might reside. That is, these future ruins and the travellers they attract must, above all, be *visible*. A trans-Atlantic contemporary of Schuyler, Richard Jefferies employed a kind of New Zealander figure in his novel, *After London; or, Wild England* (1885), about a disenchanted wanderer called Felix. Jefferies goes to great lengths to invert the visibility of ruin associated with Macaulay, Doré and Schuyler by describing the almost absolute disappearance of London, as a city nearing intangibility: 'The very largest of the buildings fell in, and there was nothing visible but trees and hawthorns on the upper lands, flags, reeds, and rushes on the lower'.[56] When Felix enters the further reaches of the Great Lake and encounters the 'deserted and utterly extinct city of London […] under his feet' (*AL*, 378), the grainy substance of the past inspires neither solitary contemplation nor artistic reproduction:

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> he came to walls like those of houses, such as would be left if the roofs fell in. He carefully avoided touching them, for they seemed as brittle as glass, and merely a white powder having no consistency at all. As these remnants increased in number, so that he had to wind in and out and around them. In some places the crystallized wall had fallen of itself, and he could see down into the cavern […] Whether the walls had been of bricks or stone or other material he could not tell; they were now like salt. (*AL*, 375–376)

These are future ruins verging on the indistinction of dust, towards the dissolution of the idea of ruin into mere matter. Georg Simmel observed that, 'the metaphysical-aesthetic charm of the ruin disappears when not enough of it remains to let us feel the upward-leading tendency. The stumps of the pillars of the Forum Romanum are simply ugly and nothing else, while a pillar crumbled – say, halfway down – can generate a maximum charm'.[57] But to judge whether a ruin is 'charming' or 'ugly', 'something' or 'nothing else' depends on the visibility and availability of ruin, its resistance to absolute erasure. Jefferies' *After London* suggests the limits of the Ozymandias Complex and the temporal questions it poses, reaching into the sands that surround Shelley's statue to articulate the line between the intelligible materialization of time through waste and the dematerialization of time only made intelligible through the amorphous indistinction brought by dust. As Shelley and Jefferies make us aware, dust or salt, powder or sand frequently marks the disappearance of ruins and all the intimations of human action that can be made by them. Carolyn Steedman has argued that, 'Dust is the opposite thing to Waste, or at least, the opposite principle to Waste. [Dust] is about circularity, the impossibility of things disappearing, or going away, or being gone'.[58] But if dust suggests the impossibility of things disappearing, going away or being gone, then it erodes many of the temporal qualities of waste which deign to hold time up, to slow time down, to arrest time's relentless passing. As dust, the ruin no longer provides us with any sense of ending, incomplete or otherwise. Although dust might be the terminal condition of the ruin, it also marks the termination of ruin's chronographic potential; minimally cohesive, dust is too diffuse to chart a transition between use and waste.[59] The temporal qualities of waste, which structure and give license to our reconstructive impulses and provide the basis of ruin's exigency, lose their power to signify. If, as Steedman goes on to suggest, dust represents the 'grand circularity'[60] of matter, a time might unfold without any of the temporal punctuation that waste gives us, motivated by a continuous flow of material that neither retains the past nor heralds any particular future. Just as Horace imagined

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a monument capable of eroding the 'now' and the 'then' by being impervious to erosion, so in the monumental potential of dust we are left unable to distinguish this dust from any other, this time from any other. Surrounded by dust, Felix can only note the sheer absence of Ozymandian complexity:

> He looked around, supposing that he might see the gleaming head and shoulders of the half-buried giant, of which he recollected he had been told […] The learned thought, if such a thing really existed, that it might be the upper part of an ancient brazen statue, kept bright by the action of acid in the atmosphere, and shining with reflected light. Felix did not see it. (*AL*, 380)

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8

Conclusion

By stressing the temporal and narratological effects of using and discarding things, I hope to have been able to outline the timely and essential role waste plays in bringing measure to our doings. Objects of waste come to be known in time, by making time and being made articulate through time. Things of waste are effective and affirmative objects that help us find ourselves in the world, periodizing our comings and goings, giving evidence of life's activities as well as indicating the life's departure, the residual permutations in the flow of human and non-human relations. By being temporal phenomena, objects of waste provide a means to mark and measure durations, setting temporal limits to the objects and the tasks we perform with them, allowing us to achieve those tasks and assess their success or failure. Waste is a matter of efficacy. Our acquisition and disposal of things show how we make and take time from things, disclosing how 'being-with' objects is just another way of saying that we are temporally codependent with the things with which we interact, giving and exchanging ends with matter that facilitates our living.

This book has made a conscious departure from the environmental politics of waste in order to know more of the phenomena of disused things as they work across historical periods, material, artistic mediums and economic systems of exchange. Far from building a universal and trans-historical account of waste things however, something far more flexible and semantically plural has emerged, a philosophical poetics that accounts for a certain repertoire of narrative and temporal shadow play. Waste did not simply arrive in modern times, through the environmental and climactic crises in which we now find ourselves globally, since waste has always been coming *and* going, indeed, waste is the thick feeling of absence that makes a story of things possible. Waste has all sorts of effects on us, but it also needs material effects to come to light. By sidestepping the politics of commerce I have been able to introduce the rich interplay between matter and its capabilities, the activities which we share with our thingly effects and the

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durations we construct in codependence with material things. This strikes me as a strong basis for a political economy of waste whose full realization, I regret, has been beyond the scope of this work.

I introduced *Waste* with a position that was roughly phenomenological in nature, focussing on the experience and interpretation of waste things. This position, I argued, involved the temporal register of things and the ways in which we narrate them in and through time. To waste is to bring an end to use, this much is commonplace, but I have tried to make an addition to current theories of waste by seeing how, to bring use to an end, a new sort of time needs to be reckoned with. This might bring us beyond the subject-dependent and somatic thrust of the phenomenological tradition, which stresses human correlations with objects. In the processes of collecting, reading and building described earlier, we frequently found objects in excess of our momentary relations and representations. I called this temporal condition 'waste-time' and understand it to be an anachronic tense, one that commingles pasts and presents and leaves things lingering, loitering and persisting above and beyond the time of its functionality. It is the persistence of what has passed that makes waste an articulate thing of time.

In Chapter 2, I considered how we hesitate before waste, asking why it is that we say a thing remains, say, a pin, a jukebox, a railway station but, in being discarded, is said to be out of joint with this identity. I introduced a series of readings taken from twentieth-century philosophers and cultural theorists who have, in various ways, described the occasions where waste occurs. Through these readings I was able to suggest that a sense of temporal seizure, severance and discontinuity – the 'event of waste' – was only one aspect of the twofold nature of discarded things. Whilst waste might frequently suggest interruption, it is also an intelligible and articulate thing in time. This double logic, that subordinates and affirms, interrupts and makes continuous the past, is engrained in the language of the discarded. Words like 'obsolescence' (from, *ob*, against, *solēre*, to be accustomed, to use[1]) or 'redundancy' (from the stem *undāre*, 'to surge, to flow, abound') carry the discontinuous-continuity of waste things. Objects that break or are simply no longer required for future use do not fall from time but enter into a relationship with an absent but no less traceable past.

Encounters with waste reveal how our experience of time is underwritten by the things that we use; time materializes and is made material through our projects, plans and ambitions. This chronographic potential of waste is supported by a supplementary effort to account, describe and legislate between times, especially through our powers of narration. In Chapter 2, the work of Cornelia Parker

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brought to life H. Porter Abbott's definition of narrative exigency: 'included in the present time […] is a shadowy sense of time preceding it, and specifically of narrative time—that is, time composed of a succession of necessary events that leads up to, and accounts for, what we see'.[2] As Abbott argues, this definition of narrative is not reducible to artworks but is applicable to countless aspects of life, where a shadowy sense of absence plays a fundamental role in our efforts to make sense of things in time, whether sculptural, textual, architectural and so on. This absence, this backstory, this implied but necessary succession of events, is both a cause of waste's duplicitous and interrupted nature and a means to control, divide and stabilize its past and future trajectories. Parker makes the power of things central to her work and relies on their quasi-absent backstories to enliven otherwise-static tableaux – the fragments of a shed, the charred remains of a Texan Baptist church, the shrivelled slivers of blackened wood, left over from a forest fire. What she made absent, both the past states of the material and the events that gave her material the form we see in the gallery, renders this a waste that works, an agent in the mediation of other agents, making traceable events that become knowable through things.

Questions of presence and disappearance, continuity and discontinuity, also surfaced in Chapter 3, where an enquiry was made into how collecting and organizing waste objects can help model the stories that might be told by those collections. The collections of Mark Dion provided an opportunity to discuss the contestation between processes of gathering and dispersal, as well as the oscillating relationship between the temporalities of using and wasting things. Despite work that has led others to conclude to the contrary, the enigmatic backstories available through things mean that there cannot be a single or uniform trajectory that sees objects move from conditions of use to conditions of waste. Instead, Dion's work harnesses a rich series of material comings and goings, a crisscrossing in and out of the projective time of use and the slack, indeterminate and disorientated time of waste. Here lies a crucial aspect of waste, its structure of contradiction; the collection of waste does not necessarily make smooth its irregularities or make sequential the ruptures of its temporality. Nothing lasts forever, including those things we thought had found conclusion in disposal. The objects in the cabinet are carried by complex, continuous and fluid process of cycling in and out of the times of use and waste, attended by and expressed through assembly and disassembly, preservation and dispersal, retrospective legibility and dust. Although rubbish might be seen to mark the end of an object, Dion's work is one that mobilizes and confounds this sense of ending, not just by being an object within a larger collection but by the unstable

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nature of the objects it gathers. Anticipating an argumentative arc that emerges in later chapters, we saw how the dust that has settled in Tate's conservation department marks an end to the powers of these things to facilitate the narration of waste events. This does not mark an end to the material as such, but an end to its shadowy, documentary capacity.

It seemed important to me, precisely because writing is frequently considered an intangible and ephemeral practice, that I should not lose the timely thingliness that evolved out of the first three chapters. In developing a theory of 'textual waste' throughout Chapters 4 and 5, I sought to make the important connection between the world that is described in poetry and prose and the processes of wasting that achieved these descriptions. A text can describe certain things, people and landscapes that have fallen from a temporally codependent relationship with human activity; on another, texts might suggest a compositional form of waste by alluding to or including drafts, excisions or textual variants; and on a third, more ghostly limb, writing may also signify its status as an object, as a thing that might be discarded, a thing to be jettisoned. Through the work of T. S. Eliot, I demonstrated how each expression of textual waste interacted with the other to inform the legibility of his texts, their significance and durability. Approaching literature through this mode of analysis, even literary works as famous and as widely read as Eliot's provided an important material basis for concluding that his work was neither entirely ruinous nor pristine, neither dead nor fully alive, but rich with allusions that serve to highlight and renegotiate the efficacy of his source material. Just as, in earlier chapters, waste was seen as a force for order and disorder, collation and dispersal, evidence and absence, textual waste stands as both an absence in the 'final' work and resides in the residues of variants, manuscripts and notebooks that attest to the redundancy that is integral to literature.

When reading the work of Eliot and Joyce, we discover a form of writing that is intimately bound to the process of critical writing that was necessary for its composition, disclosing the textual variations that enter and are actively expressed in the words we find on the page. My reading of Joyce's *Ulysses* demonstrated how the subject of waste is formed in productive negotiation with the language that composes and decomposes its presence, the base matter of words. Since the idea of waste transforms the meaning of language, the problem of waste in Joyce is also a problem of legibility, comprehension and representation. Through a genetic consideration of 'Proteus', we found the recurring theme of this project – the peculiar existence and persistence of waste matter. Past versions of the text do not 'disappear' in Joyce but are retained,

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held in suspended animation. What remains in the Bodley Head, Penguin and many other versions of *Ulysses* is a syntactic trace of a textual absence and not an absolute absence. In this manner, Joyce's text displays the same charged, shadowy quality found in Parker's exploded shed or the contents of Dion's *Wunderkammer*; it draws attention to the words and textual marks that have *not* silted there, to a tracery of textual detritus that forms the necessary condition of a work in progress, a work that has yet to remain.

Chapter 5 concluded with the observation, made by Roland Barthes, that the seduction of manuscript drafts is their reconstructive potential; in textual waste lies the germ of an unfulfilled work. Chapters 2 to 5, which considered various objects and tried to understand the kind of time that they carry through their engagement with waste, carried out a reconstructive and supplementary compulsion. Waste may well provide us with an image of something that is desiccated, exhausted, insufficient or shattered, but our categorical and narratalogical responses refuse this sense of deadened inertia. It seems that we cannot let bygones be bygones and we cannot let things, for which time has run down, simply be the sum of their negativity. This is partly because things are rarely so deadened, so terminal. They are constantly changing, mutating, falling into and out of a multitude of uses. Without this change we would not experience the thingly feedback loop that helps us make time. But there might be another reason that we cannot let waste be 'mere waste'. Reanimating and recoding this restless matter, tracing its enigmatic effects through academic research, participate in the same imaginative and supplementary logic that I have claimed is a peculiar aspect of encountering waste. I sought to address this compulsion to 'complete' waste in this chapter and in Chapter 6. I argued that it is the diverging temporal relations, use-time, and the slack and indeterminate time of waste, waste-time, that make the ruin a supplementary architecture open to recoding, intercession and reanimation. But it was also argued that it is insufficient simply to identify the semiotic plurality of waste as if it were an inherent quality of things for which 'designated meanings and purposes of things [have] evaporated'.[3] We cannot recode infinitely, we cannot make things mean anything we like them to, especially the things we call 'waste' or 'ruin'. The imaginative and supplementary logic I identify here has limits that are, amongst other things, temporal and material. In fact, the dusty absence of London in Richard Jefferies' novel, the corroded iron artefacts in Dion's collection, the disappearance of the Elijah handbill in *Ulysses* or the knowledge that manuscript material is lost, corrupted or becomes illegible – all attest to the failure and limitation of waste as a category. As I have repeated elsewhere, waste

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is a thing governed by the way in which action and functionality give things time, but without the material trace of these actions the shadowy absence of waste becomes absolute. The Ozymandias Complex is snuffed out; waste must communicate an effect, and it needs complicit effects. The material might linger, but its momentary associations, which make past action knowable, remain unobtainable.

One might reasonably expect a book about waste to conclude with apocalyptic visions of nuclear or some other condition of planetary annihilation. Plainly put, I think it more useful (more useful for its familiarity when encountering waste) to stress the disappearance of effective waste things instead of the disappearance of individuals capable of narrating their effects. The relative comprehensibility of dust depends on the level of analysis being employed; a microscopic analysis of the salty, silted material Felix discovers in *After London* may well have given him a better impression of the city beneath his feet. But this conjecture, at the level of competence and expertise, does not contradict the necessary truth that, if we cannot recognize past action, then reflections upon the recursive nature of that object will slip from view. These are the wider limits of the supplementary logic of waste that have emerged throughout the foregoing pages, a logic that includes a commingling of tense, continuities and discontinuities, presence and absence, collation and dispersal, all of which are central to the system of contradiction that makes waste an articulated and articulate thing in time.

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Notes

Chapter 1

1 The origin of Douglas' definition is, itself, rather difficult to place. Whilst sometimes attributed to Lord Palmerston, Palmerston himself did not claim that the formulation was of his own making. See Steven Connor, "Smear Campaigns," accessed 10th September 2011, http://www.stevenconnor.com/smearcampaigns/.

2 Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966; Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), 44.

3 An indicative list might include Dominique Laporte, *History of Shit*, trans. Nadia Benabid and Rodolphe el–Khoury (1978; Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002); Ellen Lupton and J. Abbott Miller, *Bathroom, the Kitchen, and the Aesthetics of Waste* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997); William A. Cohen and Ryan Johnson, *Filth: Dirt, Disgust, and Modern Life* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2005); Ben Campkin and Rosie Cox, ed., *Dirt: New Geographies of Cleanliness and Contamination* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008); Sophie Gee, *Making Waste: Leftovers and the Eighteenth-Century Imagination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Gillian Whiteley, *Junk: Art and the Politics of Trash* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

4 For an exploration of the 'biography of things', see Igor Kopytoff, "The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process," in *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 64–91. Kopytoff argues that the biography of things occurs through the conflict between singularisation (idiosyncratic and individually motivated meaning) and commoditisation (culturally located and monetised meaning). Time is a flat, undifferentiated problem for Kopytoff, and narrative is an outcome rather than a cause of how an object is used. He fails, in my view, to recognize how time is fashioned by our use of things and the ways in which we narrate those things give us horizons of expectation, expectations that create the biographic potential of objects.

5 Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, 3 vols, (1988; Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 3:241.

6 Daniel Miller's *The Comfort of Things* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008) provides an ethnographic exploration of how human biography is motivated by things. These

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are the stories we tell through the things humans collect; an anthropology of material that stresses how things are constantly caught up in the biographies of those that use and discard them. Miller's work asks 'what these [things] tell us about [human] lives' (1). Less concerned with describing human lives through things, I ask how things organize and are structured by codependent temporalities, neither entirely human nor non-human.

7 Michel Serres, *Rome: The Book of Foundations*, trans. Felicia McCarren (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 43.

8 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 116.

9 See Mark Currie, *About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 17–18; 141–151.

10 Bill Brown, "Thing Theory," *Critical Inquiry* 28, no. 1 (2001): 4.

11 Currie, *About Time*, 81.

12 See John Scanlan, *On Garbage* (London: Reaktion, 2005), 99, 142, 168.

13 Jean Baudrillard, *The System of Objects*, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 1996), 75.

14 Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 257.

15 Wolfgang Iser, *How to Do Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 64.

16 Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (1975; New York: Harper, 2001), 33.

17 Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, 265.

18 Dylan Trigg, *The Aesthetics of Decay: Nothingness, Nostalgia, and the Absence of Reason* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 131.

19 These are terms are taken from Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 102–105, a more thorough discussion of their application to ideas of waste occurs in Chapter 2.

20 Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994), 25.

21 Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 17.

22 Walter W. Skeat, *An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), s.v. 'redound'.

23 William Shakespeare, "The Tragedy of King Lear," in *The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard and Katherine Eisaman Maus (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 1.1.88. All quotations from the first Folio edition.

24 T. Weiss, quoted in Kieran Ryan, "King Lear," in *A Companion to Shakespeare's Works Volume 1: The Tragedies*, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 388.

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25 The play's other 'discarded father' is the Earl of Gloucester. His sense of disposal is made explicit after the Duke of Cornwall has gouged out Gloucester's eyes: 'Turn out that eyeless villain. Throw this slave/Upon the dunghill', 3.7.94–95.
26 Peter Sloterdijk, *In the Interior of Capital: For a Philosophical Theory of Globalization*, trans. Wieland Hoban (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 52.
27 See Robin Butlin, "Some Terms Used in Agrarian History: A Glossary," *The Agricultural History Review* 9 (1961): 99. One of the earliest written uses of the word 'waste' is registered in pipe rolls of Henry II, 1155–1156. It described land from which tax could not be claimed for the exchequer, for being unproductive, devastated in the civil war or excluded by royal favour. That Lear should find himself on a land from which no taxable profit can be gained, whether when he was king or as a discarded father, simply exaggerates his transition from sovereignty to conditions of waste, to an earth 'weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable' ('Hamlet' 1.2.133–134). See Emilie M. Amt, "The Meaning of Waste in the Early Pipe Rolls of Henry II," *The Economic History Review* 44, no. 2 (1991): 240–248.
28 Kenneth Gross, *Shakespeare's Noise* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), 183.
29 James I, *The True Law of Free Monarchies: And, Basilikon Doron*, ed. Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier (Toronto: CRRS Publications, 1996), 71.
30 Charles Lewis and Charles Short, ed., *A Latin Dictionary: Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary* (1879; Oxford: Clarendon, 1945), s.v. 'vast'.
31 *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd 1989. s.v. 'waste'.
32 Quoted in ibid.
33 S. R. Driver, *The Book of Genesis* (1904; London: Methuen, 1948). Others have 'a formless waste', see E. A. Speiser, *The Anchor Bible: Genesis* (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 3.
34 Revised Standard Version.
35 New International Version.
36 David Toshio Tsumura, *The Earth and the Waters in Genesis 1 and 2: A Linguistic Investigation* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 31, 42.
37 James Murphy, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Genesis, With a New Translation* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1863), 33; Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, *Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament*, trans. James Martin, 10 vols. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1866), 1:48.
38 Giorgio Agamben, *Profanations*, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 74.
39 Jean-Jacques Laffont, "Externalities," in *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd ed, ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, accessed 08 January 2011, http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000200.
40 Heather Rogers, *Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage* (New York: The New Press, 2005), 9, 36.

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41 Susan Strasser, *Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash* (New York: Owl Books, 1999), 17, 18.
42 Heather Rogers, *Gone Tomorrow*, 31, 50. My italics.
43 Rogers, *Gone Tomorrow*, 32. My italics.
44 Greg Kennedy, *An Ontology of Trash: The Disposable and its Problematic Nature* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 4–5, 5.
45 Kennedy, *An Ontology of Trash*, 19.
46 Kennedy, *An Ontology of Trash*, 54.
47 Kennedy, *An Ontology of Trash*, 121.
48 Kennedy, *An Ontology of Trash*, 123.

Chapter 2

1 Bjørnar Olsen, *In Defense of Things: Archaeology and the Ontology of Objects* (Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 162.
2 Bill Brown, *Critical Inquiry*, 4.
3 Graham Harman, "An Outline of Object-Oriented Philosophy", *Science Progress* 96, no. 2 (2013): 198.
4 Julian Stallabrass, "Trash", in *The Object Reader*, ed. Fiona Candlin and Raiford Guins (London: Routledge, 2009), 416.
5 John Scanlan, *On Garbage*, 43.
6 Scanlan, *On Garbage*, 107.
7 Scanlan, *On Garbage*, 37.
8 Jean-François Lyotard, *Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 18; Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2006), 181.
9 Alain Badiou, *Theoretical Writings*, trans. Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2004), 100
10 Graham Harman, *Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing* (Chicago: Open Court, 2007), 63.
11 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 97, no. 1.
12 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 97.
13 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 98. An implicit version of this readiness-to-hand appeared earlier in Brown's description of the object that functions; it describes the condition of a functioning thing prior to the revelation of its 'thingliness'.
14 Graham Harman, *Tool-being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Chicago: Open Court, 2002), 21.
15 *Being and Time*, 102–103.
16 *Being and Time*, 104.

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17 *Being and Time*, 105.
18 The term 'planned obsolescence' has a colourful history; see Bernard London, *Ending the Depression Through Planned Obsolescence* (1932; Online, 2011), accessed 12 June 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org. Searching for a solution to the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, London was an early advocate of planned obsolescence as a policy for growth and economic recovery; Vance Packard, *The Waste Makers* (New York: Pocket Books, 1961), gives a staunch critique of London's analysis and the phenomena of planned obsolescence more generally.
19 See Giles Slade, *Made to Break: Technology and Obsolescence in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
20 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1976; Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 5.
21 Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13.
22 David Herman, *Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2013), 92.
23 See Paul Cobley, *Narrative* (London: Routledge, 2001), 6.
24 Herman, *Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind*, 86.
25 Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 19.
26 H. Porter Abbott, *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6–7. Italics in the original.
27 Mieke Bal, *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997), 187.
28 See Gillian Whiteley, *Junk: Art and the Politics of Trash*, and Vea Legrine, *When Trash Becomes Art: Trash Rubbish Mongo* (Milan: Skira, 2007).
29 Whiteley, *Junk*, 8, 33.
30 Whiteley, 53.
31 The label reads: 'Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View, 1991/Garden shed, blown up for the artist by the British Army, the fragments suspended around the lightbulb from the shed', quoted in Jessica Morgan, "Matter and What it Means", in *Cornelia Parker*, 2nd ed., ed. The Institute of Contemporary Art Boston (Boston, MA: Art Data, 2000), 24. Perhaps because the official title is so uncommon, the work is often colloquially referred to as 'Parker's shed', 'the shed in the Tate', or simply 'the exploded shed' – testimony to how people can rename unusual works according to the source of the work's material.
32 The temporal contrast between shed and ex-shed was forcefully made when the work was first put on public display. In 1991 visitors to Chisenhale Gallery viewed photographs of the shed standing in an otherwise empty room. When they then entered that room they found Parker's exploded view where the shed once stood. Morgan, "Matter and What it Means", 21.

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33 Jonathan Watkins, "*Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View*", in *Avoided Object*, ed. Stuart Cameron (Cardiff: Chapter, 1996), 30.
34 Watkins, "Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View", 30.
35 Cornelia Parker, "Cornelia Parker Interviewed by Bruce Ferguson: October 1999", in *Cornelia Parker*, 46.
36 See Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny", in *The Uncanny*, trans. David McLintock (London: Penguin, 2003), 121–161.
37 Parker, "Cornelia Parker Interviewed by Bruce Ferguson", 46.
38 H. Porter Abbott, 15.
39 Esther Leslie, "Recycling", in *Restless Cities*, ed. Matthew Beaumont and Gregory Dart (London: Verso, 2010), 248.
40 Parker, "Cornelia Parker Interviewed by Bruce Ferguson", 58.
41 Parker, "Cornelia Parker Interviewed by Bruce Ferguson", 58.

Chapter 3

1 Christopher Tilley, "Interpreting Material Culture", in *The Meanings of Things: Material Culture and Symbolic Expression*, ed. Ian Hodder (London: Harper, 1989), 192.
2 Matthew Johnson, *Archaeological Theory: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (1999; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 7. Italics in original.
3 Michael Shanks, David Platt, William L. Rathje, "The Perfume of Garbage: Modernity and the Archaeological", *Modernism/Modernity* 11, no. 1 (2004), 67. Hereafter cited as *PG*.
4 William Rathje and Cullen Murphy, *Rubbish! The Archaeology of Garbage* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). The Garbage Project was established in the 1970s by Rathje and his associates. It represents one of the most widely publicized attempts to excavate contemporary landfill sites, as well as less-official dumping grounds. Guided by the principles of behavioural archaeology, Rathje and Murphy describe contemporary consumerism through the excavation of discarded materials. Also see William Rathje, "The Archaeology of Us", in *Encyclopaedia Britannica's Yearbook of Science and the Future: 1997*, ed. Charles Ciegelski (New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1996), 158–177.
5 For some concerted efforts to address the importance of waste in archaeology, see Ian Hodder, "The Meaning of Discard: Ash and Domestic Space in Baringo", in *Method and Theory for Activity Area Research: An Ethnoarchaeological Approach*, ed. Susan Kent (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 424–448; Stuart Needham and Tony Spense, "Refuse and the Formation of Middens", *Antiquity* 71 (1997): 77–90; Louise Martin and Nerissa Russell,

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"Trashing Rubbish", in *Towards Reflexive Method in Archaeology: The Example at Çatalhöyük*, ed. Ian Hodder (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 2000), 57–70.

6 Robert Williams, "Disjecta Reliquiae: The Tate Thames Dig", in *Mark Dion: Archaeology*, ed. Mark Dion and Alex Coles (London: Black Dog, 1999), 79.

7 "Works for Consideration", March, 2000. Dion, M., Acquisition File. PC10.1. Tate Archive, London.

8 Gavin Lucas, *The Archaeology of Time* (London: Routledge, 2005), 128–129.

9 Gustav Milne, Martin Bates, Mike D. Webber, "Problems, Potential and Partial Solutions: An Archaeological Study of the Tidal Thames, England", *World Archaeology* 29, no. 1, *Riverine Archaeology* (1997): 131.

10 Robert Williams, "Disjecta Reliquiae: The Tate Thames Dig", 75.

11 Ian Hodder writes of the conceptual and methodological problems this causes archaeologists: 'there can be no general theory and no universal method of measuring and interpreting activity residues, except in relation to physical, nonhuman processes of decay and deposition', Hodder, "The Meaning of Discard: Ash and Domestic Space in Baringo", 424.

12 John Chapman, "'Rubbish Dumps' or 'Places of Deposition'? Neolithic and Copper Age Settlements in Central and Eastern Europe", in *Neolithic Orkney in its European Context*, ed. Anna Richie (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 2000), 349.

13 James M. Skibo and Michael Brian Schiffer, *People and Things: A Behavioural Approach to Material Culture* (New York: Springer, 2008), 6.

14 William Rathje and Cullen Murphy, *Rubbish! The Archaeology of Garbage*, 54.

15 Gavin Lucas, *The Archaeology of Time*, 109.

16 This is an empathetic form of narrative engagement close to R. G. Collingwood's theory of historical re-enactment, the significant difference being that an engagement with waste requires a narrated past and a material continuity, as well as a greater concern with the non-human past. See R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History: With Lectures 1926–1928*, ed. Jan van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

17 Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative*, 3:116, 117.

18 Christopher Gosden, *Social Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 137.

19 See Bjørnar Olsen, *In Defense of Things*, 21–38, 135–143.

20 James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 231.

21 "Works for Consideration", March, 2000. Dion, M., Acquisition File. PC10.1. Tate Archive, London.

22 "Sculpture Conservation Preliminary Condition Report", 19th January 2000. Dion, M. PC10.1.

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23 Sasa Kosinova, "Deinstallation at the Tate Modern, Level 3: Treatment: October – November 2005", Dion, M. Conservation File. T07669. Tate Archive, London. In 2009 Kosinova qualifies earlier notes by adding, 'Almost all iron items are disintegrating', see Sasa Kosinova, "Installation, Condition and Treatment Notes", Dion, M. Conservation File. T07669. Tate Archive, London.
24 Sasa Kosinova, "Deinstallation at the Tate Modern, Level 3: Treatment: October – November 2005".
25 See Dion, M. Conservation File. T07669. Tate Archive, London.
26 Alex Coles, "The Epic Archaeological Digs of Mark Dion", in *Mark Dion: Archaeology*, 30.
27 See Dion, M. Conservation File. T07669.
28 Ricouer, 3:122, 120.
29 Currie, *About Time*, 12.

Chapter 4

1 Francesco Orlando, *Obsolete Objects in the Literary Imagination: Ruins, Relics, Rarities, Rubbish, Uninhabited Places and Hidden Treasure*, trans. Gabriel Philas, Daniel Seidel and Alessandra Grego (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 79, 102.
2 Francesco Orlando, *Obsolete Objects*, 207.
3 Orlando, *Obsolete Objects*, 102.
4 Patricia Waugh, *Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction* (1984; London: Routledge, 1996), 6.
5 See Susan Cahill, Emma Hegarty and Emilie Morin, ed., *SubStance* 37, no. 2 (2008).
6 These and subsequent references are taken from T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot* (1963; London: Faber, 1969). Brief quotations will be cited as *CPP*, with page references, additional line numbers accompany more extensive quotation.
7 These are the mantras suggested by Sean Latham, *Joyce's Modernism* (Dublin: National Library of Ireland, 2004), 1–3.
8 T. S. Eliot, *The Letters of T. S. Eliot: Volume I 1898–1922*, ed. John Haffenden (London: Faber, 2009), 1:749.
9 Quoted in B. L. Reid, *The Man from New York: John Quinn and His Friends* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 540.
10 Daniel H. Woodward, *Notes On the Publishing History and Text of The Waste Land* (Papers of the Bibliographic Society of America, 58, 1964), 268.
11 See Christopher Ricks, "Preface", in *Inventions of the March Hare*, ed. Christopher Ricks (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1996), xiii.
12 Christopher Ricks, *Inventions of the March Hare* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1996), 4.

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13 Ricks, *Inventions*, 5.
14 T. S. Eliot, "The Art of Poetry I: T. S Eliot," interview by Donald Hall (1959; Online, 2010), accessed 2nd October 2010, http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/4738/the-art-of-poetry-no-1-t-s-eliot.
15 Quotations from *The Waste Land* are from the 1922 edition, reprinted in T. S. Eliot, *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Typescript of the Original Drafts Including the Annotations of Ezra Pound*, ed. Valerie Eliot (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1971), 133–149.
16 Lyndall Gordon, "The Waste Land Manuscript," *American Literature* 45, no. 4 (1974): 557–570; John T. Mayer is one of the few critics to have traced the relations between the *Inventions* notebook and *The Waste Land* but makes no mention of waste, see John T. Mayer, "*The Waste Land* and Eliot's Poetry Notebook," in *T. S. Eliot: The Modernist in History*, ed. Ronald Bush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 67–90, esp. 72.
17 Hannah Sullivan, *The Work of Revision* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 125.
18 Henry James, *The Bostonians*, ed. R. D. Gooder (1886; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 167, 168.
19 See '[Preludes]', *Inventions of the March Hare*, 334–337.
20 Jayme Stayer, "Searching for the Early Eliot: *Inventions of the March Hare*," in *A Companion to T. S. Eliot*, ed. David E. Chintz (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 117.
21 Jayme Stayer, "Searching for the Early Eliot," 117, 188.
22 Stayer, "Searching for the Early Eliot," 188.
23 Louis Menard, *Discovering Modernism: T. S. Eliot and His Context*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 76.
24 Ezra Pound, "Preface," *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Typescript*, vii.
25 Intratextuality draws near to what Gérard Genette calls 'hypertextuality', in which one text is 'derived from another preexistent text', but differs insofar as Genette confines his term to the transformative potential of one discrete text upon another – two versions of *Snow White*, for example – whereas I argue that there exists a thicker seam of texts immanent in those published and recognized as 'works' or 'editions'. See Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 1–10.
26 Richard Badenhausen, *T. S. Eliot and the Art of Collaboration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75.
27 Harriet Davidson, "Improper Desire: Reading *The Waste Land*," in *The Cambridge Companion to T. S. Eliot*, ed. A. David Moody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 123.
28 Maud Ellmann, *The Poetics of Impersonality: T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1987), 93

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29 Ellmann, *The Poetics of Impersonality*, 93.
30 Michael H. Levenson, *A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine 1908–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 172–173.
31 Julia Kristeva, "The Bounded Text," in *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*, trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez, ed. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 36
32 Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue, and Novel," in *Desire in Language*, 71, 72.
33 Louis Untermeyer, quoted in Gregory S. Jay, "Discovering the Corpus," in *Bloom's Modern Critical Interpretations: The Waste Land, Updated Edition*, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), 83, 91.
34 Hugh Kenner, "The Waste Land," in *Bloom's Modern Critical Interpretations*, 18.
35 John Paul Riquelme, *Harmony of Dissonances: T. S. Eliot, Romanticism, and Imagination* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 167.
36 T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays* (1932; London: Faber, 1951), 22.
37 James Longenbach, "'Mature Poets Steal': Eliot's Allusive Practice," in *The Cambridge Companion to T. S. Eliot*, 183.
38 Colleen Lamos, *Deviant Modernism: Sexual and Textual Errancy in T. S. Eliot, James Joyce and Marcel Proust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 111.
39 T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays*, 14.
40 Daniel Chandler, "Intertextuality," Semiotics for Beginners, accessed 29th May 2011, http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem-gloss.html.
41 Jean Bellemin-Noël, "Psychoanalytic Reading and the Avant-texte," in *Genetic Criticism: Textes and Avant-Textes*, ed. Jed Deppman, Daniel Ferrer and Michael Groden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 30.
42 T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays*, 30.
43 Eliot, *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Typescript*, 9.181. Hereafter cited *TWL: Facs* with page and line numbers.
44 Laurence Rainey, *Revisiting The Waste Land* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 49.
45 Sullivan, *The Work of Revision*, 135. Italics in original.
46 Mindful of the *Ulysses*' influence was having on his writing, Eliot told Joyce, "I wish, for my own sake, that I had not read it", see *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, 1:562.
47 *Letters*, 1:626.
48 Badenhausen, 82.
49 Hannah Sullivan's analysis of this 'collaboration' shows that editorial protagonists were not always working in harmony. *The Waste Land*, she argues, was achieved through Eliot's substitutions and Pound's more dramatic excisions. She suggests that they were working with different conceptions about what the poem should be and that Pound, "ignor[ed] the formal and aesthetic principles of Eliot's drafts." See *The Work of Revision*, 141.

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50 Eliot, "The Art Of Poetry I."
51 T. S. Eliot, "On a Recent Piece of Criticism," *Purpose* 10, no. 2 (1938): 93.
52 Gregory S. Jay, "Discovering the Corpus," 89.
53 *Letters*, 1:748.

Chapter 5

1 Michel Serres, *The Birth of Physics*, trans. Jack Hawks (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), 149.
2 Tony Thwaites, *Joycean Temporalities: Debts, Promises, and Countersignatures* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 85–86. Italics removed.
3 Aside from the presence of manuscript material, readers of Joyce's *Ulysses* must first decide which of the many editions of the book to consult. Believing it to be the most accurate version of the text currently available, all subsequent quotes are from Hans Walter Gabler's Bodley Head edition of 1986, hereafter cited in the text as *U* with episode and line numbers. However, since many come to read Joyce in inexpensive editions, I include page references to the Penguin text of 2000, cited alongside as *UP*.
4 Maud Ellmann, "*Ulysses*: The Epic of the Human Body", in *A Companion to James Joyce*, ed. Richard Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 61.
5 When considering the 'survival' of this waste it is important to note that these excremental passages were ones that Ezra Pound was keen to see expunged, prior to serialization in *The Little Review*. Joyce resisted these excisions vehemently. See, Paul Vanderham, "Ezra Pound's Censorship of *Ulysses*", *James Joyce Quarterly* 32, no. 3/4 (1995): 583–595.
6 Don Gifford with Robert J. Seidman, *Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce's Ulysses* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1988), 84.
7 Lawrence Rainey, *Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.
8 Cheryl Herr, *Joyce's Anatomy of Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); R. Brandon Kershner, "Dialogical and Intertextual Joyce", in *James Joyce Studies*, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 183–202.
9 Steven Connor, *James Joyce* (Plymouth: Northcote House, 1996), 54.
10 Incidentally, Bloom has already used his copy of the *Freeman's Journal* to kneel and pray at Dignam's funeral (*U*, 6.586–587; *UP*, 130).
11 Steven Connor, *James Joyce*, 56.
12 Karen R. Lawrence, "Bloom's Circulation: Who's He When He's Not at Home?" in *Joyce on the Threshold*, ed. Anne Fogarty and Timothy Martin (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 23.

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13 Thwaites does not consider the effect of his own criticism in speeding up the process of reading and rereading; see Thwaites, *Joycean Temporalities*, 53–54.
14 Maud Ellmann, "Ulysses: The Epic of the Human Body", 63.
15 Richard Ellmann, *Ulysses on the Liffey* (London: Faber, 1972), 98.
16 Jacques Derrida, "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes In Joyce", in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1991), 286.
17 This position is taken by Robert Spoo, *James Joyce and the Language of History: Dedalus's Nightmare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 108. It follows a particular reading of the *Portrait* which takes Stephen's intellectual development literally, that is, the aesthetic ideas he takes up reflect his beliefs.
18 For an account of Romanic linguistics and classical materialism, see Hugh Roberts, *Shelley and the Chaos of History: A New Politics of Poetry* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Whilst in the NLI Stephen invokes Shelley's *A Defense of Poetry* to comment upon the temporality of the imaginative act, 'In the intense instant of imagination, when the mind, Shelley says, is a fading coal, that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be' (*U*, 3.381–383; *UP*, 249). Stephen's interest in Shelley had been established in the *Portrait*; he tells Lynch of 'that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading coal', James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (London: Penguin, 1992), 231.
19 'Proteus' closes with Stephen describing how his 'water flowed full, covering greengoldenly lagoons of sand, rising, flowing' (*U*, 3.453; *UP*, 62). Perhaps by urinating in the sea Stephen makes an explicit 'contribution' to the history he observes. Not such a wild hypothesis; contributing to literary history through one's urine is something alluded to later in the novel when Stephen learns that Synge has accused him of urinating on his doorstep. Stephen replies: 'Me! […] That was your contribution to literature' (*U*, 9.572; *UP*, 256).
20 Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 36.
21 Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 44.
22 A writerliness akin to the 'open' text that Roland Barthes describes in *S/Z*. See Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), 4.
23 Jean-Michel Rabaté, *James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 207.
24 Jean-Michel Rabaté, *James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism*, 207.
25 Wyndham Lewis, "Wyndham Lewis on Time in Joyce", in *James Joyce: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Robert H. Deming, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1970), 359.
26 Wyndham Lewis, "Wyndham Lewis on Time in Joyce", 360.
27 James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (London: Penguin, 1992), 19. Hereafter cited as *FW* in the text.
28 Sam Slote, *Ulysses in the Pural: The Variable Editions of Joyce's Novel* (Dublin: The National Library of Ireland, 2004), 1.

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29 George Bornstein, quoted in Michael Groden, "Genetic Joyce: Textual Studies and the Reader", in *James Joyce Studies*, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 238.

30 Finn Fordham, *I do I undo I redo*: *The Textual Genesis of Modernist Selves in Hopkins, Yeats, Conrad, Forster, Joyce, and Woolf* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 214.

31 Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 101–120. Foucault gives some important parameters for thinking through questions of literary value and the way in which contemporary authorship incorporates drafts and sketches within an author's corpus. Foucault has little to say on how the author-function alters according to a writer's compositional methods, for example, Joyce's method of composition-in-revision, and his habit of hoarding his notebook drafts, produced an unusually diverse quantity of manuscript material. As Sam Slote has argued, 'Joyce's fundamental process of writing was accretion and he seemed constitutionally incapable of leaving a document unsullied by further modifications and additions'. Slote, Ulysses *in the Pural*, 4.

32 Twenty-five years after the publication of his edition, Gabler continues to refer to himself as 'the enemy of the Joyce Estate', Hans Walter Gabler, "The Critical and Synoptic *Ulysses*: an Edition of its Age and for our Time" (Paper presented at Ulysses: 25 Years Critical and Synoptic Edition of *Ulysses*, Senate House, London, 6 November 2009).

33 See Stuart Gilbert, *James Joyce's Ulysses: A Study* (1930; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969). The efficiency of such a system was something Joyce himself doubted, admitting to Samuel Beckett that he 'may have oversystematised *Ulysses*'. See Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce: New and Revised Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 702.

34 T. S. Eliot, "T. S. Eliot on *Ulysses* and Myth", in *James Joyce: The Critical Heritage*, 270.

35 Ruben Borg, *The Measureless Time of Joyce, Deleuze and Derrida* (London: Continuum, 2007), 82–83. Italics are mine.

36 Tzvetan Todorov, *The Poetics of Prose* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 53. For more on the narrative complexity of Homer's *Odyssey* see Laura M. Slatkin, "Composition by Theme and the *Mêtis* of the Odyssey", in *Reading the Odyssey: Selected Interpretive Essays*, ed. Seth L. Schein (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 223–237.

37 James Joyce, *The Joyce Papers 2002*. National Library of Ireland, Dublin. MS 36,639. II.ii.1: 1.

38 James Joyce, Buffalo V.A.3: 11, cited in Sam Slote, "Epiphanic 'Proteus'", *Genetic Joyce Studies* 5 (2005), accessed 6 July 2009, http://www.geneticjoycestudies.org/GJS5/GJS5lote.htm.

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39 Sam Slote, 'Epiphanic "Proteus"'.
40 See Derek Attridge, *Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory, and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 93–98.
41 Walter W. Skeat, *An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, s.v. 'silt'.
42 Louis Hay, "Genetic Criticism", in *Genetic Criticism: Texts and Avant-Textes*, ed. Jed Deppman, Daniel Ferrer and Michael Groden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 22.
43 Pierre-Marc de Biasi, "Toward a Science of Literature: Manuscript Analysis", in *Genetic Criticism*, 39, 41.
44 Finn Fordham, *I do I undo I redo*, 23.
45 Quoted in Helen Gardner, *The Composition of Four Quartets* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), v.
46 We can add to these the countless other instances elsewhere in the novel where signs and texts are misread, illegible, misunderstood. During the same 'Nausicaa' passage Bloom finds a piece of paper: 'Mr Bloom stooped and turned over a piece of paper on the strand. He brought it near his eyes and peered. Letter? No. Can't read. Better go. Better. I'm tired to move. Page of an old copybook' (*U*, 13.1246–1248; *UP*, 497).
47 Quoted in Luca Crispi, Sam Slote and Dirk van Hulle, "Introduction", in *How Joyce Wrote 'Finnegans Wake': A Chapter-by-Chapter Genetic Guide*, ed. Luca Crispi, Sam Slote (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 32. Harriet Shaw Weaver performed this task from 1923 until 1939, and her role as archivist and curator accelerated in 1948 when many of Joyce's manuscripts were donated to the British Library.
48 Roland Barthes, *The Preparation of the Novel: Lecture Courses and Seminars at the College de France (1978–1979 and 1979–1980)*, trans. Kate Briggs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 190.
49 Barthes, *The Preparation of the Novel*, 191.

Chapter 6

1 See Michael S. Roth, Claire Lyons and Charles Merewether, ed., *Irresistible Decay: Ruins Reclaimed* (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 1997); Robert Ginsberg, *The Aesthetics of Ruins* (New York: Rodopi, 2004); Tim Edensor, *Industrial Ruins: Space, Aesthetics and Materiality* (Oxford: Berg, 2005); Dylan Trigg, *The Aesthetics of Decay: Nothingness, Nostalgia, and the Absence of Reason* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007); Nicholas Yablon, *Untimely Ruins: An Archaeology of Urban Modernity, 1819–1919* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Julia Hell and Andreas Schönle, ed., *Ruins of Modernity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010);

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Owen Hatherley, *A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain* (London: Verso, 2010); Brian Dillon, ed., *Ruins* (London and Cambridge, MA: Whitechapel Gallery and MIT, 2011).

2 Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998), 177–178.

3 Christopher Woodward, *In Ruins* (London: Chatto & Windus, 2001), 15.

4 Robert Ginsberg, *The Aesthetics of Ruins*, 34.

5 Steven Emmit and Christopher A. Gorse, *Barry's Introduction to Construction of Buildings*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 1.

6 Jacques Derrida, "Point de Folie—Maintenant l'architecture", in *Architecture Theory Since 1968*, ed. K. Michael Hays (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2000), 573. Italics in original.

7 John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1958), 374.

8 See Stewart Brand, *How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They're Built* (New York: Viking, 1994).

9 Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 143.

10 Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 157, 147. Italics in original.

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44 William Gilpin, *Three Essays: On Picturesque Beauty; on Picturesque Travel; and on Sketching Landscape*, &c. (1794; London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1808), 46. My italics.
45 Joseph Heely, *Letters on the Beauties of Hagley, Envil and the Leasowes. With Critical Remarks and Observations on the Modern Taste in Gardening*, 2 vols. (London: R. Baldwin, 1777), 1:172–173.
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49 Andreas Huyssen, "Authentic Ruins: Products of Modernity", in *Ruins of Modernity*, ed. Julia Hell and Andreas Schönle, 18, 20.
50 Huyssen also suggests that the renovation of disused industrial ruins, such as the transformation of Bankside Power Station into the Tate Modern in London, also exemplifies the 'inauthentic' era of the ruin. Here, it seems, it is not ideas of authenticity or inauthenticity that are at stake but whether 'ruins' are allowed to exist 'free' of human interference. In any case, the renovation or preservation of ruins is certainly not a modern phenomenon, as Huyssen seems to suggest.
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52 Sophie Thomas, "Assembling History: Fragments and Ruins", *European Romantic Review* 14 (2003): 181.
53 William Ockenden, *Observations on Modern Gardening, Illustrated by Descriptions* (Dublin: John Exchaw, 1770), 138.
54 William Ockenden, *Observations on Modern Gardening*, 138
55 William Ockenden, *Observations on Modern Gardening*, 138–139.
56 Friedrich Schlegel, quoted in Marjorie Levinson, *The Romantic Fragment Poem: A Critique of a Form* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 10.
57 Diana Ketcham, *Le Désert de Retz: A Late Eighteenth-Century French Folly Garden: The Artful Landscape of Monsieur de Monville* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 1.
58 Quoted in John D. Bandiera, "Form and Meaning in Hubert Robert's Ruin Caprices: Four Paintings of Fictive Ruins for the Château de Méréville", *Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies* 15 (1989): 83.
59 Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, 25.

Chapter 7

1 Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative*, 1:67–68.
2 *The Planet of the Apes*, DVD, dir. Franklin J. Schaffner (1968; Los Angeles: Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, 2001).
3 See Paula Rea Radisch, *Hubert Robert: Painted Spaces of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 129–133.
4 Daniel Brewer, *The Enlightenment Past: Reconstructing Eighteenth-Century French Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 192.
5 Brian Lukacher, *Joseph Gandy: An Architectural Visionary in Georgian England* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2006), 162.
6 Brian Lukacher, *Joseph Gandy*, 163.
7 Christopher Woodward notes the correspondence between Gandy's images and the demolition of the bank in 1925. See *In Ruins*, 163.

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9 Serres, *Rome*, 42.
10 For further commentary on the visual techniques employed in Robert's painting, see Daniel Brewer, *The Enlightenment Past*, 189.
11 Serres, *Rome*, 45.
12 Frank Kermode, *The Sense of Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 8.
13 Frank Kermode, *The Sense of Ending*, 18.
14 Hence, Marx argued that waste was antithetical to the progress found immanent to the capitalist mode of production. See Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes, 3 vols. (London: Penguin, 1990), 1:303.
15 See Teodor Shanin, "The Idea of Progress", in *The Post-Development Reader*, ed. Majid Rahmena and Victoria Bawtree (London: Zed, 1997), 65–71; *Progress and Its Discontents*, ed. Gabriel A. Almond, Marvin Chodorow and Roy Harvey Pearce (Berkeley: California University Press, 1985).
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17 Gordillo, "Bringing a Place in Ruins Back to Life", 335.
18 Percy Bysshe Shelley, "Ozymandias", in *The Poems of Shelley Volume 2: 1817–19*, ed. Kelvin Everest and Geoffrey Matthews (Harlow: Pearson, 2000), 2:310–311.
19 I have borrowed the phrase 'Ozymandias Complex' from Christopher Woodward's *In Ruins*, 178–204. It is unclear what Woodward means by the phrase (it serves as a chapter heading) and, whilst he is concerned by the complex relationship between empire and the ruin, he does not explore this complexity as a temporal symptom or definition of waste.
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21 David West, ed., *Horace* Odes *III: Dulce Periculum* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 259.
22 Everest, "'Ozymandias': The Text in Time", 32–33.
23 Steven Connor, *The English Novel in History: 1950–1995* (London: Routledge, 1996), 206.
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25 H. G. Wells, *The Fate of Man: An Unemotional Statement of the Things that are Happening to Him Now, And of the Immediate Possibilities Confronting Him* (London: Longmans, 1939), 247; see also, Patrick Parrinder, *Shadows of the Future: H. G. Wells, Science Fiction, and Prophecy* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), 65–79.
26 George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949; London: Penguin, 1987), 5.

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29 Katherine Washburn, "A Book At the End of the World", 169.
30 Joseph Bounden, *The Deserted City; Eva, A Tale in Two Cantos; and Other Poems* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1824), 2.
31 Alois Riegl, "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin", trans. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo, *Oppositions* 25 (1982): 34.
32 Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (1970; London: Cardinal, 1975), 96. Hereafter cited as *ITR* in the text.
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35 Owen Hatherley, *Militant Modernism* (Winchester: 0 Books, 2009), 5.
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37 Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow*, 94.
38 Le Corbusier, *The City of To-morrow*, 38, 24.
39 As Nikolaus Pevsner observed, "Concrete structures, with walls designed to be rendered white, make bad ruins", cited in Mark Sanderson, "Derelict Utopias", *Cabinet* 20 (2005/2006): 83.
40 J. G. Ballard, *High-Rise* (1975; London: Flamingo, 2000), 5.
41 The building's swimming pool, for instance, takes on the appearance of a charnel-house: "covered with the skulls, bones and dismembered limbs of dozens of corpses", *High-Rise*, 170.
42 J. G. Ballard, *High Rise*, 147.
43 J. G. Ballard, "The Ultimate City", in *Complete Short Stories* (London: Flamingo, 2001), 879.
44 J. G. Ballard, "The Ultimate City", 915
45 Horace Smith, *Amarynthus: A Pastoral Drama, in Three Acts. With Other Poems* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1821), 231.
46 For further comparisons between Shelley and Horace Smith, see Eugene M. Waith, "Ozymandias: Shelley, Horace Smith, and Denon", *Keats-Shelley Journal* 44 (1995): 22–28; M. K. Bequette, "Shelley and Smith: Two Sonnets on Ozymandias", *Keats-Shelley Journal* 26 (1977): 29–31.
47 See W. G. Sebald, *The Rings of Saturn*, trans. Michael Hulse (London: Penguin, 1999); Robert Smithson, "A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey", in *Complete Writings of Robert Smithson*, ed. Jack Flam (Berkeley: California University Press, 1996), 68–74.

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48 See David Skilton, "Contemplating the Ruins of London: Macaulay's New Zealander and Others", *Literary London: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Representation of London* 2, no. 1 (2004), accessed 15 July 2010, http://www.literarylondon.org/london-journal/march2004/skilton.html; "Tourists at the Ruins of London: The Metropolis and the Struggle for Empire", *Cercles* 17 (2007): 93–119. Skilton claims that the figure of the New Zealander "become[s] shorthand for the "coming man," and designate[s] the entire phenomenon of the anticipated ruin of the city and empire", *Cercles* 17, 118.

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51 See Michael Bright, "Macaulay's New Zealander", *The Arnoldian: a Review of Mid-Victorian Culture* 10 (1982): 8–27; and Robert Dingley, "The Ruins of the Future: Macaulay's New Zealander and the Spirit of the Age", in *Histories of the Future. Studies in Fact, Fantasy and Science Fiction*, ed. Alan Sandison and Robert Dingley (London: Palgrave, 2000), 15–33.

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53 Anne Janowitz, *England's Ruins: Poetic Purpose and National Landscape* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 20.

54 Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History", in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (1970; London: Pimlico, 1999), 249. My italics.

55 Montgomery Schuyler, "The Bridge as a Monument", *Harper's Weekly* 27, 26 May 1883, 326.

56 Richard Jefferies, *After London; or, Wild England* (London: Cassell, 1885), 68. Hereafter cited *AL* in the text.

57 Georg Simmel, "The Ruin", 265.

58 Carolyn Steedman, *Dust* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 164.

59 On the "quasichoate" and "omnivalent" properties of dust, see Steven Connor, "Pulverulence", *Cabinet* 35 (2009): 71–76.

60 Carolyn Steedman, *Dust*, 166.

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3 Edensor, 98.

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